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Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Syria: Assessing the Role of INGOs

Posted by / 28th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: , , , / -

The Syrian situation

The major human rights violations in Syria have created a wave of concern within the community of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and particularly among those INGOs that work on issues relating to human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation. This article aims at underlining the importance for INGOs to take into account the “lessons learned” from past (post) conflict situations. Indeed, over the last two years, many INGOs have developed programmes on peace building and transitional justice in Syria, but today many questions arise regarding the effectiveness and efficiency thereof. Do the INGOs take into account the particular needs of the Syrian civil society? Is there any coordination between the stakeholders present on the field? Are they willing to support initiatives that already exist on the ground? And, last but not least, do they develop mechanisms to empower the civil society in Syria?

While some INGOS establish programmes within a well-developed strategy, others just follow the “trend” to develop programmes on peace building and transitional justice without a clear objective and/or strategy. Three years after the beginning of the conflict, it is time to look at the way INGO’s are involved in the Syrian situation regarding peace building and transitional justice.

Peacebuilding, transitional justice and INGO’s

Past and recent experiences have demonstrated the challenges of post-conflict transitions. Peace building and transitional justice were firmly developed in the 1990’s, following conflicts such as the ones in ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda or South Africa. Today, both peacebuilding and transitional justice are considered essential tools in post-conflicts situations.

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that encompasses programmes designed to consolidate sustainable peace, prevent disputes from escalating, and avoid a relapse into violent conflict. Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that are implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses.

INGOs are often, if not always, involved in these processes of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It is important to underline the core principles regarding peacebuilding and transitional justice that INGOs must take into account when operating in situations such as the one in Syria. INGO’s have often been criticised for the way they handle crisis situations, and those working in Syria and beyond should learn from criticisms the sector faced in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan.

Empowerment, coordination and long term strategy

INGOs have a role to play in conflicts situations: their expertise in reconciliation, peace building and transitional justice can be meaningful to civil society. However, they cannot work in isolation. Instead, they need to work together and be interdependent with local actors. If INGOs can, and must, take initiatives the development of joint programmes based on grass root initiatives needs to be the preferred approach since it has already shown successes in various countries such as Libya and Tunisia.

If possible, peacebuilding and transitional justice priorities must be determined locally. On the one hand, local actors usually have a better knowledge of the situation and, on the other, it is more likely that peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives will succeed if citizens and groups are involved in defining the problems and articulating the solutions. This local based approach leads to empowering the civil society. If local initiatives are the basis of programmes developed by INGO’s, it become more natural for internal actors to be the drivers, or owners, of their own national peacebuilding frameworks and transitional justice mechanisms. Developing the capacity of, and giving ownership to, the local government and civil society should thus be the main methodology of all INGO programmes.

Furthermore, the need for enhanced coordination between external actors (such as donor governments, United Nations Country Teams, INGOs) on the one hand- and internal actors (such as governments, local administrations and civil society) on the other, is essential. Without enhanced and deepened levels of coordination, peacebuilding and transitional activities will overlap, duplicate, and potentially have limited impact on the conflict systems they try to stop.

Over the last few years, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of peace building, the international community has understood that there was a need for guidelines and particularly regarding coordination of all stakeholders. In 2005, the Peacebuilding commission was established by resolution 60/180 of the United Nations Security Council, and resolution 1645 of the United Nations General Assembly. The Peacebuilding Commission is an inter-governmental advisory body that helps countries in peace building, recovery, reconstruction and development. It has defined a “peacebuilding architecture”, composed of roadmaps on action that should be taken in order to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding. The Commission insisted on the necessity of a local based approach.

Finally, in order to have a real impact on the situation, it is necessary not only to involve local actors and to have a good coordination between all actors but also to develop long term programmes of actions with them. Indeed, it is essential to share knowledge and expertise between local and international actors but this must be done within a framework which allows long-term benefits for local civil society.

In Syria, it seems that while some INGOs understand the necessity of working with local actors, others have forgotten the overall goal of developing programmes on peace building and transitional justice. INGOs working there should keep in mind that their aim is to strengthen Syrian civil society capacities and outcomes, and not their own.

This article is part of the Polis Project, a ReSeT programme focused on connecting local needs to global resources.

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Money for Nothing: What the Development Sector Could Learn from Cash-Transfer Programmes

Posted by / 20th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: , , / -

Earlier this year Balder Hageraats published an article titled “International Development: Please drop the Charity Act”, criticizing the schizophrenic relationship between donors, NGO´s, and local beneficiaries of development help, and arguing for a more efficient development sector in which needs on the ground take centre-stage. If the sector were to follow such an approach, it could learn a lot from the global South, where various government programmes transfer money directly to the poor, no strings attached. They have led the way in showing that poor individuals already KNOW how to escape poverty: they simply lack the cash.

