Catching a Cold: Europe’s Exposure to Arctic Change

Posted by Rory Robertshaw / 6th November 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Arctic, Climate Change, European Union / -

Europe’s tendency toward policy dominated by concerns for the environment in the Arctic risks the perverse outcome of the Arctic being laid waste to unfettered global demand for new sources of commodity extraction. The boat to the Arctic has already sailed. Rapidly melting sea-ice driven by accelerated climate change means that the Arctic sea routes will shortly see ice-free summers, opening opportunities for transcontinental and local shipping, as well as resource extraction from the Arctic’s rich wealth in oil, gas, minerals, green-energy and fish. Europe’s policy inertia means it has caught a cold – too sick to capitalise on the opportunities of change nor able to protect against its more destructive tendencies.

If Europeans want environmental outcomes high on the Arctic agenda, as they have done to date, the best way to achieve this is by not assuming anyone is listening, nor by banging on the table to make people listen. If it is to have any traction, the European approach needs a degree of sophistication built around EU competencies and capacities. It requires a level of honesty regarding its economic and security interests whilst being more cognisant of its constrained powerbase. Here, China offers Europe some lessons. After a period of testing the temperature, China clearly found the Arctic too cold for confrontational politics. Instead China has geared up on the economic front, opening substantial lines of investment via Greenland, Iceland, and Russia that give it a direct stake in exploration and extraction. It has shored up diplomatic ties with emerging Arctic powers, in particular Iceland whilst having gained observer status at the Arctic Council. Finally, it is investing heavily in Arctic research, partly driven by its own domestic environmental concerns, but also to build credibility with the Arctic community.

Europe’s interests and influence in the Arctic are a little complicated. First off, of the European Union member states only Denmark, by virtue of succession seeking, EU adverse Greenland, is one of the five Arctic Coastal States (US, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark). However the wider definition of Arctic Countries – that comprise the permanent members of the Arctic Council – swells European interests through the inclusion of Sweden and Finland (US, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland).

The Arctic Council – although its early interests were rooted in collaborative research and knowledge sharing – is now seen increasingly as the legitimate international forum for considering wider Arctic issues and has recently secured its first internationally binding agreement for search and rescue. A proposal for the Arctic Council to discuss issues of security was vetoed by the US, but with increasing legitimacy and representation the agenda may still widen. Asides from the 3 European permanent members of the Arctic Council, the UK, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, France and most recently Italy have observer status. Europe’s own bid for observer status, unlike China’s was rejected at the last session. Led by Canada, the EU’s protest on seal culling by indigenous people was cited as the reason, but also reflects a broader concern in some quarters of diluting Council decision making and increasing bureaucracy, an undervaluing of the rights and interests of indigenous people, and perhaps a sense that EU interests were marginal to the Arctic debate particularly given bilateral representation of European states.

Europe’s first big foray into melt-conscious Arctic politics started in 2006. At this time Arctic expertise in the assembly was thin, allowing a small group with Arctic interests or expertise to have a big impact on policy direction. Led by Diana Wallis, a European from Yorkshire, the group floated the idea of an Arctic Treaty for its protection, in part modelled on the Antarctic Treaty, albeit that the Antarctic itself does not impinge on sovereign territory. Wallis’ was not a moderate voice, far from it, steering a proposal for a shakeup in Arctic governance. In a controversial move, having no support from any of the five Arctic states, it was proposed that the EU should have a role in the management of the Arctic. The Norwegians took it upon themselves to steer the EU away from a course of conflict that would have resulted in greater marginalisation of EU in Arctic affairs. In November 2008, flanked by the Norwegian Prime Minister, the EU Commission President, humiliated in retreat, issued a joint statement that ‘as a matter of principle, we can say that the Arctic is a sea, and a sea is a sea’. In essence, supporting sovereign claims and therefore primacy under the auspices of the Law of the Seas. With that, any remaining hope for a treaty was dead and buried.

This difficult lesson at least means the EU has graduated class 101. With hindsight the European Commission now states:

“As a matter of fact, the similarities between the two poles are scarce: while the Arctic is mainly an ocean the Antarctic is a continent. The Arctic has been populated by humans for millennia, while Antarctica is the largest uninhabited area in the world.”

Following the demise of the Arctic Treaty in 2008, the EU has switched tracks, focussing anew on developing a less strident Arctic policy, but still grounded in environment outcomes. Since that time, at glacial speed, the organs of Europe, including the new EU Arctic Forum, have issued a suite of policy-like documents – none of them policies per se and most of them talking to future policy yet to be developed. Their overarching themes have, not unpredictably, been to protect and preserve the Arctic in unison with its population; to promote the sustainable use of resources; and international cooperation.

Five years on, cold shouldered by the Arctic Council and with the melt seemingly in overdrive, the EU is starting to see its policy objectives have failed. In 2012, the generally glossy progress report made to the European Parliament had one exception, a tale telling sentence that reveals a bigger truth and the hint of a change in direction:

“However, given the evident speed of change in the Arctic, the time is now ripe to refine the EU’s policy stance towards the region, take a broader approach, and link it with the Europe 2020 Agenda for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth while continuing to support every effort to ensure the effective stewardship of the fragile Arctic environment.”

Indeed, a speech issued by European Union on Arctic Strategy in April this year goes somewhat further, with the announcement of focusing policy on three components:

1. Knowledge – establishing closer links with researchers from third countries.
2. Responsibility – working with Arctic partners and with the private sector to develop environmentally-friendly, low-risk technologies that could be used by the extractive industries and the shipping industry.
3. Engagement – stepping up dialogue with Arctic states and stakeholders.

