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Many students of international sanctions recognize some sort of progress of sanctions as coercive tools. In this essay I attempt to look beyond the issue of economic effectiveness, and into the origins of sanctions; the sources of power that decide under which circumstances UN sanctions should be imposed and that decide which should be the objectives of UN sanctions policy. This leads us to ask another set of questions: How can UN sanctions create international security? Which threats to security should be sanctioned? Who are the usual suspects? And who is deemed fit to play the role of sheriff? In this essay I look at the history of UN sanctions policy in order to answer two questions. (1) How have sanctions changed? And (2) Why did sanctions change?

In the first part of the essay I will show that sanctions have not only become better at undermining targets economically, but that the norms and values that surround sanctions policy have also changed substantially. The power of institutions and ideas has been especially strong in determining when sanctions may be imposed. Throughout history, UN sanctions have been imposed for increasingly ambitious goals with regard to ideas such as racial equality, human security, and liberal democracy. As tools of an ever more precise machine, UN sanctions help to terminate conflicts and to protect human rights, and even to construct a sustainable liberal peace.

In the second part I will explain that the ideas behind UN sanctions policy have become so institutionalized in global governance that one would almost consider them as mere bureaucratic functions, free of power. However, the ideas that are embedded in UN sanctions policy were forwarded *by someone* and *for something*. Why did these ideas about sanctions, and not other ideas, become institutionalized? I will show that the norms and values surrounding UN sanctions are not only *projections* of power, but also *reflections* of constitutive power. The ideas that dominate contemporary UN sanctions policy were not god-sent or the product of exact science; they were created by people with histories, needs, and beliefs.

A HISTORY OF UN SANCTIONS AS TOOLS

UN Sanctions have changed dramatically as tools of foreign policy. Classically, comprehensive economic sanctions were used to force governments into making or unmaking political decisions or to sign peace agreements in interstate conflicts. Such comprehensive sanctions had a symbolic power, but above all they

affected the target economically, as the sanctions would normally have the shape of a trade embargo in order to hurt the target's economy. As Woodrow Wilson said at the inauguration of the League of Nations:

*"A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist."*¹

However, multilateral sanctions hardly existed in the League of Nations and the United Nations until the 1990s. Most sanctions were imposed unilaterally by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. As a matter of fact, out of 121 sanctions episodes selected between 1914 and 1990, 77 were imposed by the United States, sometimes in coordination with allies, but mostly unilaterally. The US was especially active in the 1970s and 1980s, unilaterally sanctioning regimes in Central America, South America, and Asia. The United Nations were mostly put offside during the Cold War. UN sanctions were only imposed twice, regarding racist regimes in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa.

Comprehensive trade sanctions would oftentimes be poorly implemented economically, and hopelessly ineffective politically. One well-known large-N study on sanctions episodes between 1914 and 1990 claimed a 34 percent success rate (Hufbauer et al, 2009). However, critics have argued that this rate should be adjusted downward, as many of the acclaimed successes were actually achieved through military intervention, and because some sanctions episodes should in reality be regarded as trade disputes without any political objectives (Pape, 1997).

Regardless of the quibbling over success-rates, it is possible to recognize some variables that undoubtedly make sanctions effective as tools. Firstly, there is the simple recognition that comprehensive trade sanctions are more impressive when they are imposed by a powerful state, or group of states. On the receiving side, sanctions are more effective when the target is a small country, preferably dependent economically on the sending party (Galtung, 1967). Sanctions are also more likely to be politically effective when the groups at hand are 'friends' rather than enemies.

Of course a sanctions episode needs to be watertight in order to be credible; the target has to feel the pain, especially when it is not likely to be persuaded based on normative arguments. So implementation is key (Cortright & Lopez, 2000). But although economic pain is a necessity for credibility, it does not necessarily lead to political gain. The UN sanctions episodes of the early 1990's show that sanctions can have nasty side-effects, and that the tool of sanctions is not always as 'peaceful' as imagined. The comprehensive UN sanctions episodes on Iraq (1990), Haiti (1993), and Yugoslavia (1992) were very successful economically, but also gravely impoverished innocent civilians. The sanctions episode on Iraq was especially cruel, leading to a load of criticism on the peaceful character of sanctions and a call for an alternative. Subsequent UN sanctions regimes, such as those on Liberia, Rwanda, and Eritrea, were a lot softer, often only comprising of easily violatable and poorly implemented arms embargoes.