In Kenya, Having worked as a day labourer for years on end, mr. Omondi one day woke up to receive an sms-text saying he had been given $500 US, no strings attached! He had been one of the recipients selected in a programme where poor families in poor rural villages were given free cash-transfers to help them out of poverty. No conditions, no pay-backs, just free money. Local villagers suspected that the government was somehow behind it, trying to buy votes. People in the development industry were mostly afraid that recipients wouldn’t be able to handle the money wisely, spending it on alcohol and cigarettes. However, none of this happened. Many people in the programme used the money to replace their thatched roofs with metal roofs, which costs a few hundred dollars, but saves money in the long term. The results? People also invested in livestock and small businesses, showing a 48% increase in revenues from animal husbandry, for example. Mr. Omondi bought a motor-cycle to drive people from town to town, making $6 to $9 a day, more than doubling his daily salary, and enabling him to buy a second bike to expand his business.

Most cash-transfers programmes are not one-time lottery tickets however. More and more developing countries, most notably Brazil, Mexico, South-Africa, but also Indonesia, Namibia, Bolivia, Armenia and many others, are setting up long-term programmes that target a substantial but selected portion of the population and gives them a monthly cash transfer between 3$ and 100$ a month. Cash-transfer programmes differ greatly from each other, but are similar in the sense that (1) they benefit a selected group of poor families, (2) that the transfers are monthly and on a long-term basis, and (3) that there are no or few conditions as to how the money is spent. The basic results: It pushes the poorest families out of absolute poverty; it leads to more capital investments, local economic growth, better health, more children going to school, and lower birth rates; all without outside interference. For example, children that benefit from the Oportunidades programme in Mexico (which gives an average of 38$ a month to poor households) are 23% more likely to finish grade 9 than those outside of the programme. The same programme also meant that people eat 8% more calories and a more balanced diet of fruit, vegetables, and meat, leading to fewer illnesses among children and fewer sick-days for adults. In Brazil, the Bolsa Familia (family grant) and Bolsa Escola (school grant) programmes helped in bringing down poverty from 28% in 2001 to 17% in 2008.

Why cash-transfer programmes make sense and are affordable

Just as in developed western societies, various countries in the global South have recognized that everyone in society deserves a minimum amount of economic security. The cash-transfers are a right, not charity. Obviously, the transfers are only for selected groups of people in need, and they don´t serve as a substitute for salary through labour. Depending on the country and the programme, the transfers vary between USD $3 and USD $100 per month per individual or per family.

There are two important counter arguments to the idea behind cash-transfers in developing countries. One, can states afford such kinds of projects? And two, doesn´t handing out free money kill initiative and entrepreneurship, making people lazy and dependent? The answer is that pessimistic expectations with regard to the latter lead people to over-estimate the importance of the former. In other words; cash-transfers lead to local economic growth in the longer term, helping people out of the poverty trap and making the cash-transfer programmes not just relatively cheap, but actually profitable.

Let´s start with the argument that “charity” takes away initiative and entrepreneurship, a theory that micro-credit guru Muhammad Yunus has been fond of pointing out. Cash-transfer programmes in Mexico, South Africa, and Brazil have however shown that the money transferred to poor families is almost never spoilt. Admittedly, the money is not always invested, but rather spent on keeping children in school, or buying more nutritious food. This might not harvest direct financial profits, but certainly helps in long term development; Children in the Mexican Oportunidades programme, for example, are more likely to finish 9th grade, are healthier, and score higher grades. But cash-transfer programmes, just like micro-credits, can also have a multiplier effect for local businesses, because the extra cash allows people to invest in tools or skills and setting up a small enterprise. Poor people tend to invest and consume locally, creating a double benefit for the local economy. Also, cash-transfers don´t necessarily replace micro-credits. As a matter of fact, they can serve to make micro-credits safer and more attractive. Indeed, studies have shown that beneficiaries of cash-transfer programmes are more receptive to taking financial risks.

The fact that cash-transfer programmes are cost-effective in the long term takes away a big obstacle for governments as to who is going to pay. There are however other comprehensible concerns. Firstly, cash-transfer programmes are not a silver bullet to solving poverty; they can help people out of absolute poverty and intergenerational poverty, and they contribute to strengthening local economies and promoting social mobility, but only few make it to middle class. Also, the bigger the amount of cash per family, the less families you can select, and vice versa. In order to be able to afford a substantial programme, a government needs a solid tax-base or windfalls from resource-exports.

Why the development sector should jump on the bandwagon

But the money could also come directly from the international development sector. If governments in the global South can demonstrate that there is no need for paternalistic nudges, conditionality, or moral guidance, why couldn´t the development sector follow suit? There are many reasons to suggest that it should.