This smacks more of pragmatism and should be applauded. But, of course, the devil is in the detail and, in the case of the EU, the time it takes to develop it. Certainly, Europe is not in a position to match Chinese economic and scientific investment in the region. Rather, Europe needs to identify its own policy devices that balance economic gain with collective stewardship over the environment. Arctic opportunities are specific and many for which European companies are well place to respond. Research remains an obvious area of strength, but Europe should also be leveraging industrial investment in innovative green technologies that can support economically viable and environmentally sensitive Arctic resource extraction. Consideration of the EU’s role in promoting safe, serviced Arctic shipping, improving Arctic communications, supply-logistics and weather forecasting. Promoting European businesses with competitive advantages such as marine insurance and high value engineering. Supporting and investing in northern European ports so that they remain competitive and responsive to rapidly increasing throughput. Providing technical assistance and funding to support indigenous population dislocated by environmental change. Continuing to lobby for environment protection and conservation resulting from Arctic climate change as well as for new risks such as industrial pollution and accidents. To achieve these, there is a need for a pragmatic EU Arctic policy, forged with the right content and strategic balance, not simply a lament for conservation.

The interminable policy drag is a product of failed leadership in a bloated transnational system that is increasingly concerned most with self-conservation and least with the social and economic interests of its people and beyond. The failure in the Arctic is a microcosm a wider malaise, mediocrity and EU inertia. Now that we have caught a cold, there is no cure in sight.

Dissecting the Corruption Perceptions Index

Posted by Thomas Kruiper / 4th November 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Corruption, Liberia, Transparency / -

Earlier this year, when I was in Liberia collecting data for a research project, a national radio station announced that Liberia had made some big steps towards becoming a less corrupt country. According to the Transparency International Transparency Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2012, Liberia had climbed from 22 to 41 points over the past seven years, which measures the perceptions of corruption in public sectors of 174 countries. With this score, Liberia outperformed countries such as Greece, Panama, and China. They were almost on equal footing with Italy, which scored 42 points. In Africa, Liberia now ranks 11th on the list of least corrupt countries, beating substantially more developed countries on the list such as Tanzania and Morocco. For those people that have never been to Liberia, these results might simply be surprising. Perhaps Liberia is one of those exceptional countries that do well out of war and that adopt sensible policies in order to further economic and social development. To me, it rather led me to question the index itself.

Liberia is not the only country that stood surprisingly high on the list (75th). Rwanda even made it to the 50th position, just before Georgia, which ranked 51st. In contrast, some countries that scored surprisingly badly considering their economic situation were Thailand (88th), Indonesia (118th), and Argentina (102nd).

Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Measuring corruption in a quantitative or absolute manner is not possible, warns Transparency International. “Corruption generally comprises illegal activities, which are deliberately hidden and only come to light through scandals, investigations or prosecutions. There is no meaningful way to assess absolute levels of corruption in countries or territories on the basis of hard empirical data.” The reports that do exist on court cases and uncovered scandals rather reflect the effectiveness of prosecutors and the media to expose corruption practices. The CPI therefore looks only at the perceptions of corruption in countries´ public sectors. The index measures administrative and political corruption.

Living and working in a country, or even just travelling through it, is a great way of perceiving administrative and political corruption. In Liberia, police officers at road-blocks asking for “cold water”, the local euphemism for a bribe, are a way of life. A 20 dollar handshake to get a visa renewed is simply seen as the way it works. These are just small forms administrative corruption, but they form the tentacles of a much bigger creature. The national ministry of finance only collects a fraction of the taxes they should. This is partly due to a lack of administrative capacity, resulting in a situation in which the government basically has no idea who pays their taxes and who doesn´t. However, when it comes to big multinational investors, politicians know precisely how to stash millions of dollars on private bank accounts. Embezzlement and patronage seem to be almost structural phenomena.

Admittedly, Liberia also has a lot going for it. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first female African head of state, has been tough on corruption since she was elected in 2006. Several officials have been fired after corruption scandals, and police officers are unarmed, which is primarily a security issue, but also makes it more difficult to push for bribes. The last two democratic elections were internationally regarded as generally free and fair. Liberia was also the first country to be compliant with the Extraction Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and is part of the Kimberly Process Scheme for the legal exportation of diamonds. These are noteworthy achievements, although they are also known for being more successful on paper than on the ground.

Leaving aside the case of Liberia, Transparency International’s claim that countries such as Rwanda, Georgia, and Liberia are perceived less corrupt or equally corrupt as Italy, Greece, and Argentina seems counter-intuitive to say the least. Perhaps this feeling is caused by the misleading sense that corruption is negatively correlated with wealth. As the Guardian warned with regard to the CPI: “Wealth seems no easy antidote to corruption: some relatively rich countries, including Russia, fall at the bottom of the global league table. Meanwhile, some of the world’s poorer states do comparatively well: Botswana, Bhutan, Cape Verde, and Rwanda all appear among the 50 ‘cleanest’ countries.” The newspaper also noted that “Arab Spring countries, and many Eurozone countries – particularly those affected by the financial crisis – are doing worse and worse”. There is anecdotal evidence of Greek politicians stashing away money on Swiss bank accounts in order to evade taxes, and of families that receive state-pensions for their long-dead parents and child support for children that were never born. Surely, the role of the Mafia also plays a role in ranking the Italy’s perception of corruption. But one wouldn’t dare to bribe a local customs-officer at a Milanese airport. Also, the fractions of public money that might be siphoned off by Greek officials might amount to the fractions of public money that actually make it to the treasury in a country such as Liberia.

Analyzing the Corruption Perceptions Index

So how do some countries end up so high on the Corruptions Perception Index, while others are placed confusingly low? Which indicators does the CPI use in order to give countries a place on the 100-point scale, on which Denmark, Finland and New Zealand scored 90 points, and on which Afghanistan, Korea, and Somalia scored no more than 8 points?