¹Padover, Saul, K: "Wilson's Ideals", American Council on Public Affairs, Washington (1942). Quoted in Hufbauer, Gary, Schott, Jeffrey & Elliot, Kimberly Ann: "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered History and Current Policy". Washington D.C. Institute for International Economics, 3rd ed. (2009), page 1.

Around the end of the century these criticisms were addressed by the introduction of what we know as ‘smart’ sanctions, or targeted sanctions. For example, the UN would impose aviation sanctions on targets or travel sanctions on targeted individuals, thereby complicating and actually criminalizing the travel of government officials, army officers, or rebel leaders. Another way to undermine the actions of targets, the UN would freeze the assets of targeted individuals or entities responsible for or financing conflict, slavery, rape, or recruitment of child soldiers. Together with the introduction of UN Expert Panels to monitor sanctions regimes and blueprints that indicate how to implement sanctions into national legal frameworks, sanctions have become increasingly effective tools.

Most scholarly research on international sanctions also recognizes this progress of sanctions as tools of coercion (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 2009; Cortright & Lopez, 2000; Wallensteen, 2005). Much of this progress was achieved at the end of the 1990s, when three international conferences on targeted sanctions were held in Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm between 1999 and 2003. In these conferences the ground would be laid for the use of effective targeted sanctions. The conferences brought standardized UN resolutions and legal frameworks to improve the implementation of sanctions in national legislatures. It also centralized a lot of expertise on how to impose and monitor arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans.

A ground-breaking sanctions regime was that on the UNITA rebel movement in Angola. After decades of civil war and half-hearted arms-embargoes, the UN sanctions committee under Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler was the first to effectively impose and monitor sanctions on UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi and his financial and military network. Sanctions were effectively imposed on the export of conflict-diamonds, as well as on the import of arms and on the international travels of UNITA officials. Subsequent UN sanctions regimes on other African civil conflicts have since followed a similar strategy.

A HISTORY OF UN SANCTIONS AS NORMS

Scholars have also noted that international sanctions have been used for different types of objectives over time. For example, Hufbauer et al recognized an important shift in the 1990s, “reflecting a new political kaleidoscope after the Cold War”. In the 1990s Western sanctions against the former Soviet Union sharply diminished, while Russia actually increasingly sanctioned its own ex-satellite states. The 1990s also meant a geographical shift towards Africa. 14 out of 30 sanctions cases that were initiated in the 1990s and that were somehow connected to democratization concerned countries in Africa.²

The most important shift of the 1990s is perhaps the shift towards multilateralism and the final blossoming of the United Nations as a central actor in the age of globalization. As a matter of fact, one of the most influential books on sanctions regards an evaluation of UN sanctions policy in the 1990s, titled ‘The Sanctions Decade’ (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).

² Hufbauer, Gary, Schott, Jeffrey & Elliot, Kimberly Ann: “*Economic Sanctions Reconsidered History and Current Policy*” ,Washington D.C. Institute for International Economics, 3rd ed. (2009)

Students of sanctions have also recognized that the UN sanctions episodes of the 1990s served a diverse range of purposes: 'to reverse territorial aggression, to restore democratically elected leaders, to promote human rights, to deter and punish terrorism, and to promote disarmament'.³ In the new millennium we might add purposes such as 'to undermine the networks of rebel movements, to deter and punish nuclear proliferation, and to promote good governance in failed states'.

However, even though most scholars do recognize the fact that sanctions can serve many purposes, all of them simply use this information as a disclaimer in their search for a formula for effective sanctions. For example, Chesterman noted that it is important to mention that 'even when there is agreement to impose sanctions on a state or other actor, this agreement may in fact stem from different reasons particular to the various states imposing the sanctions. This makes it difficult to identify objectives, and hence difficult to measure effectiveness. Hufbauer et al recognize that democratization has become a more important purpose, but do not go further than a simple recognition. The general conclusion holds that sanctions can be imposed for different goals, so their effectiveness is difficult to measure and compare.

Unfortunately, no studies on UN sanctions have solely focused on the purposes of sanctions throughout history. This is strange, because sanctions are inextricably linked to values about what we consider right and wrong, and these values have clearly changed over time. Why isn't there a single overview and analysis of the purposes of UN sanctions episodes between 1945 and 2010 that evaluates the cases at hand based on the values that underlie them? In the following paragraphs I will show how the moral values behind UN sanctions have changed over time. Subsequently, I will also ask where these values come from, and what this says about power in UN sanctions policy.

