All posts tagged Sahel

International Focus Shifting towards the Sahel

Posted by Paula Sánchez de la Blanca / 1st May 2013 / Categories: Analysis / Tags: Sahel, War on Terror / -

Humanitarian catastrophes, food crisis, hijacking, hostage taking, ethnic conflicts, endemic violence. We hear more and more talk about the Sahel in the media. There is a clear increase in interest in the region, which has become a new central hotspot for International Relations. This is a very new perspective on the Sahel, traditionally very much ignored. It is interesting to try to understand how it has passed from being the forgotten corner of the world to a major zone of problems threatening the “international community”. In this process elements of colonisation, decolonisation and globalisation converge in the scenario of a failed state where causes and consequences overlap in a complex vicious circle.

Difficult to define, the Sahel has traditionally been the ignored part of Africa. From the Arabic Sahil that means shore, the word Sahel referred to the border regions of the Sahara desert. The main (and almost only) factor of unity in the region is the climate, and even this is very relative and changes as the desert keeps on moving forward. It is a region ranging from Senegal to Djibouti that hosts a mosaic of populations with poverty and a growing scarcity of resources being one of the few things that they have in common. Disengagement from local development and the plundering of resources seem to have been the traditional approach of both colonial powers and emerging states. This attitude started to change after 9/11 and the beginning of the war on terror by the US, which started developing a number of military projects to fight terrorism in the region.

From then we have witnessed a clear change of approach to the Sahel by the major international powers. What has changed in the region for it to be argued to be the origin of the modern threats such as terrorism or drugs? Normally the responses evoked are the expansion of dangerous flows and networks (drugs, arms, terrorism). Nevertheless, these dynamics are not new. On the contrary, as a traditionally uncontrolled region, the Sahel has always been characterised by constant flux and trafficking from slaves to cigarettes. Rather, the new phenomenon would be the inclusion of these local dynamics in the flux of globalization, and, more specifically, their insertion into “the grey globalization”. An increasing grey zone, out of law and state control, where criminal networks spread freely.

“The international community” has almost only focused on these dangers of grey zones perceived as modern, but when we analyse these phenomena more carefully, it becomes clear that they are more than a product of globalisation. Let’s analyse for instance the symptomatic case of drug dealing, especially of cocaine. Located between producers (Latin America) and consumers (Europe), the region offers cocaine dealers the appropriate political scenario where many are keen to embrace such a source of money and power. Still, if a weak state represents an advantage to traffickers, a complete disorganisation of the territory becomes dangerous. And the evidence is that current flows move traffickers from Mali to a more stable Niger. This corroborates the idea that the major source of destabilisation in the Sahel is not mainly those by criminal networks.

Without neglecting the impact of external influences and manipulation, the central problems are not drug trafficking, or even terrorism, but their use as an instrument by actors undermining the state. This way, income from cocaine would have become a major political instrument for the army, the Tuaregs, and jihadists, all to fight state power. It is essential to understand the context in which the actors act. That context is in this case a failed state. This collapsed state needs to be understood within a whole economic and political trajectory of the state (where the impact of colonisation and decolonisation has an important role).

It is difficult to analyse which is the major source of problems in the Sahel. Quite contrary to this task, what is needed is precisely to admit the complexity of the situation where a huge range of factors are intertwined. Colonial history, decolonalisation, globalisation. These vulnerable states are the outcome of structural weaknesses that promote and exacerbate competition and impact of different actors. This includes both non-state actors (ethnic minorities, jihadists, traders, NGOs) as well as international and regional powers. This is not new in itself, but it is very much accelerated by globalisation. It is a vicious circle of past and present in which the legitimacy and the inability of states to control the territory are structurally undermined. Still, notwithstanding the new evaluation of the region, the majority of the approaches to the problem continue to be very simplistic and focalised on terrorism and drugs. Some analysts speak of a self-fulfilling prophecy. By focalising on terrorism we would have forgotten the polymorphic nature of the problem and precisely create the condition for it to develop.

And the consequences of a bad evaluation of the region extend their roots even further. Indeed, at the origin of those structural weaknesses, characterising the failed states, we find the traditional disengagement of the power states. The process of colonisation and decolonisation has had an undoubted impact on the failed state, from arbitrary frontiers to the absence of social investment. Even nowadays, the specific geopolitical interests in the region shown by the power states still refuse further engagement. The West focus on threats such as drugs and terrorism, the emerging states are mainly interested in raw materials, the Arab states using their religious influence, all to have a piece of the cake of this uncontrolled region.

So, it is by this indifference that the “international community” has created the conditions to make the Sahel a hotspot. It is precisely because it was considered no man’s land that it has become the dangerous zone of problems that it is today. It seems we are still in this situation of misunderstanding the region; a misunderstanding that risks giving surrendering to those heralding a self-fulfilling prophecy of terrorism and local state fragility. And the local population remains mostly forgotten, even if they are the only direct victims.

Conspiracy in the Sahel? Would that it were

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 28th February 2013 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: AFRICOM, Mali, Mauritania, Sahel / -

With Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger and various other countries in the Sahel suffering from instability and foreign intervention, conspiracy theories about Western control are running amok. They always do, especially in the complex context of international relations. Conspiracy theories give us comfort and shelter against the much harsher realities of our world. Unfortunately, they also block serious analysis and our quest for solutions. The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is no different: it is essential to analyse and tackle the very real challenges in the region- including Western involvement- without reaching for counter-productive conspiracy comfort food.