The index is based on thirteen indicators that intend or claim to measure corruption perception from different angles. All the indicators are other indexes constructed by expert organizations, consultancy bureaus, and international institutions, such as the African Development Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the World Bank, the World Justice Project, Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit, among others. The indicators normally measure corruption, but as part of wider indexes that focus on sustainable governance, political risk, and the rule of law, but also on economic competitiveness and economic risk for investors in countries. One indicator, Transparency International’s own “bribes payers survey”, solely focuses on the act of bribery.

There seem to be two basic problems with the sources used for creating the index. Firstly, the scores given for ‘corruption perception’ in some surveys about country risk or competitiveness of countries judge the problem of corruption in relation to other problems that affect that same country. Secondly, some of the indexes used in the CPI only use data on corruption from African countries, while others only use data from developed or industrialized countries. However, the scores that countries get in the CPI index count as if they came from the same league.

To sketch an example that illuminates the first problem, in the World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Index, one of the indicators, experts were asked about the “most problematic factors for doing business” . In Argentina, corruption is in the top three, with 11.5% considering corruption as a major problem. In Greece and Italy the sentiment against corruption is equally critical, with 11.6% and 7.1%. Contrarily, in Rwanda corruption was recognized as an obstacle by only 0.4% of those asked. The three top problems were Access to Financing (20.2%), inadequately educated workforce (19.6%), and Tax Rates (17.5%). But does this mean that corruption almost doesn’t exist in Rwanda, or rather that it doesn´t form a real obstacle for those doing business in Rwanda?

Interestingly, the CPI does not always lie in line with other research on corruption by Transparency International. For example, Transparency International also has facilitated research that found that corruption is at times positively correlated with economic growth. According to Transparency International´s Corruption Barometer, an insightful global poll that tries to measure public opinion on corruption, Rwandans are indeed surprisingly optimistic about corruption. Despite this optimism, still 11% of Rwandans admitted to having paid a bribe to the judiciary during the past twelve months, and 23% admitted to having paid a bribe to the police. In Argentina, Greece, and Italy these figures were substantially lower (6% and 16% for Argentina, 12% and 4% for Italy, and 6% and 4% in Greece ), but this apparently doesn´t withhold Argentineans, Italians, and Greeks from being extremely critical of their government and judiciary when it comes to corruption. It could very well be that complaints about corruption are also related to economical downturns, although I have not checked this. In Liberia a staggering 77% percent admitted to paying bribes to the judiciary and the police, but according to the World Economic Forum only 9.6% considered corruption to be among the most problematic factors for doing business. Lacking basic infrastructure and access to credit, many underdeveloped countries simply have bigger problems on their minds.

We could pull two careful conclusions from these observations. Firstly, some indicators in the index measure corruption relative to other problems in the same society. On the ranking, this ‘benefits’ underdeveloped countries that have much bigger problems to worry about than corruption, even if they suffer from systematic administrative and political corruption. Meanwhile, several countries that have their basic political needs covered perceive corruption as a terrible societal monster, even though they might be doing ‘better’ than several countries with a higher rank. The second conclusion is that there might be a lot of people that perceive their society, or the societies they do business in, as corrupt, while they don’t necessarily see corruption as an obstacle.

This last observation leads us to ask whether corruption should by definition be regarded as bad for social and economic stability and equality. As a matter of fact, researchers have written about the ambiguous relationship between corruption and various economic and political factors since the 1960′s. For example, in 1964 Nathanial Leff explained how corruption can “grease the wheels of an economy”, and that corruption can introduce an element of competition in what is otherwise a “comfortably monopolistic industry”. More contemporary authors have made arguments following the same logic, claiming that corruption can benefit economic growth and entrepreneurship in poor but highly bureaucratized states with little institutional capacity. Mironov (2005) and Heckelman & Powel (2008) argue that under conditions of institutional weakness, corruption is positively correlated with capital accumulation and economic growth in developing countries. In weakly insitutionalized states, corruption can also function as a social mechanism to decrease income-inequalities, as it benefits lower class workers in the informal sector getting jobs they wouldn’t get in a more formalized system (Dobson and Rodriguez Andés, 2010) . The other side of the equation is that a reduction of corruption is favorable for growth only when political and, more importantly, economic institutions are strong. These findings might help us in explaining why businessmen in Greece and Italy consider corruption a burden to bureaucracy, while those doing business in Rwanda and Liberia rather see it as an alternative to bureaucracy. Fighting corruption is thus only worth the trouble if there is sufficient institutional capacity to take away the incentives for corruption.

The second methodological problem with the Corruption Perception Index is that several of the thirteen indicators only measure corruption in developed countries, while others only measure corruption in Africa or Asia. For example, the African Development Bank Governance indicator only applies to African states. According to the CPI, the ADB rewarded Liberia with a generous 55 points on a scale of 100, which put them on par with South Africa and Ghana, admittedly worth a compliment. But this high score on governance was only possible because of the other players in the League. Liberia didn’t have to compete with European countries in order to get this score. On the other side of the equation, the IMD competitiveness index, also part of the CPI, only uses a populations of fifty-nine industrialized economies, ranging from Denmark and Finland at the top (95 points) to the Ukraine and Venezuela at the bottom (25 points). Italy and Greece respectively scored a mere 39 and 35 points on the indicators that measured corruption in the IMD´s competitiveness ranking, which leaves out developing countries. Similarly, the Bertelsmann Sustainable Governance index only compares 31 OECD countries. Not surprisingly, Greece and Italy again scored low in this ‘champions league’.