Since the end of WWII the United Nations has imposed sanctions on over two dozen countries, for various reasons and with mixed success. Interestingly, the norms that surround the question "when should sanctions be imposed?" have changed a lot over time. Let us have a look on which 'crimes' have been deemed punishable over the past decades.

Originally, the UN institutional framework aimed at preventing large scale conflict between the world's major powers. The system provided a sanctions-mechanism for dealing with intra-state conflict between sovereign member-states. Comprehensive economic sanctions were to be a heavily persuasive tool in order to keep aggressor states in line. Of course this configuration had much to do with the trauma of WWII: the types of conflicts that dominated the nightmares of de Gaulle, Truman, and Churchill were Westphalian conflicts.

Due to the Cold War deadlock, sanctions were only used twice in the period between 1945 and 1990, on Rhodesia and South Africa. Surprisingly, neither of these sanctions episodes were reactions to large-scale interstate conflicts; they were reactions to racist governments and apartheid politics in the era of decolonization. Neither Rhodesia nor South Africa formed threats to international security. It was the concept of racial equality that triggered the international pressure for sanctions; not the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. Norms about racial equality were thus crucial in deciding who should be sanctioned in the international system.

³ Cortright, David, Conroy, Richard & Lopez, A. George: "*The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s*". Boulder CO etc.: Lynne Rienner (2000), page 2

For the next instance of UN sanctions we have to skip forward to the year 1990, in which Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacked neighbouring Kuwait, triggering the most comprehensive and watertight sanctions ever imposed by the United Nations. They were also the cruelest. The oil embargo, in combination with a trade embargo completely isolated Iraq, leading to dire circumstances among the people of Iraq and a wave of international criticism. Ironically, the UN sanctions regime on Iraq has so far been the only case in which UN sanctions reacted to an act of international aggression.

The episodes on Haiti (1993-1994) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-1995) were subject to similar forms of criticism on their harsh nature. However, the cases of Iraq, Haiti and Yugoslavia were also very different from each other if we look at the values that led to the imposition of UN sanctions. Iraq was sanctioned as a reaction to the attack on neighbouring Kuwait. Ironically, Iraq represents one out of only two cases in which an aggressor state was ever sanctioned by the UN as a reaction to an interstate war (the other case is Ethiopia – Eritrea, 1998-2000). The sanctions regime on Haiti was a reaction to a coup d'état, and had the objective of bringing back to power the democratically elected president Bernard Aristide. Thirdly, the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were a reaction to a semi-domestic conflict after the cessation of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. It was the first time the UN imposed sanctions in reaction to a civil war.

So far, the first five UN sanctions episodes had four different normative arguments: racist white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, interstate aggression in Iraq, a coup d'état in Haiti, and a civil war in Yugoslavia. Only one of them was in line with the traditional UN policy of non-interference.

Throughout the rest of the 1990s, more civil conflicts, mainly in Africa, would be at the centre of UN sanctions policy. The new threats to security apparently lay with civil wars. And there were plenty of civil wars in the 1990s. The notion of Westphalian peacekeeping had made place for a more ambitious plan. UN sanctions had to protect civilians from their own governments and from each other. The time of absolute sovereignty had passed.

In 1992, the UN Security Council, in coordination with ECOWAS, imposed an arms embargo on Liberia with the objective to stop the civil war. In that same year it did the same with regard to Somalia and parts of Cambodia, whose citizens were also fighting amongst each other. The same logic underlined subsequent UN sanctions episodes on governments and rebel movements in Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia. In these 'new wars', civilians, rebels, warlords, arms brokers, mining companies and Diasporas created dark realities that much resembled the world described in Kaplan's 'Coming Anarchy'.

So civil wars were at the centre of UN sanctions policy in the 1990s. But civil wars were not the only threats of the 1990s; the UN also sanctioned two other types of threats: terrorists and countries that were trying to build nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In 1992 the Security Council agreed to impose sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in response to the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, in which two Libyan suspected terrorists were protected by the Kaddafi regime. It represented the first time that the organization had used sanctions against international terrorism. A similar scenario was played out with regard to the Sudanese government in 1996, which refused to extradite the terrorists that were suspected to have attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In 1999 the Security Council also agreed on

imposing targeted sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who was harbouring the then relatively unknown Osama bin Laden.