Firstly, cash-transfer programmes simply have a pretty convincing track-record when it comes to helping people out of poverty. In other words, it simply works. Cash-transfers are right-based rather than charity based, they are pragmatic in the sense that by nature they empower beneficiaries, and they are cheaper because each invested dollar has the potential of turning into two dollars. Many countries that currently benefit from ´traditional´ forms of cooperation could hugely benefit from switching to a more direct approach.

The development sector could jump on the bandwagon in two ways. The simplest way is by pitching in directly where governments lack public money to pay for cash-transfer programmes. But the development sector has an at least equally important role to play when it comes to actively stimulating development through the provision training, research, expertise and other services. ONLY giving money helps people in climbing out of the poverty trap, but they do still need a hand to pull themselves up. The development sector has all the necessary qualities to be this hand stretching out. Sadly, the hand that the development sector is currently stretching out is that of NGOs stretching their hands upwards to donors.

If the development sector were to learn from the logic behind cash-transfer programmes, they would fund locally identified needs directly. Donors could allow funds to flow more easily and directly to local communities (through local connectors), empowering those on the ground and connecting local needs to global resources.

This article is part of the Polis Project, a ReSeT programme focused on connecting local needs to global resources.

 

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Environmental Disconnect Between Global and Local Actors: The Case of REDD+ and Embobut Forest

Posted by / 14th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: , , , , / -

The global environmental initiative for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is unrealistic in its ambitions and image: various actors, including local populations, are divided on how this mechanism impacts their livelihoods and its utility towards global climate challenges. A case in point is the situation in Kenya. In that country, there are two clearly opposite perspectives with respect to the REDD+ project at Embobut Forest, and there is major disagreement with respect to dangers and opportunities. In order for REDD+ and similar initiatives to be truly effective, global institutions, governments and local populations must attain an agreement on the way in which they are implemented. Without active local support and stakeholdership, such mechanisms are doomed to fail.

REDD+ is a mitigation mechanism still being designed, and one that forms part of international climate change dialogue. Its principal aim is to reduce climate change by protecting global forests- the main planet’s CO2 stores and sinks- from deforestation and degradation. With 25% of total CO2 absorption occurring through forests, and around 15% of carbon dioxide emissions coming from changes in land use, there is widespread consensus that that global rainforests should be protected as a path towards climate change reduction. By maintaining absorption rates and reducing an important source of CO2, global emissions will increase more slowly, which will significantly contribute to anti-climate change efforts. As a form of encouragement, countries with rainforests that reduce their emission levels (coming from these forests) relative to a calculated reference, will receive financial compensation. As countries having rainforests within their borders tend to be impoverished countries, this mechanism is also seen as an opportunity towards poverty alleviation. With these goals in mind, the driving forces for REDD+ mechanisms are the introduction of governance reforms and institutional support, a monitoring system and the design of safeguard frameworks for possibly damaged injured sectors.

Lack of understanding

Many REDD+ initiatives all over the world face strong disagreements. One such case is Kenya’s Embobut Forest. The project was designed by the Kenyan government and World Bank, and has led to a series of displacements of Sengwer People, the indigenous people occupying the area and who have traditional land rights. These displacements are seen as illegitimate evictions by this indigenous group and their supporters, and as a necessary and well-justified step in the path for conservation and global climate initiatives by the Kenyan government. Another prominent line of confrontation is the usefulness of REDD+ as an actual way to protect forests and fight climate change. Kenya’s government has been accused of using indigenous forest lands for agricultural and profit-making purposes, which would of course be in contradiction with the REDD+ purpose and official public stance.

The principal reason behind deforestation in Kenya is forest conversion into agriculture. Forest degradation also occurs through unsustainable utilization, illegal logging, uncontrolled grazing and charcoal production. Thus, Kenya’s government identified the REDD+ project as a useful mechanism to protect Embobut Forest. This programme includes the identification of grazing systems and the implementation of a methodology for monitoring community engagement in forest management. Within this last strategy, a series of workshops were organized for local communities to educate them on carbon financing from a government perspective. In addition to improving forest protection, these actions are presented as a way to transmit management responsibilities to local communities, which would empower them and improve their livelihoods by “increasing the benefits of forests”. REDD+ mechanisms would therefore strengthen the fight against climate change through better governance of forestry lands.

The Kenyan government and other promoters of REDD+ mechanisms signal poverty and population growth as two of the main threats to national forests. With population growth and lack of access to biomass energy substitutes, there exists major friction in rural zones. Poverty makes people more dependent on natural resources, as they turn to them in order to cover their basic needs and extract economic income. This leads to more pressure on Kenyan forests. In addition, Embobut’s forest population has increased as a result of landslides and people fleeing cities after Kenya’s 2007-2008 electoral disturbances. These Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), just like the Sengwer, are seen as squatters, and a series of evictions were carried out to safeguard urban water supplies and to protect the forest.