Luckily for many developing countries, they were left out of these competitions. For example, no African states except for South Africa were part of the Bribe Payers Survey. Where many developed countries were indexed through the Bertelsmann Sustainable Governance survey, many developing countries were indexed through the Bartelsmann Transformation Index. This division boosted the ranking for countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, thereby beating, again, Greece and Italy, who remained at the bottom of the other Bertelsmann index.

There are thus two reasons that explain why some countries rank suspiciously high on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, while others rank deceptively low. The first reason is that several of the most corrupt countries in the Index simply have bigger problems to worry about, making the issue of corruption relatively less important to people doing business. In countries such as Liberia, corruption is perceived as a secondary problem after more fundamental problems that keep a state from functioning. At the same time, countries that have the basics covered have more time and money to dedicate to ‘secondary problems’. I do not say this to downplay the importance of fighting corruption, but merely to point out that there are other factors that are much more crucial to welfare and stability in a state. It could even be the case that people doing business in developing countries with weak institutions are benefiting from the option to pay bribes, because without this grease on the wheels it would be impossible to get through the bureaucratic jungles that these states often times house. In strongly institutionalized states the opposite happens. Rather than an alternative to bureaucracy, corruption represents a burden. On a side note, it seems that especially those societies suffering from social revolt and financial crises put the blame on corrupt politicians and institutions, even though objectively they might be relatively clean. The fact that people are critical or careless however doesn´t make these countries more or less corrupted. Transparency International also makes this point regarding public opinion, but misses the point when it regards the World Economic Forum executive opinions.

The second reason is that the CPI uses a several sources that only compare competitors within a certain category. The CPI then combines these indicators as if they came from the same league, creating a distortion. To put it in simple terms, the reason that Liberia scored a lot of points on some indicators is because it was regarded among the best in Africa. Bulgaria and Romania ranked high because they were regarded among the best on the Transformation Index. At the same time, Italy and Greece scored badly on other indicators in which they were only compared to other rich countries, but not to Liberia, Rwanda, or Bulgaria.

The question remains what it means to receive a higher or a lower ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index. Does the index measure to what extent states are perceived as corrupted? And if so, perceived by whom? Or does it measure to what extent corruption is perceived a problem in these states? And if so, a problem for what? If the answer is that the CPI measures the former (perceptions of corruption levels) my answer would be that the ranking is flawed because of its methodology. If the answer is that it measures that latter (corruption as a perceived problem), the counter-intuitive rankings of some developing countries with weak institutions could be justified. However, fighting corruption in these countries might not be the solution as long as there is no institutional capacity to take away the incentives for corruption.

Economics and the Environment: A Brief Review of Arctic Change

Posted by Rory Robertshaw / 2nd November 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Arctic, China, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Russia / -

This morning, two news stories filled me with a fleeting sense of hope. Firstly, a remote Arctic Island, known as ‘Rat Island’ due to a mass infestation of Norwegian rats, is finally rodent free. Conservationists have been working tirelessly to exterminate the invasive population for the benefit of the indigenous inhabitants of nesting birds including puffins. Secondly, after their sojourn from storming Arctic oil-rigs, Greenpeace activists and accompanying journalists have had piracy charges downgraded to hooliganism by Russian authorities. What are the wider prospects though for the Arctic heritage to remain unchanged?

In popular European imagination the Arctic looms large as a pristine inaccessible wilderness, a cold inhospitable land of polar bears, fit only for our most intrepid explorers and scientists. From this starting point European sensitivities rail against the huge potential of the Arctic as a source of primary commodities to fuel economic growth. Europe’s is a tendency toward Arctic conservationism and a fanciful hope, like that of China’s too, that the Arctic should be considered, in a non-legal sense, a global Common. This imagery will be increasingly that – a figment of the imagination. We are witnessing an astonishing pace of ecological, economic and political transformation of the Arctic driven by climate change. The Arctic we know and love is moving to the mythological annals of history.

Change is coming apace. Already the annual average temperature for the Arctic region is about 1 ºC warmer than the recorded average between 1961 to 1990 and as much as 5 ºC above the seasonal norm for October-November. As the arctic warms, the scientists’ Arctic sea-ice dial is being constantly ratcheted down from rock-hard towards almost-slushy. In three decades Arctic sea ice covers now only half of its previous expanse. Estimates of an ice-free summer ocean by 2030 are now looking a little conservative with the latest data suggesting a decade earlier is plausible, in part explained by polar amplification and spurred along by black carbon deposits.

Polar bears and walruses are particularly dependent on thick sea ice. The polar bear is now listed as an endangered species and walruses as candidate species for listing. Decline in the population of several sub-species of seal follow hot on their heels. Moreover, subarctic flora and fauna, both terrestrial and marine, are migrating northward to compete with indigenous species that cannot rely on evolutionary responses to keep pace with the rate of change. Habitats are changing: coastlines are eroding and as the permafrost reduces, frozen tundra is reverting to swampland last seen some 50 million years ago. Arctic cyclones are growing in size and strength with local impact, but also being held responsible for catastrophic weather events across the hemisphere: flooding in China, heat waves and fires in Russia, severe winters in the US and Europe and summer monsoons and droughts in India.

Change does not end there. The changing climate opens the areas to economic exploitation on a grand scale – a new centre of trade and industry with a form not unlike that of the Mediterranean. It is not entirely fanciful to suggest that the opening up of the Arctic frontier will deliver the sorts of radical shifts in global trade and geo-political strategy that come only once in a life-time. Paralleling the Age of Discovery or the US’s taming of the west as an engine of its meteoric rise to global super power status. In economic and political terms there is a lot to play for, but as with great games there is also real risk, among them irreparable environmental damage, militarisation, and dislocation of indigenous people and their livelihoods.