Finally, North Korea and Iran represent the last threats to international security that have been sanctioned by the Security Council. North Korea and Iran are of course not the only countries that have developed nuclear weapons during the last decades. India, Pakistan, and Israel also did so, but they were not sanctioned for doing so, or at least not by the UN. North Korea was first sanctioned by the UN in 1993. Iran was only sanctioned in 2006, although the country has been subject to unilateral sanctions by the US since 1979.

Let us count the score again. Which threats to security and which moral values have steered UN sanctions policy in the 1990s? We have gone from racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa to interstate wars in Iraq-Kuwait and Ethiopia-Eritrea; coup d'états in Haiti; civil wars in Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, and Cambodia; terrorism in Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan; and nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran. In the 2000s the lists of coup d'états, civil wars, and terrorists would grow further, with cases such as Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, and Al Qaeda.

But there are other moral objectives that have slowly but surely found their way into UN sanctions policy. Democratization, the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and good resource governance have become increasingly important goals of UN sanctions regimes. These governance goals are not directly related to physical threats of war. These objectives don't serve the goal of conflict resolution or peacemaking. Rather, they tell us a lot about how the international community intends to establish a sustainable peace *after* war. In this sense sanctions have also become tools of conflict prevention; tools of peace building.

The United States have been trying to democratize countries through conditioning sanctions since the 1970s. The UN has started doing so in the 1990s, although carefully at first. The Security Council resolutions that regarded sanctions on Liberia (1992), Angola (1993), Cambodia (1993) Rwanda (1994), and Sierra Leone (1997) made no specific mention of establishing or restoring democracy, although the peace agreements that the sanctions promoted did include provisions for democratic elections.

The switch to targeted sanctions and resource related sanctions also brought along a shift towards good governance. The UN sanctions committee on Angola under the coordination of Robert Fowler for the first time linked the exploitation of diamonds to the financing of the rebel movement and decided to impose a diamond embargo. This embargo was effective through the naming and shaming of diamond traders and thanks to the cooperation of the De Beers diamond company. On top, the lifting of the embargo would also be linked to the establishment of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which ensured the legal export of diamonds through the government of Angola, and greatly diminished the profits of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA network. The KPCS has later also been linked to UN sanctions regimes in Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia, and Ivory Coast, among others.

A similar scheme was put in place in eastern Congo in 2010, where armed groups have been financing conflict through the exploitation of gold, copper, tin-ore, and other minerals. Although the UN sanctions committee has not imposed full embargoes on the exports of these resources, it has supported guidelines

for due diligence, which indicate that companies that import raw materials from eastern Congo have to make sure their money does not finance conflict.

The linkage of natural resources and good governance is not completely new. As a matter of fact, the UN sanctions on Iraq did not only include an oil embargo, they also dictated what the Iraqi government could do with oil export through the oil-for-food programme. Similarly, the UN sanctions on Libya in 2012 also froze the assets of Libya's national bank and oil-funds, stating that the sanctions would be lifted when the new government assured that these funds would be used to benefit the Libyan people.

The UN timber-embargo on Liberia in 2003 was perhaps the most ambitious type of sanction as far as governance objectives go. The embargo was installed just *after* the ousting of warlord Charles Taylor and the signing of a peace-agreement. Timber exports had been an important financier of war, and renewed conflict still loomed. After lobbying efforts by Liberian civil society organizations and investigations by a UN expert panel, the export of logs was forbidden until all existing logging-contracts had been cancelled and renegotiating under an accountable and transparent national timber law. This law had to protect the interests of local communities, the environment, and the commercial interests of the government of Liberia. When this new legal framework finally went through congress in 2006 with the inauguration of the new president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the sanctions were lifted.

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF PUNISHABLE CRIMES

	League of Nations 1919-1945	Cold War 1945-1989	Sanctions Decade 1990-1999	Targeted Sanctions Decade 2000-2010
Racist Governments	0	2	0	0
Interstate Wars	4	0	2	2
Civil Conflict	0	0	8	4
Coup d'état	0	0	1	1
Terrorism	0	0	3	0
Nuclear proliferation	0	0	2	1

The various norms that have steered UN sanctions policy over the decades can be summarized as in the table above. For the purpose of comparison I have included the sanctions episodes of the League of Nations too, all of which were imposed as reactions to classical interstate wars. This, along with WWII, helps explain why the UN charter was institutionalized as it was, focusing on the threat of aggression and giving the major powers a right to veto. During the Cold War, plenty of conflicts were fought all over the globe, but the only instances in which sanctions were used regarded domestic issues of white minority governments in Africa. The sanctions decade brought along a big shift; not only in quantity, but also with regard to the right to sovereignty and the idea of human security.