In opposition to REDD+ projects, indigenous people and various national and international NGOs claim that this project is serving to illegally eject traditional occupants from their lands in the name of a fake climate change fight and with the real aim of financial profit. A major complaint is the government’s support in the eviction of the Sengwer, signaling cases of individuals being targeted and persecuted, as well as the burning down of their houses. From March 2013 until January 2014, Eldoret High Court emitted various rulings forbidding and condemning these actions. On the other hand, REDD+ opponents claim that Embobut project will actually promote deforestation. They accuse the Kenya Forest Service of having transformed indigenous forest into profit-making plantations and agriculture lands in the past, something which they fear will be repeated in Sengwer lands under the guise of REDD+ projects. They argue that the way in which REDD+ is being implemented does not only fail to contribute to the fight against climate change, it also leads to social injustices.

Addressing confrontation

Why indigenous people and some NGOs and ecologist groups in Kenya position themselves against REDD+ mechanism might be a mystery to its supporters, as they are meant to be the first beneficiaries or partisan of climate change and poverty fighting efforts. Clearer and more focused dialogue is needed to clarify different concerns and perspectives and find common ground. Agreeing that mechanisms have to be implemented to fight both poverty and climate change, stakeholders must first determine if such dynamics are really properly designed towards achieving the desired results.

One confrontation line- and thus need for dialogue- is the management of forestry resources and the potential displacement of people. While indigenous groups allege being unlawfully evicted, and governments and intergovernmental institutions arguing that this is necessary to attain better governance, poverty threatens affected areas. Nonetheless, government institutions also claim that REDD+ mechanisms will lead to communal management and livelihood improvements. It is crucial to clarify how the eviction of indigenous populations will serve to empower local communities and strengthen their position in forests management. And although energy generation and consumption is rather inefficient among the poorer sectors of affected populations, the lack of industrial behaviour and the small scale of such activities are insignificant to other sources of CO2 emissions, certainly when compared in absolute terms. Moreover, in order for the solutions to environmental problems to be supported by crucially important local actors, they should avoid social upheaval and disproportionate sacrifice. Truly effective measures require traditional occupants to remain actively involved and not be forced to leave their lands.

The utility of Embobut REDD+ project to environmental objectives also require further analysis. The problems witnessed in Kenya have also been signaled in other parts of the globe in which REDD+ projects are being developed. Kenya’s government and international agencies empathetically deny this accusation of generalized problems, but at the very least a clearer framework must be designed and monitoring mechanisms must be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary destruction in Embobut Forest and elsewhere.

The search for understanding

What is clear is that there is no unanimous support for REDD+. While large institutions and a vast majority of governments present it as a promising way to fight climate change and poverty in Kenya, wide sectors of civil society stand up against it and claim that it will have disastrous consequences in people’s lives and their environment. Evictions of indigenous groups undermine the fight against climate change, and better solutions must be found to IDI’s situation. Clearer forest management plans are required to guarantee consistency both with REDD+ overall objectives as well as with those of local stakeholders.

Climate change and poverty alleviation are two of the most important challenges facing the global community, and it is a point of serious concern why positions between people directly affected by these challenges and the mechanisms designed to face them seem so far apart. For REDD+ to work, governments and international institutions have to translate global ambitions into effective local application, and this requires much greater dialogue with local populations. Without this, indigenous peoples and other local communities will stand at the edge of these dynamics, eventually suffering the negative consequences as well as undermining the objectives of the project. It is still to be seen whether REDD+ can eventually become a useful mechanism towards climate change mitigation and poverty alleviation, as Kenya’s government and international institutions claim. Only the future will tell. Then again, when dealing with climate change, the future is not an option.  facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

U.S. Self-Perception and Foreign Policy

Posted by / 5th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: , , , , / -

If one thing were ever true about America’s own interpretation of its foreign policy and role in the global arena, it is that it is unapologetic. The American public’s worldview is shaped and informed by selective historical memory that is perpetuated in classrooms nationwide. Such memorializing of particular events fuels an almost messianic national psyche, which provides a basis of popular support for often self-defeating foreign policy initiatives. The disastrous campaign to defend U.S. interests in Afghanistan and ensuing damage caused by drone strikes throughout the Middle East are two prominent illustrations of such failures. This in turn, calls for the diversification of competing historical narratives in America’s public education in order to prevent its population from holding a limited understanding of the past and allowing unreasonable ideology to propel overseas ventures. A more comprehensive understanding of past events may not change the outcome of certain policy measures per se, but it will at minimum provide a more receptive space for debate and thus allow for a diverse range of opinions to weigh in on detrimental policy proposals.