Alaska and western Siberia already account for around 10% of global oil and gas production, the region’s production share is set to rocket. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds 22% of the worlds undiscovered oil and gas, not to mention rich deposits of rare minerals and isotopes. Retreating ice; new exploration and extraction technologies; and transport access by sea make discovery and extraction real and increasing possibilities. It does not end here, the potential for hydro- and geothermal power, construction and fishing (as stocks head for warmer arctic waters) all add to a very long list of economic opportunities that spin out and will spur on the changing face of the Arctic. Just imagine the tourism opportunities: paired sailings of cruise ships witnessing the dramatic sight of vast walls of melting ice crashing into the ocean and strings of wilderness junkies trudging over pristine Icelandic glaciers in designer snow boots.

The question of sea access – the opening of the fifth ocean – of itself is of massive economic and naval significance. Reducing sea-ice coupled with supporting maritime technology and logistical support will lead to the opening up of new sea routes crossing the Arctic. The passage becoming accessible most rapidly is the Northern Sea Route (Russia’s preferred name for the North-East Passage) skirting the Russian coast. The North-West Passage, following the Canadian archipelago, lags behind, but remains a realistic possibility. In 2012, 46 vessels managed to cross the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and most recently, the Yong Seng, a Chinese commercial vessel followed the NSR, arriving in Rotterdam amid much media fanfare. The excitement was generated by the news that the voyage had trimmed 14 days off the usual time required for the route south via Suez. Estimates place financial savings per commercial vessel per voyage are in the region of $600,000.

In the long term, the reorientation of shipping from China via the NSR to supply the major markets of Europe bodes well for both economies in broad terms, with the prospects of cheaper products arriving more quickly. However there are winners and losers. Hong Kong marks the equidistance point between the southern and northern routes. As such the future of seaports North and South of this point look very different. Singapore, for example, may lose out to new ports developing along the Chinese coastline and in Japan. Likewise northern European ports such as Rotterdam and Felixstowe may benefit.

Politics and questions of infrastructure supporting shipping are also critical. Russian cooperation, ice-breakers to rescue beached ships, maritime policing, supply and repair stops are all part of the viability jigsaw. Also, there remain challenges to Canada and Russia’s sovereignty over the two sea routes. Much to their annoyance, the US and EU in particular continue to argue that the routes should be considered as international Strait. China too, in its references to global commons and the occasional broadside from an ex-sea admiral, may well hold this view, but prefers to supress it given a more fundamental respect for sovereign rights.

The assimilated view of seasoned political commentators seems to be shifting in regards to the Arctic. Whereas the trend a couple of years back was to stress the dystopian prospects of the Arctic thaw – a terrain poised to escalate geopolitical conflict – the pendulum, with some reasoned argument, swings now in favour of backing the prospect of a new Arctic consensus. This revised view is derived from a growing tendency for Arctic states to find agreement on some of their long-standing, sometimes pernicious, territorial disputes. Realising there is good sense in rising above the narrowest state-interests, there may be a move to avoiding escalating conflict and to work collectively to exploit the rich opportunities offered in the Arctic.

These difficulties and differences aside, surely this is good news for Europe, but the question is what is Europe’s response in making hay while the sun shines and how does this articulate with European environmental and conservation aims? The question of European policy, flavoured by our well-heeled and well-intentioned Arctic imaginary is important. It has coloured the EU policy approach without winning many friends. For those states or transnational bodies sitting outside of the Arctic inner circle lessons are being learnt, more rapidly in the case of China than Europe, about not rocking the boat if you want to get in on the action. To date Europe has been perceived as an angry child rather than a critical friend, with the dual impact of removing us from the economic and environmental spheres of influence. Europe needs more sophistication in defining its Arctic interests and related policy, if it wants to move from the imaginary to the pragmatic.

Returning to Rat Island puffins, the question arises as what is their long-term hardiness in the face of new waves of change arriving on their shores? As for Greenpeace, notwithstanding the vagaries of the Russian judicial process, jurisprudence suggests that piracy charges are subject to international law – the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas – and that there seemed little hope of a successful prosecution on these terms. Russia no doubt realised this, although appearing to have backed down, they have in truth managed to send a clear warning to transgressors as to the primacy of Russian economic interests in the Arctic region. Perhaps then we need to set sail on a new course for the European eco-warrior, hell bent on achieving the best and most pragmatic environmental outcomes for the Artic, by turning attention on EU reform. We need to look at our own institutions rather fighting Russian or Chinese ghosts. Batten down the hatches Greenpeace, were setting sail for Brussels!

International Focus Shifting towards the Sahel

Posted by Paula Sánchez de la Blanca / 1st May 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Sahel, War on Terror / -

Humanitarian catastrophes, food crisis, hijacking, hostage taking, ethnic conflicts, endemic violence. We hear more and more talk about the Sahel in the media. There is a clear increase in interest in the region, which has become a new central hotspot for International Relations. This is a very new perspective on the Sahel, traditionally very much ignored. It is interesting to try to understand how it has passed from being the forgotten corner of the world to a major zone of problems threatening the “international community”. In this process elements of colonisation, decolonisation and globalisation converge in the scenario of a failed state where causes and consequences overlap in a complex vicious circle.

Difficult to define, the Sahel has traditionally been the ignored part of Africa. From the Arabic Sahil that means shore, the word Sahel referred to the border regions of the Sahara desert. The main (and almost only) factor of unity in the region is the climate, and even this is very relative and changes as the desert keeps on moving forward. It is a region ranging from Senegal to Djibouti that hosts a mosaic of populations with poverty and a growing scarcity of resources being one of the few things that they have in common. Disengagement from local development and the plundering of resources seem to have been the traditional approach of both colonial powers and emerging states. This attitude started to change after 9/11 and the beginning of the war on terror by the US, which started developing a number of military projects to fight terrorism in the region.