The targeted sanctions decade is usually mentioned because of the change of tools to deal with civil conflicts. And indeed, the use of asset freezes, travel sanctions, and commodity sanctions has made sanctions a lot more effective. However, since the late 1990s there has also been an increasing focus on

democratization and governance as objectives of sanctions. Democratization and governance are both pro-active objectives, rather than re-active ones. They dictate what should happen in order to secure sustainable peace after conflict. Democratization has been linked to UN sanctions policy since the 1990s, but with the switch to targeted sanctions, specifically commodity sanctions, it has also become increasingly possible to link sanctions to governance and the establishment of institutions.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the switch to targeted sanctions has not only influenced their effectiveness, but also their image as tools of punishment rather than persuasion. Thanks to improved implementation, the standardization of legal frameworks, and the use of expert panels to monitor sanctions, targeted sanctions have become better at weakening networks of warlords, authoritarian regimes, and terrorists. But students of sanctions don't seem to note that with this shift, sanctions have turned into weapons of economic warfare rather than political persuasion. The objective of targeted sanctions just seems to be to weaken the enemy militarily and economically. There is little persuasive power behind this strategy. Of course this argument only goes for sanctions during conflict; post-conflict governance sanctions can be quite persuasive.

POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Throughout history, the norms surrounding UN sanctions have thus changed, or even evolved, in several ways. They have been used as re-active tools to stop aggressors, racist regimes, rebels, dictators, terrorists, and nuclear aficionados. As pro-active instruments they have also been used to promote conflict resolution (internationally and domestically), human rights, democratization, and good governance. All these ideas have become strongly institutionalized in the UN framework, and dictate when the international community should come into action to sanction wrongdoers.

What does this tell us about power in international sanctions policy? Are the norms we live by like dictators that restrain the power of states to do as they please? In a way they are. After all, states can't just go about sanctioning targets as they please or for any reason. The norms regarding sanctions, institutionalized in the UN framework, restrain the power of states to follow their self-interest.

However, in order to get sanctions imposed one needs more than just a good argument. After all, in international society the rule of law is not as strictly followed as in western domestic societies. Citizens that break the law 'automatically' go to jail. Countries that break the law might get away with it if they have allies in court, i.e. the Security Council. The failure to impose sanctions on Syria is a clear-cut example of the influence of power politics. Even when sanctions do get imposed, self interested states can influence the situation by lacking the willingness to implement sanctions, or by actively acting as spoilers.

Leaving aside for a moment all the cases in which sanctions 'should' have been imposed, in general we can recognize that the ideas that steer UN sanctions policy have progressed substantially over time. In general, everybody agrees that aggression should be punished; that racism should be exterminated; that human rights should be protected; and that governments should not kill their own citizens. In 1945, the members of the UN only shared the first goal of protecting sovereignty. The norms regarding racial equality, human

rights, and conditional sovereignty are inventions that we have conjured up since. Nowadays, they are so vested in our global psyche that we can't imagine ever having opinionated differently. It shows us how malleable the social world is, and how intangible ideas can create very touchable realities.

The institutions dictating UN sanctions policy have become very much embedded in our thinking about international security issues. We don't only agree on which actions should be punished, we also agree on how countries should be rebuilt *after* conflict. We would almost forget that the rules that surround UN sanctions policy and post-conflict peace building were made by people, not imposed through nature. The realization that institutions are made by *someone* and for *something* is very instructive when analyzing the pro-active objectives of UN sanctions policy. Whereas in the globalized world we all agree more or less about what is considered 'unlawful' behaviour in the international arena, we definitely do not agree on how we can best create the circumstances for sustainable peace. Many scholars argue that quick democratization can threaten the peace in states that have recently come out of conflict. Several authors are convinced that not economic liberalization, but rather protectionist state-led development is the way towards sustainable economic growth in poor post-conflict societies. The Chinese don't even seem to agree on the idea of human security and interventions in civil conflicts, rather sticking to the traditional idea of Westphalian sovereignty.