The American National Psyche

Whether it results in a well rounded or even restricted understanding of the past, history is continuously filtered for contemporary interpretation for which may be called selective historical memory. It is the strategic remembering and convenient forgetting of prior events that make societies contextualize the past as if it were a present reality. By strategically selecting interpretations, there are many truths to a single event but never a single truth, therefore designating it the creation of a common history. In the case of nation states like America, it is capturing the trials and tribulations of past events that most vividly contextualize the meaning behind possessing U.S. citizenship. Consequently, the selectivity of events in U.S. history have created a mentality that often fails to take many diverse and often competing narratives into account, which impact the creation of and support for self-defeating policy initiatives abroad.

So what is the collective mindset that every patriotic citizen tends to feed off of in support for U.S. foreign policy measures? It is a mentality enshrined in the concept of ‘rally around the flag’. Americans are vulnerable to the call for action in the form of serving the ideas of liberty and freedom, as they are mistakenly told that these concepts hardly exist anywhere else as much as they do within their borders. Historical events that have been convoluted into self-serving nationally recognized and absolute truths fuel this mentality. And so it is through skewed perceptions of U.S. efforts to end the Second World War, its self-congratulatory response to the civil rights movement, erroneous impressions of spearheading woman suffrage, tolerance of dissent over the Vietnam War, and after traumatizing events like 9-11, they see themselves as the ultimate embodiment of democracy, free speech, capitalism, and equality. Therefore, even through their faults they celebrate themselves for being well-rounded and lenient, understanding and charged with a moral imperative to disperse these ideals throughout the world. In this same sense, they personify the biblical injunction to become a ‘city upon a hill’ as called for in Matthew 5:14 and echoed in the words famously used by John F. Kennedy and then later by Ronald Reagan to depict the enormous trust and responsibility placed upon Americans. In being founded by diverse immigrant populations looking for a better future, U.S. citizens best capture the historical image of well-seasoned veterans that have fought, struggled, and found unification amid differences that cannot be located elsewhere, and that supposedly serves as an example for humankind to follow.

These ideals are reinforced in the tolerance of ethnic diversity, religious freedom, strong racial and gender equality standards, and the ongoing desire of so many foreigners that attempt to cross over its borders. Thus, people who have filtered through the education system are parented by the baby boomers and the “American dream(ers),” who see their country as a land of opportunities, where an endless work ethic knows no bounds in the quest for material success and having the mere chance to live free from fear and persecution because you may be different. To this extent, Americans advertise themselves and their resolute frontier as a safe haven. Though undoubtedly well intentioned and honorable in its original quest, these American ideals are often vocalized through a preference for positive historical narratives. The resultant American national psyche has a tendency to overstep the boundary from national pride to idiosyncratic provincialism, exemplifying the hazard in not having competing narratives that better educate the popular public support for foreign policy initiatives.

A downward spiral

With such enamored manifestos being present in most countries, the problem with the American psyche then becomes its tendency to give a false impression of its own importance, dangerously straddling the line between national political self-interest and a moral imperative. We have all heard the “U-S-A” chants and witnessed the on-and-off again preoccupation America has with overseas conflicts, as it curiously self-appoints itself as the globe’s psychiatrist. This Wilsonian diagnosis is not new. What has become a recent trend is how this memorialized psyche has transformed into a militaristic platform for oxymoronic foreign policies that are overly aggressive.

The repercussions stemming from U.S. involvement in Afghanistan are substantial and can be directly tied to the selective historical memory and lack of competing classroom narratives. There is little doubt that the attacks of September 11th, 2001 unsettled every American. And for good reason. The traumatic image of the collapsing twin towers, a lack of information surrounding the emerging Taliban terrorist faction, and a controversial national debate over the urgent need for a proper response presented the American psyche with its first millennial challenge to personify its originally good virtues and properly rehabilitate transgressing neighbors. Yet, what matters is not whether the actions of the U.S. were justified by moral discernment, but rather how this populist mentality harmed its national interests in nation building and seeking security. By targeting the Taliban and its allies, America declared war on a terrorist faction and not even a sovereign state. What’s more, the U.S. neglected the ongoing civil war taking place within Afghanistan, amongst other colossal challenges. But when God is on your side, every adversary can only be the devil. Therefore, a failure to eradicate the region of their Taliban and later Al-Qaeda adversaries, the subsequent substantial loss of military personnel, the generation of anti-Western sentiment in streets across the globe and among foreign elites, and the trillions of tax dollars that went down the drain made the decision to go to war a self-defeating policy – one that could have been more properly calculated had the American historical narrative been more objective in its approach. It is erroneous to claim that the U.S. public would have altogether abstained from the blunders that followed in Afghanistan had they not had such an engrained national psyche, but at least the breadth of opinions leading up to the war would have varied.