From then we have witnessed a clear change of approach to the Sahel by the major international powers. What has changed in the region for it to be argued to be the origin of the modern threats such as terrorism or drugs? Normally the responses evoked are the expansion of dangerous flows and networks (drugs, arms, terrorism). Nevertheless, these dynamics are not new. On the contrary, as a traditionally uncontrolled region, the Sahel has always been characterised by constant flux and trafficking from slaves to cigarettes. Rather, the new phenomenon would be the inclusion of these local dynamics in the flux of globalization, and, more specifically, their insertion into “the grey globalization”. An increasing grey zone, out of law and state control, where criminal networks spread freely.

“The international community” has almost only focused on these dangers of grey zones perceived as modern, but when we analyse these phenomena more carefully, it becomes clear that they are more than a product of globalisation. Let’s analyse for instance the symptomatic case of drug dealing, especially of cocaine. Located between producers (Latin America) and consumers (Europe), the region offers cocaine dealers the appropriate political scenario where many are keen to embrace such a source of money and power. Still, if a weak state represents an advantage to traffickers, a complete disorganisation of the territory becomes dangerous. And the evidence is that current flows move traffickers from Mali to a more stable Niger. This corroborates the idea that the major source of destabilisation in the Sahel is not mainly those by criminal networks.

Without neglecting the impact of external influences and manipulation, the central problems are not drug trafficking, or even terrorism, but their use as an instrument by actors undermining the state. This way, income from cocaine would have become a major political instrument for the army, the Tuaregs, and jihadists, all to fight state power. It is essential to understand the context in which the actors act. That context is in this case a failed state. This collapsed state needs to be understood within a whole economic and political trajectory of the state (where the impact of colonisation and decolonisation has an important role).

It is difficult to analyse which is the major source of problems in the Sahel. Quite contrary to this task, what is needed is precisely to admit the complexity of the situation where a huge range of factors are intertwined. Colonial history, decolonalisation, globalisation. These vulnerable states are the outcome of structural weaknesses that promote and exacerbate competition and impact of different actors. This includes both non-state actors (ethnic minorities, jihadists, traders, NGOs) as well as international and regional powers. This is not new in itself, but it is very much accelerated by globalisation. It is a vicious circle of past and present in which the legitimacy and the inability of states to control the territory are structurally undermined. Still, notwithstanding the new evaluation of the region, the majority of the approaches to the problem continue to be very simplistic and focalised on terrorism and drugs. Some analysts speak of a self-fulfilling prophecy. By focalising on terrorism we would have forgotten the polymorphic nature of the problem and precisely create the condition for it to develop.

And the consequences of a bad evaluation of the region extend their roots even further. Indeed, at the origin of those structural weaknesses, characterising the failed states, we find the traditional disengagement of the power states. The process of colonisation and decolonisation has had an undoubted impact on the failed state, from arbitrary frontiers to the absence of social investment. Even nowadays, the specific geopolitical interests in the region shown by the power states still refuse further engagement. The West focus on threats such as drugs and terrorism, the emerging states are mainly interested in raw materials, the Arab states using their religious influence, all to have a piece of the cake of this uncontrolled region.

So, it is by this indifference that the “international community” has created the conditions to make the Sahel a hotspot. It is precisely because it was considered no man’s land that it has become the dangerous zone of problems that it is today. It seems we are still in this situation of misunderstanding the region; a misunderstanding that risks giving surrendering to those heralding a self-fulfilling prophecy of terrorism and local state fragility. And the local population remains mostly forgotten, even if they are the only direct victims.

Mali: When Collective Security is Too Slow

Posted by Alberto Perez Vadillo / 4th February 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: ECOWAS, France, Mali / -

As if collective security was a student, the conflict in Mali has been a test to assess if it is up to the task of properly preventing and managing crises. In this respect, France’s recent intervention suggests that the student did not perform well. It makes it all the more important to examine how collective security operates, and analyse the specifics of the intervention planned by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Reflection on this issue will help us understand the prospect of global and regional collective security as a mechanism of security governance.

Collective security strives to prevent and end armed conflict. It is based on the idea that no aggression against a member state of the collective security regime will be tolerated. When an aggression does occur, the states will, theoretically, gather around the victim and assemble a force of overwhelming power, capable of dealing a swift and definite blow to the aggressor, thus provoking the end of its operations and deterring future evil intentions. Having said that, it should be remarked and understood that the response against the troublemaking actor has to be quick –please note the use of “actor” rather than “state”. Without a rapid reaction, there is no guarantee that the attacked state’s core security concerns –like sovereignty, territorial integrity or military capability- are damaged up to a point of no return. If this were to happen, a collective security regime would not only have failed, but also be seen as unreliable by its members. They might simply decide to leave and go back to schemes of self-help.

When thinking about the Malian case, collective security has a global and a regional perspective based on two different international institutions: the United Nations’ Security Council and ECOWAS. There is little doubt that both of those institutions, as well as international law, are ill-suited to frame and address aggressions originating from internal threats posed by irregular armies, like the one opposing Bamako. This complicates the issue. Among other things, it affects the range of policies available and, most importantly for this analysis, diminishes the sense of urgency the states attribute to the crisis.