So if the ideas that dictate UN sanctions policy are flexible through space and time; and if they are not universally shared; then where does the 'moral progress' in UN sanctions policy come from? Which sources of power can determine under which circumstances sanctions should be imposed? Who has the power to use global governance institutions to their advantage? And which sources of power can make sanctions regimes economically effective?

There are several ways to consider power in global governance (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Depending on the issue that one studies, different forms of power are dominant, but in issues of global governance all of them play a role.

Compulsory power, most akin to classical realist power, refers to a direct interaction in which one actor intends to project direct control over another actor. In order to demonstrate compulsory power, one needs the material capacity, either economically or militarily, to make your subject act the way one wants. When states wage war, fight out economic disputes, or when they want another state to change its politics otherwise, compulsory power comes in handy.

Institutional power works more indirectly, as actors intend to project their power on other actors through the design of international institutions. Compulsory power and institutional power are both central to understanding the actions of UN member states with regard to the implementation of sanctions. Hard (compulsory) power is important in the analysis of realist scholars, who focus on the ability of actors to directly influence the behaviour of others. This hard power is weakened by the creation of moral rules and values as to what is permitted within the existing structure. Values about what is permitted in the international arena and about what is considered unlawful can be very powerful in determining who should get sanctioned.

Structural power concerns the very constitution or creation of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. It looks at the underlying identity structures of agents in the system.

Gramscians and historical materialists have examined how international organizations help to stabilize and spread a type of global governance that has a markedly liberal and capitalist character (Rupert & Smith; 2002, Murphy; 1994, Cox; 1992, Latham; 1999). The structure of global capitalism substantially determines the capacities and resources of actors, and it also shapes their ideology. Contemporary global governance as we know it can be seen a result of a global capitalist structure, in which capitalists determine the rules and the values that ought to be promoted with regard to international trade, civil society, and conflict. This structure creates *specific* collective action problems, which can be 'solved' through *specific* institutions. The institution of UN sanctions fortifies this structure.

Finally, productive power is also concerned with how power is created, but rather looks at the constitution of legitimate knowledge, values, and norms. Scholars that study productive power critically look at how and by whom 'problems' are constituted in socially diffuse contexts. With regard to UN interventions, central subjects include the socially problematic terms of 'weak states', 'terrorists', and 'the conflict economy', among others.

For the analysis of UN sanctions throughout history, compulsory power and institutional power seem the most straightforward perspectives to account for change. They form the machine within which the power-struggle between ideas and material capabilities is played out. The constitutive side of the story, explained through structural power and productive power, is oftentimes overlooked, as their configurations can be taken for granted by analysts. Let us look at the evolution of sanctions from each perspective.

POWER IN UN SANCTIONS POLICY

Compulsory power regards the power of one actor to directly influence or control the behaviour or the circumstances of another. In sanctions theory, compulsory power lies at the basis of their function. As a matter of fact, at the Inauguration of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, US President Woodrow Wilson argued that "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender." In making sanctions effective, compulsory power is thus a necessity. Those sanctioning states with the material capabilities to successfully implement and monitor a sanctions regime are more likely to get what they want. All things being equal, compulsory power tends to be necessary for backing up one's threats, even in the UN framework.

In principle the framework of the United Nations restrains members from using their compulsory power indiscriminately. Firstly, the actions of members have to be approved by the Security Council. This is a demonstration of structural power. This configuration gives some states structurally more power than others, while it gives all states structurally less power than in an anarchic system. Secondly, and more importantly, Resolutions have to adhere to certain normative standards. These values determine the playing field. But as we have seen, the values that dictate UN sanctions policy have changed over time. So where did they come from? In order to find an answer we have to consider who has productive power in the globalized world.

Is it possible to say that the norms that currently dominate the framework in which we sanction states are partly the result of the economic and military capacity of powerful states? Perhaps not directly, but hard power and soft power do often go hand in hand. In order to check whether those with hard power have also dominated the normative agenda of UN policy making, it makes sense to look at the state that has boasted most hard power since 1945: the United States. And indeed, the normative changes that took place with regard to UN sanctions policy were also promoted by the US.

The US was a big promoter of decolonization after WWI. The old European powers were not always equally eager to give up their old colonies; the road to independence was seldom bloodless, especially for African colonies. In the 1940s, the US imposed unilateral sanctions on the Netherlands with regard to the decolonization and recognition of Indonesia. The US was also influential in the decolonization of the Belgian Congo. Later, the UN would defend similar norms when it sanctioned Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.