The destructiveness that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq reinforced the assumption that the U.S. was peddling global hegemony, but overlooked the subsequent asymmetrical warfare tactics (i.e. the Predator and Reaper drone attacks) as America’s way of projecting its selective historical memory onto the international scene. President Obama’s rhetoric surrounding the 2013 drone attacks in Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, underscored the fact that these “signature strikes” were targeting adversaries not necessarily for what they had already done, but because they displayed key patterns of terrorist behavior. This sounds an awful lot like the reflection of the American psyche that endorses the saying that, “America does not negotiate with terrorists.” The downward spiral of America’s unchallenged supremacy that it enjoyed following the collapse of the Soviet Union is partly the result of this rather cloudy approach to war that has moved from conquering foreign adversaries to their total obliteration, as they are seemingly attacking America not because of what it does, but rather what it represents. In return, the U.S. has somehow made perfect sense of complicated identity practices surrounding terrorist factions and engaged in the parallel: killing its enemies for who they are and not necessarily for what they do. In a moment of introspection, Obama later observed:

“We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the well-spring of extremism, a perpetual war – through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments – will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.”

This demonstrates how recently, America’s foreign policies that were originally designed to fortify and grow their regional clout have failed partly because of a lack of rational analysis of alternative historical narratives. By demonizing the enemy in such a way, the U.S. has managed to create foreign adversaries all over the Middle East, undermining America’s image as a sincere force for freedom and social justice. So if Obama’s caution is to be realized, Americans must cautiously expand the scope of competing historical narratives in the classroom in order to ‘make decisions based not on fear, but hard-earned wisdom’.

If history can teach us one thing, it is that every state has a pinnacle of success followed by downfall. Being a relatively young country that has yet to experience true national blunder strengthens America’s perpetuated historical narrative as one of dignified successes, supplying the national psyche with evermore justification to buttress foreign policy initiatives that demonstrate the same moral authority and economic power as in the 19th century Manifest Destiny fervor. Reinforced by past triumphs, the collective mindset of the U.S. has moved from a once self-serving yet successful nationalism that suffused the “American dream” to a self-defeating motivation that has generated oxymoronic foreign policy moves.

By diversifying the amount of competing narratives in American history education to include different perspectives on how and if an event actually occurred, pluralism will logically take its course in filtering and often correcting the memories of past events. Furthermore, it will help prevent U.S. public opinion from engulfing itself in a narcissistic view of America’s role in the globalizing world at large. Until that day, past events such as the war against terror in Afghanistan and extensive drone strikes across the Middle East remain tokens of the dangers of U.S. selective historical memory that loom over its foreign relations, undermining the democratic rationale that it traditionally sought to champion.  facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

International Cooperation and Cultural Heritage Programs: in the name of which heritage?

Posted by / 25th April 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: , , , / -

International cooperation  in the cultural heritage sector is strongly  dependent on  investments with a top-down approach which does not substantially consider local communities in decision making. On the other side  of the  system, NGOs should fill the gap,  but when working  as a medium for  governmental funding,  no space is left  to plan actions based on the real needs of local communities. The Mutual Cultural Heritage (MCH)  program  in Galle, Sri Lanka, is just an example of this kind of attitude, and despite claims of sustainable cooperation, there is a clear discrepancy between  financial support and local needs. This raises concerns about ownership and heritage management.

The Mutual Cultural Heritage Program in Galle: in the name of which heritage?

The Netherlands launched  the first phase of the Mutual Cultural Heritage (MCH) Programme between  2009 -2012. According to the Cultural Heritage  Policy Framework, ”common cultural heritage” meant relics of a past that the Netherlands has shared with others: buildings and engineering constructions, archives, underwater wrecks and museum exhibits, as well as intangible heritage. The aim of the Common Cultural Heritage policy was to “collaborate on the sustainable maintenance and management of the common cultural heritage”.

After settling on the policy, the Dutch government identified eight priority countries: Brazil, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Suriname, South Africa and Sri Lanka. In order to implement the plan, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science allocated funding and  contributed €2 million a year for the MCH program making cooperation agreements with the above countries.  One million was assigned to the relevant Dutch embassies. The other million was added to the budgets of the Netherlands’ three cultural heritage agencies: the National Archives (NA), the National Service for Archaeology, Cultural Landscapes and Built Heritage (RACM) and the Netherlands Institute for Cultural Heritage (ICN).

All the MCH projects in Sri Lanka started  just after the end of the civil conflict, in 2009, and were  focused on project proposals and restoration plans   concerning Dutch remains such as forts and  Dutch archival sources. The shared heritage identified for the projects was related only to Dutch colonial heritage. Particular attention within the Mutual Cultural Heritage  was given to  Galle, a town located 120 km  south of Colombo, declared World Heritage Site in 1988. Within the MCH programme, the ancient Dutch  rampart and the drainage system in Galle Fort were  restored as well as the Dutch Warehouse in which the National  Maritime Museum was later established.