After the March 2012 military coup, there has been much political infighting in Mali. The army and officials of the interim civil government, in particular, have held opposing views about the need for external intervention, with the latter supporting it. Finally, during the autumn of 2012, key Malian political figures, including the interim president Dioncounda Traore, asked for the ECOWAS intervention. This was a sensible choice, since the strength of the rebels might be too much for a weakened Malian army, which, in turn, is regarded with suspicion over its commitment to reinstate democratic normalcy.

Since rebels captured the north of Mali in April 2012, ECOWAS pushed for the intervention. The Security Council, with its resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012), gave the green light, but only after delaying its final decision to make ECOWAS present a clear intervention plan. The majority of Malian neighbours are deeply concern about the threat posed by the rebels, and this is a shared worry for Western powers like the UK, France and the US. Bearing in mind all of this, it is a striking fact that the intervention would not have taken place before September 2013. Such a delay is precisely what has caused the partial failure of collective security in the crisis in Mali and what makes the whole edifice of collective security tremble.

As a matter of fact, it is always possible that a policy gets lost in its implementation, and this applies to the case we are studying. Well before the UN resolution authorizing the intervention, there was a widespread agreement about the necessity of intervening. It was one of those strange moments in international politics when almost every relevant actor falls in line, at least around which policy should be chosen. However, back then there were already signs that certain actors might choose to pass the buck at the moment of truth. When UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon talked about only conditional backing to ECOWAS and gave no offer of financial support he was being the mouthpiece of many states that might well choose to pass the buck. Therefore, Security Council’s authorization amounts to little more than a seal of approval. For all of its importance, this normative requirement is just an element of collective security, not its essence.

With the UN resolution, the burden of assisting the Malian army to strengthen its position in the south and, eventually, retaking the north, was primarily carried by ECOWAS. Supposedly, other states, like France, would only have a supporting role. So far and in theory, commissioning action to an international organization like ECOWAS is not strange; it has already been done with NATO in other cases. The problem is when the commissioner has to assemble a well-organized and effective force to accomplish its objectives. That is when implementation is a serious issue that can delay the materialization of the policy. ECOWAS is formed by sixteen West African countries, from which Nigeria is by far the most important in military terms. According to reports, the Nigerian army, however, is not properly prepared to face a high-profile operation like the one in northern Mali. Besides, states like Mauritania and Algeria, although not members of ECOWAS, are also relevant to implement the policy. This leads to a long process to decide who adds what –for example, number of troops- to the common endeavor. The result is a dangerous delay in the implementation of the policy.

Even if we assume September had been the beginning of the intervention, since its authorization nine months would have passed. This is time enough for the enemy to plan, organize and try to achieve its objectives or at least maximize its military position to make the intervention more difficult and costly. With each day without action collective security loses its ability to deter present and future threats; each day without action is an advantage for the aggressor. From this rationale we can understand the rebels’ recent push southwards. They could have got to Bamako if their move had not triggered France’s reaction, which was a response to the Malian president plea for help. However, Paris’ intervention fundamentally changes the situation and frames it outside proper collective security. While it is true that ECOWAS will deploy its troops soon to help France and the Malians, this was only because the involvement of a powerful non-regional actor. Similarly, the Security Council and states like the UK and the US have backed Hollande’s France’s decision, but this cannot conceal the fact that this looks more like the not-so-old ways of managing security, instead of collective security.

In the long term, and despite the difficulty of the task, everyone fearful of Mali’s breakaway north becoming a haven for terrorism will benefit from the French intervention and its joint efforts with ECOWAS. However, in the end common gains are the result of Paris’ pursuit of its self-interest. Had France not have had postcolonial interests in Mali, inaction would have led to grim consequences. French geostrategic and economic concerns were the main drive for the country to intervene, not collective security in a broad sense. This does not mean that collective security as a governance mechanism is doomed to fail. It can work, like past ECOWAS low-profile interventions during the nineties have proved. But to face challenges like the one in Mali, regional collective security arrangements must be develop in two different, albeit complementary, ways. Obviously, there is a need to invest in proper structures and tools. Creating an ECOWAS rapid reaction force will be a must if the organization is to guarantee security in the region. However, this will not be easy if it is not coupled with a deeper sense of security community across the region. Without a certain degree of loyalty to security structures based on common values, bargaining games over immediate material costs will likely compromise the policy.

You might also want to read:

“The West and Radical Islamists in Mali”, by Marc Pierini, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

“Mali: War by Default”, by David Zounmenou, All Africa

“French Success in Mali May Herald War of the Shadows”, by Jonathan Marcus, BBC News

Central Asia: Renewed Focus on Kashmir

Posted by Carmen Alonso Villaseñor / 1st July 2012 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Central Asia, China, Geopolitics, India, Kashmir / -

The geostrategic situation in central Asia is likely to change dramatically in the next few years, and especially after 2014. Two main events will trigger this: the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan– leaving a power vacuum in the region-, and the already growing economic dominance of China, as well as India. The consequent rivalry for resources and influence in the region between is likely to have large consequences.

In this environment, the Kashmir conflict will be a scenario where the intentions and political strategy of China for this new context might be revealed. The solution of the conflict in this region between India and Pakistan remains complex, with no real prospect of a long-lasting agreement. The relative calm in the region seems to have been the result of the situation in Afghanistan and US pressure to put the conflict on halt to not exacerbate the difficulties it is facing already. Now, with the US removing itself from the equation, Beijing will become a more prominent variable. It has welcomed positive developments between Islamabad and New Delhi, but it has been reluctant to show its cards. The fate of Kashmir is now in the hands of three, rather than two, regional and nuclearly-armed rivals. India seems to have more to gain from this than Pakistan.

CHINA’S KASHMIR POLICY OVER TIME

Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, Kashmir has been the main battlefield for the projection of their rivalry. However, the Kashmir territorial dispute has been also a global concern, as it caused nuclear proliferation and cross-border terrorism.