In the 1970s, and 1980s, the US unilaterally sanctioned many regimes in Latin America and Asia, with the objectives of reversing coups, restoring democracy, and improving human rights. In 1972 The US, together with the UK, was also involved in sanctioning Uganda with the objectives of improving human rights and destabilizing the power of one of Africa's bloodiest dictators, Idi Amin. In America's own backyard, US unilateral sanctions targeted Pinochet's Chile, Videla's Argentina, and juntas in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, among other. Of course the interventionism of the United States is not without criticism, but the winds that brought human rights and democracy certainly came from the West.

During the Cold War, liberal values of western democracy didn't make it through the UN framework much. These values only came to be reflected in United Nations sanctions policy since the 1990s. Before the breakthrough of globalization, the idea that the UN Security Council might initiate action to promote democracy or build the rule of law "would have seemed not only fanciful, but highly dangerous."⁴ UN peacekeeping missions indeed restricted themselves to pure border-patrolling and tried not to interfere with the domestic politics of the nations that hosted them.

In the 1990s, the UN became much more progressive and ambitious as a peacekeeping institution. As new threats and new opportunities emerged after the Cold War, and as the age of globalization brought us an increasing feeling of interdependence, the United Nations as an institution had to adapt. The moral values underlying UN policy started resembling more and more those that the United States had promoted for decades. According to former Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty" had passed (Boutros Ghali; 1992). Coup d'états, civil wars, and human rights violations had to be addressed in order to evade the 'Coming Anarchy' and in order to build a sustainable peace. This peace was quite radically different from the traditional peace that the international community tried to safeguard before. It was a shift from macro-security to micro-security; from protecting states to protecting human beings. Besides protecting states from one another, civilians needed protection from their own governments, either because their governments were directly violating their human rights, or because they were too weak to protect civilians from local rebels, warlords, or other threats.

⁴ Farrall, Jeremy: "Impossible Expectations: The UN-Security Council's Promotion of the Rule of Law After Conflict", in book: Bowden, Brett ed. "The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict: Great Expectations", Cambridge University Press (2009)

In the 2000s the agenda for the protection of human security, rather than national security, was furthered by the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). Perhaps not surprisingly, the Responsibility to Protect also had its origins in America (Canada). Having been published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, a few months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the report argued that the changing international environment had implications for state sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty had to be earned. The idea of R2P was institutionalized in the UN in 2005, and the idea that civilians sometimes have to be protected from their own government or sub-state predators is now widely shared.

The sanctions episodes since the 1990s tell us something about contemporary threats to human security; security has to be assured for everyone, not just for the state. As a matter of fact, the state is oftentimes the problem. The idea of human security is central to UN peace operations, and also to UN sanctions episodes. The idea of human security is thus very powerful in global governance. In the globalized world, values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are very influential in deciding who should be sanctioned and who should not.

UN sanctions episodes do not only show us *who* form threats to international peace; they also show that the international community shares common objectives as to *how* the state should be fixed. All the peace agreements that were brokered by the UN included conditions that were linked to democratic elections, the creation of free markets, and the establishment of liberal institutions. If post-conflict governments want to regain full national sovereignty; if they want United Nations peacekeepers to leave the country and give the monopoly of legitimate violence back to the national police and army; the government at hand has to fulfil conditions that will help in safeguarding peace in the future.

The norms that underlie UN policy regarding sustainable peace building also find their origins in the United States and in neo-liberalism. In 1989 an American think-tank presented a list of 10 policy prescriptions that the World Bank, IMF, and the US treasury should use in order to promote macro-economic growth in Latin America. Coined by English economist John Williamson as the 'Washington Consensus', these policy prescriptions soon became blue-print for the developing world as a whole. The prescriptions were based on the ideas of trade-liberalization, privatization, and fiscal discipline. In combination with the triumphing values of democracy and human rights, and the general belief in a liberal, globalized, and peaceful world, the liberal peace soon became a mantra for western interventionists, including the UN.