Furthermore, as part of the cooperation with the Netherlands, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and National Heritage of Sri Lanka issued a  tourism development programme in Galle, which comprised the establishment of a boating service for local and foreign tourists.  In relation to this latter specific aspect,  UNESCO  has expressed,  since 2010, serious concerns about the management plan. The plan was criticised for lacking clarity and threatening the cultural heritage of Galle, particularly through the establishment of a new international harbor.

On the Dutch side a Dutch NGO was involved in the MCH program- the Centre for International Heritage Activities (CIE)- but its role was confined to organising informative meetings and workshops, inviting stakeholders such as UNESCO, the Sri Lanka Central Cultural Fund, ICOMOS and Dutch specialists. CIE managed funding provided by the Dutch Government to organize the above activities, but no locally based activities were arranged to monitor the MCH programme.

On the Sri Lankan side, apart from ICOMOS, which works for the conservation and protection of cultural heritage sites, no local Sri Lankan NGOs were engaged, nor were any community based activities organised to evaluate the management of the MCH program or to raise awareness about the program itself. This is significant because heritage legislation and the concept of heritage itself are not the same in Western countries compared to many other parts of the world. Therefore, the meaning and nature of procedures is not always obvious. A constructive attitude toward monument preservation and management depends on the position that a local community takes in these processes in order to relate with, and create, a sense of ownership of the heritage in question. If local involvement is not planned, one consequence could be the alienation of heritage, thereby losing its links to the local, living community.

What is happening in Galle is that the local owners cannot afford the costs of maintenance for the old historical buildings because of the absence of legislation on heritage and the lack of funding from Sri Lanka authorities. Instead, many locals preferred selling their properties to foreigners. Furthermore, rather than to encourage local investments or raise local awareness, the Urban Development Authority (UDA) of Sri Lanka is trying to attract even more foreign investors, and uses the restored Dutch Hospital, in Galle Fort, as an example. It is planned to be leased as a mall with spas, restaurants and shops. On the UDA website it is not specified which kind of companies are going to manage those shops and restaurants, but if they will be led by foreign franchises and companies, the whole heritage management programme will be unlikely to offer the supposedly full benefits to local populations.

A realistic sustainable future for international cooperation and heritage management?

The main question here is how management is planned, in the name of which heritage, and how and in which ways local communities will eventually benefit from the outcomes if they are not substantially involved in the process. These issues are particularly sensitive because they touch and shape a local sense of ownership, legacy and the perception of heritage itself.

Galle showed that the MCH program did not actively involve local communities despite its goals to collaborate on sustainable maintenance and management of the common cultural heritage. A more vital and tangible heritage policy, heritage law and heritage management needs to be developed in sustainable international cooperation and heritage management. This will only be possible if governments, considering their own shortcomings, will accept the responsibility of equal cooperation, which should start with solutions, perspectives and approaches driven by the most important stakeholders: local communities. 

 

Further reading:

Lowenthal, D. (1985). The past is a foreign country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Van Maanen E., Ashworth G. (2013). Colonial Heritage in Paramaribo, Suriname: Legislation and Senses of
Ownership, a Dilemma in Preservation? International Journal of Cultural Property (2013) 20:289–310.

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Sanctions against Russia: How far will they go?

Posted by / 24th March 2014 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: , , , / -

Talk about sanctions on Russia has been tough this week. Both the United States and the European Union have been tightening screws on Russia in an attempt to reverse Russia´s annexation of Crimea. EU sanctions now include 33 highly placed individuals with close relations to Vladimir Putin and that were involved in the takeover of the Crimean peninsula after the ousting of the Ukrainian ex-president Yanukovych. The list now largely overlaps with the American list, which also includes three very close figures from Putin´s inner circle, something which the EU had not been willing to do so far. Both the EU and US have also opened doors to allow for economic sanctions against core parts of the Russian economy, such as the oil and gas industry. This would hurt Russian exports, but will surely also affect gas supplies to Europe, and potentially the global economy in general.

The efforts to bring Crimea back to the Ukraine are almost certainly in vain, but at least the sanctions send out a strong message of disapproval, and they hit Putin and the Russian political and economical elite where it hurts…or do they? What are the EU and US trying to achieve? Which sanctions have been imposed so far? And will they put their money where their mouth is?

Choose your objectives wisely

Sanctions have been imposed in the past for various reasons. They have been imposed to reverse the policies of targeted countries, be they acts of territorial aggression, coup d´état´s, or human rights abuses. But they can also be imposed simply to signal disapproval and outrage, or to deter other potential wrongdoers from breaking the law, and to deter the target at hand from going further down the road. Russia unlikely to be compelled to give up Crimea, but the US and EU sanctions can at least put the bear back in its cage.