China has not remained indifferent to the conflict either, even if its involvement has not been consistent. China´s Kashmir policy has rather flowed through different phases, each one determined by its own current interests in the region, its relations with Pakistan and India, and its general Asian strategy.

From neutrality in the 1950s, Beijing moved to a clear support of Pakistan during the 1960s and 70s, as a result of the take-over of Tibet and its own war with India in 1962. But since Deng Xiaping took over direction of China´s external policy in 1978, China returned to neutrality, as its relations with India improved. By early 1990s China´s position is that Kashmir conflict is a bilateral matter, and currently China clearly supports a peaceful solution to the conflict: Beijing is interested in a stable Asia and better relations with India.

The above stated different phases of the Beijing’s Kashmir policy are sketched by a network of complex interests and bilateral relations that will also influence China’s future position on the conflict. The most obvious of those interests is its own entanglement: India claims the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin of approximately 35,000 square kilometers as part of the territory in Ladaakh, Kashmir. This border area, even though it has no natural resources, has been strategic territory for China as it connects Tibet and Xinjiang. However, with the completion of numerous road and rail links to Lhasa from other parts of China, Aksai Chin has lost part of this significance for China.

Security and economic concerns are paramount to Beijing. Both elements are present in its relations with Pakistan and India, and the evolution of those is the key element that will define China´s approach to Kashmir´s conflict.

FROM INTIMACY TO MISTRUST

China´s cooperation with Pakistan has been strong over time. Pakistan is important for Beijing, both as a counter to India and also because of Chinese’s fight against separatist movements in its northwestern territories.

The conflict with Pakistan has distracted India from increasing its influence in the region, and has also been an obstacle in its relation with the US. In this sense China needs a strong Pakistan to contain India, to keep alive the situation of balance of power in South Asia. That is why China supported Pakistan renewed alliance with the US after 11/9. It was the only means to avoid Pakistan growing isolation in the international sphere, given its links with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Recently, however, fear of Islamic fundamentalism originating in Pakistan has also been a major concern for the Chinese. Terrorists helped radicalize Uighur separatists in Xinjiang in the 1990s and the Uighur still today find a safe haven in Pakistan´s tribal areas. The withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan will increase Beijing´s fears of terrorist destabilization of its western border; China needs a capable Islamabad of controlling this threat, and until now Pakistan has not proven a real ability or willingness to do so.

Economic interests are also part of the equation. China has invested in Pakistan infrastructures and transport routes –a significant example is the maintenance of the KKH road or the construction of the port complex at the naval base of Gwadar – as an important part of the Chinese strategy to reduce its dependence on oil supplies through the Malacca Straits and create alternative routes. In recent years the economic cooperation has continued growing, with increasing Chinese investment in different sectors, especially in energy and trade.

In the Boao Forum for Asia celebrated in April, China and Pakistan renewed their close relationship, thus formally showing the stability of their alliance. But even though Islamabad is still seen as a key piece in regional security, China has become increasingly weary of its reliability as a partner. It does not seem to be able to offer Beijing concrete results.

BALANCING POWERS

Chinese relation with India has been much more tortuous over time. Characterized by border disputes in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, the rivalry between the countries has resulted in several military confrontations in 1962, 1967 and 1987. However, in the last two decades they have relaunched their diplomatic ties.

The most powerful engine that promotes their improved relationship are the growing mutual economic interests. Trade and economic growth of both countries in south Asia has led towards cooperation in security issues as well: they share the necessity to confront the threat of organized crime, terrorism and domestic instability of countries in the region. They also share a common interest- both being rising powers- to limit United States influence in their own backyard, as well as in improving their representation in international institutions.

Even though it is true that India is an increasingly important strategic ally for the US, mainly as a possible counterweight against China in Asia, there are also concerns about their relationship. Obama’s protectionist economic policies, the US close relationship with Pakistan and its renewed emphasis on non-proliferation all put pressure on India. Just like China, India has begun to wonder if its neighboring rival could be a more useful partner than its natural friend. Some specific efforts at solidifying these mutual interests were already attempted in the past, such as the “Strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” agreed by Wen Jiabao and Manmohan Singh in April 2005.

Of course, the Sino-Pakistani strategic nexus remains a concern worry for India. China is the main provider of military capabilities to Pakistan and that is a clear threat to India, as well as seen as a display of Beijing´s hostility. Similarly, the militarization of their disputed border areas, though stable, is a focus of tension between the countries. China´s growing presence in Myanmar and in other small countries in south Asia are interpreted as a struggle for dominance of the Indian Ocean. China wants multi-dimensional (including military) cooperation with most of the region for economic and strategic reasons. Some of the countries (Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, etc.) are in the traditional sphere of influence of New Delhi, creating even greater tensions between the two most populous nations in the world

WHERE DOES CHINA GO?

With the nuclear threat ever surrounding the Kashmir conflict and its three regional rivals, the direction that China chooses in the next years is no trivial matter. Its natural ally, Pakistan, is increasingly seen as untrustworthy and unable to support China in it ambitions. Whereas in theory its position is strong, practice has created serious doubts on whether it really has anything tangible to offer.

Its natural rival, India, is still very much a source of strategic concern and practical headaches, but is also respected in Beijing. The fact that they have so many areas of contention paradoxically also means that they have a lot to offer each other. Mutual cooperation might allow dealing at the detriment of Pakistan and the United States. Diplomatic support in the Kashmir conflict is a bargaining chip that China might very well be willing to offer India in exchange for more important issues on the People’s Republic’s agenda.

« First ‹ Previous 5 678 9 Next ›Last »

All posts in Analysis