If we look at the countries that were subject to UN interventions and sanctions episodes many of the usual suspects score poorly precisely on these indicators (Collier, 2008; Rotberg, 2004). They are prone to underdevelopment and conflict as a result of bad policies, and they can be helped by introducing the right policies. Global governance initiatives ranging from the UN itself, its sub-organizations, the World Bank, the IMF, national development agencies, and NGOs, aim at improving this liberal peace system, by coordinating efforts to monitor achievements and by correcting those countries that need help. Sometimes, the imposition of sanctions can work as a carrot-stick mechanism, in which good policies are rewarded while spoilers are punished.

All these ideas - whether one agrees with it or not - have had great influence on UN sanctions policy; they have become so integrated in global governance institutions, including the World Bank, NGO's, and civil society organizations, that one would almost forget that their policies are more than just bureaucratic

struggles. They represent very powerful ideas about *who* is a threat to peace and prosperity and *how* these threats can be mitigated. When institutionalized in norms and values and international law, they form a great machine that has the power to control actions of states, NGO's, corporations, and other organizations in a globalized world.

CONCLUSIONS

United Nations Sanctions have changed significantly over the past seven decades. What started out as a blunt and comprehensive tool to reverse territorial aggression, slowly turned into a more precise machine to affect only those groups and individuals responsible for conflicts and human rights violations. Thanks to improved legal frameworks and technical advancements, it has also become easier to implement and monitor targeted sanctions.

The changing configurations of UN sanctions episodes can however not be seen separate from the moral changes that took place simultaneously. These moral changes can be seen as consequences, or even as causes of the technical changes that have taken place in the politics that surround UN sanctions regimes. Sanctions have seldom been imposed for the reversal of territorial aggression; as a matter of fact, they were imposed on racist regimes in Southern Africa, as well as on military dictatorships that got to power through coup d'état's. In the 1990s the focus shifted towards rebel movements and warlords in civil conflicts. And while they were at it anyway, the lifting of sanctions was increasingly linked to conditions of democracy and good (western) governance. This makes UN sanctions episodes more politically comprehensive, and makes western values ever more dominant.

Global governance initiatives have become so embedded in the globalized world - especially the Western world - that the mechanisms through which the institutions are coordinated appear to be merely a technical machine; a machine in which power is hardly important. After all, agents in the system can only try to hold each other to the rules as well as possible. They can try to teach weak states to organize themselves better, and they can punish states that break the rules. The better they do so, the more efficient the system. Seen from this perspective, Institutions restrain compulsory power in the sense that states cannot act unilaterally to make other actors change their policy. Advocates of UN intervention or the imposition of sanctions have to justify their cause, and have to convince the members of the Security Council that the proposed agency lies within the legal and normal boundaries of the system.

However, institutions do not only restrain power; they are also a *source* of power. As we have seen, the ideas that dictate the playing field of UN sanctions policy have changed radically over time. And they did so because they were promoted by the industrialized West, most prominently the United States.

Getting an idea or moral standard institutionalized can bring actors long-term advantages to project their power over others. Some institutions are so strong that we consider them as hard facts of life, as 'universally shared', or 'inherently good'. We tend to forget, sometimes, that these ideas and moral standards were created *by someone* and *for something*, and that they change as actors change their interests and identities.

Drawing a parallel to UN sanctions, reaching perfection is not just a matter of implementation. The mechanisms of global governance, UN peacekeeping, and indeed UN sanctions are not free of values and free of power. Institutions are constituted by power; they are the very result of power. This explains how it is possible that UN sanctions policy first focused on inter-state wars, then on civil conflicts and human security, and finally on governance and sustainable peace.

At first sight, the UN institutional framework seems to restrain power. It restrains the power of self-interested states to go about foreign policy as they please. Moreover, the structure of the system makes that some states have structurally more power than others, and that nobody has unlimited power. This helps in keeping everybody on board and in making sure that all members are playing according to the same rules and values. It also helps in drawing a bottom line when it comes to unlawful behaviour in the international arena. Values and institutions dictate the boundaries of the law.

However, the mechanisms of global governance are not free of values and free of power. Someone has to determine (1) who the alpha-males are in the system, (2) whose voice matters, and (3) which values are promoted and which are neglected.

Looking at the history of UN sanctions policy and the values that dictated this policy, we have learned that the productive power of the United States and the rest of the West has been very influential in setting the agenda. In the age of globalization, these values have also been promoted by NGOs, International Organizations, civil society organizations, and even governments in developing countries.

At times the 'objectives of the international community' seem so universal, timeless, and inherently good that we tend to forget that they too are forms of power.