When sanctions were instituted in the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that comprehensive economic sanctions would bring ´a type of pressure upon targets that no modern nation would be able to resist´. Territorial aggression would be reversed without the use of a single soldier. Of course reality turned out to be much different; sometimes they were poorly implemented and hopelessly ineffective. In cases such as Iraq and Haiti on the other hand, they were disproportionally harsh on innocent civilians, who starved to death as results of food shortages. Since the late 1990s the strategy thus shifted towards targeting individuals and banks, in order to disturb only the interests of those in power.

Reversing the policies of targeted countries through the sole means of individual sanctions is difficult, especially when the target is a superpower like Russia. Putin is unlikely to be sufficiently impressed by asset freezes and travel sanctions to suddenly give up Crimea, even if the sanctions target people in his inner circle like deputy prime minister Dimitry Rogozin and presidential advisors. The Ukraine has lost the peninsula and they will most likely not get it back. It seems like a shut and closed case. But can the sanctions at least serve other purposes?

In the past, sanctions have also been used simply to express disapproval or outrage about certain practices. Sanctions stand between statements and soldiers. The first two sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations on white minority regimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were hardly impressive economically, but at least they signalled a strong message of disapproval. White Africans certainly felt this pariah-status heavily on their shoulders. The European and American sanctions on Russia are likely to have a similar effect. They also stand between words and wars, to use a different alliteration. They might not change the status of Crimea, but at least Russia will feel that a large part of the (western) world disapproves of their actions.

A third and arguably the most important reason to impose sanctions is to warn other countries that certain actions don´t go unpunished. Punishing one target can deter others from behaving outside of international law or outside of international public opinion. For example, the sanctions on Iran and North Korea might not talk them out of continuing their nuclear programmes, but at least it can scare off other states. In a similar vein, generals plotting a coup d´état might think twice before taking action. In the Crimea crisis, the sanctions also signal that Russia should not try to further destabilize the Ukraine or to embark on other geopolitical adventures. NATO officials are concerned that Putin has also put his eye on Transnistria, a Russian speaking secessionist region of Moldova that borders the south-west of Ukraine.

Will the EU and US put their money where their mouth is?

So far, the European and American lists include highly placed government officials, army-sector figures, and the owners of Russia´s biggest industries. Sanctioned politicians include Russian deputy prime minister Rogozin, presidential advisors Glazyev and Surkov, Duma-chairman Slutsky, Crimean ´prime-minister´ Aksyonov, and Ukrainian ex-president Yanukovych. The asset freezes have also hit Bank Rossiya, assumed to be Putin´s bank, and Arkadi Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko, two of Russia´s most powerful businessmen.

The screws can be drawn even tighter on Russia if it doesn´t back down. So far the measures have included exclusion from the G8 talks that were supposed to be organized in Sochi this summer and a failed resolution at the UN Security Council. A next step would be to isolate Russia economically through the imposition of sanctions on oil and gas from Russia. However, Europe would certainly feel the measures of this double edged sword. Putin is already looking to the East for alternative trading partners, and China seems eager to sign a deal to buy more natural gas from Russia. The warming relationship between Russia and its eastern neighbours could also facilitate military contracts.

In the short run, a gas-embargo would definitely hurt the Russian economy though. Almost all of Russia´s natural gas go to Europe (89%), most notably Eastern Europe (24%) and Germany (24%). A sudden stop would most certainly disrupt the Russian economy, but it would also threaten global economic stability, primarily in Europe itself. Europe is equally dependent on Russia. Denmark, Norway, the UK, and the Netherlands produce some small amounts of natural gas, and they import LNG from countries such as Algeria, Quatar, and Nigeria, but the biggest supplier of gas remains Russia, especially in Eastern Europe and Germany. Would Europe be willing to go that far? It´s not likely. The Spanish have already complained that a Russian travel embargo would hurt the tourism sector. Other ´dove countries´ (Italy, Cyprus) even had trouble with the targeted sanctions on some individuals close to Putin, favouring a diplomatic solution. Hawk countries in the European such as the UK, Poland, and the Baltic states favour a tougher stand, but even they are likely to back down when it comes to economic sanctions.

For now, both the US and the EU can keep on tightening the screws on Russia by freezing the assets of more individuals and by prohibiting European and American citizens from doing business with Russian oligarchs. As long as such actions prove sufficient to keep Russia from further destabilizing the Ukraine, the western sanctions should be regarded a success. Russia chooses its battles carefully, and so should the EU and the US.

You may also be interested in reading the ReSeT Working Paper: Power and UN Sanctions by the same author.

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