Countries of the Sahel combine an inherent fragility caused by poor economic conditions with post-colonial divisions that make national stability difficult: ethnic and religious lines run right across borders and divide nations into disperse communities. Proper infrastructure is scarce. Even with good governance policies, such a situation would always be difficult to manage.

Whereas until 2001 the region was largely ignored by Western policy, and mostly left to development cooperation and humanitarian actors, 9/11 changed everything. Since then, it has very much been on the radar screen of offices in Washington and the main European capitals.

Not only does the Sahel represent a religious fault-line between Islam in the north and Christianity in the south, but weak control of central governments plus a lack of Western presence created perfect local hiding spots for terrorist groups. Or, at least, that was the argument for getting involved. And thus, since the War on Terror began, financial, political and military resources have been pouring into countries like Mali. The discovery of natural resources in the region accelerated these dynamics even further.

In parallel, and following the same religious-default-line argument, missionaries from both the Christian world as well as from countries such Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began flooding in. A moderate and inclusive version of Islam that communities in the Sahel typically follow is quickly being radicalized through this clash of religious civilizations. A clash that can be witnessed in most of sub-Saharan Africa through the proliferation of evangelical churches and mosques on every street corner, but which is particularly pernicious in those countries that until recently had a certain religious equilibrium of moderation and tolerance.

Even ignoring ethical concerns about foreign intervention in local societies, it is not difficult to see how destabilizing Western policies can be. The US AFRICOM, with a budget of roughly $300 million and almost four thousand personnel, is a game-changer in terms of local security. Similarly, when France intervenes through Operation Serval, the local balance of power shifts dramatically. This destabilization would occur even if such intervention is coherent and with clear purpose. As it stands, they are neither: Western governments, like any large organization, respond and act according to a multitude of internal and external pressures, resulting in inconsistent and deficient outcomes.

This is exactly where conspiracy theorists consistently get it wrong, and are detrimental to the search for better policies. Western actors in the Sahel undoubtedly prioritise their own agendas over the interest of local populations. They also will try to cover this up by formal discourse using all the tools in the box: human rights, democracy, development, anti-terrorism, and other such generic and vacuous terminology. And yet, there is no “Western agenda” as such. Instead, there is an amalgamation of a plurality of Western actors with specific objectives, some internal, and some with respect to local situation.

Before foreign policy is articulated and implemented, it will have been influenced by a multitude of actors focussed on disperse agendas. Some of those (such as defence contractors or oil multinationals) will want to use local instability for economic profit. Others will focus on expanding their range of activities to stay relevant in 21st Century complexities. This can be applied to the Pentagon as well as to religious or humanitarian organizations. The former will convince itself that its existence is vital for international security, and that, as such, their work represents a moral imperative by protecting the US population. Similarly, the latter believe they have a moral responsibility towards the souls or lives of local populations. At the same time, Malian diplomats will lobby the White House to support the political leader they represent, often with true conviction and purpose. And Human Rights groups will lobby the UN to condemn the very same political leader.

All, however, push for an expansion of their own importance, size and influence. What is more, this game of identifying groups influencing international policy can be played with respect to each individual lobby as well. The Pentagon does not represent a uniform set of interests. Nor do human rights groups. Any NGO will consist of some people who choose to work there because of non-financial agendas, such as religious or moral concerns. To others, it is just a job like any other. Both types, however, will have as a primary objective the survival and growth of their own organisation.

When analysing actors at the lowest possible level, i.e. the individual CEO, criminal mastermind, local diplomat, advocate, analyst, secretary, aid worker or lobbyist, people tend to be terrible at understanding the complexity of their own environment. As a result, and even if we have a clearly identified purpose, we tend to fail at understanding the role we need to play to properly influence such a complex system. Furthermore, the moment agendas are shared between individuals, information tends to be leaked. Groups are not particularly good at keeping secrets.

Within such complexity, any large scale policies or operations tend towards destruction rather than creation. Not because of some master plan that defends the interests of a selected few, but because of the people’s inability to create any type of master plan in the first place. The days of clearly developed Napoleonic campaigns are long gone, and even Bonaparte had to contend with numerous lobbyists and complex influences. Within this context, the best is to be as modest as possible with respect to local interventions- whether they be military, economic or humanitarian- and work on a daily basis to understand and improve the internal dynamics that lead to such decision making in the first place. In other words, know thyself.

Western policy in the Sahel is largely responsible for the destruction and violence taking place at the moment. The irony that locally based terrorism could become a reality through anti-terrorist programmes was not difficult to foresee. And yes, some actors may have actually pushed for this to happen. But the main reason is not a controlled conspiracies emanating from Washington or Parisian offices, but the lack of control and lack of purpose that complicated internal human systems always display.

This is a much scarier thought than any conspiracy theory could ever be: human beings- including its most powerful individuals- are not in control of their own destiny. All we can do is try to steer society in the right direction by analysing and improving our systems’ internal mechanisms. Putting one’s head in the sand by eating the comfort food provided by conspiracy theorists only undermines such a worthy cause. Reality is difficult enough, and there is no need to create imaginary foes.