Global Problems, Local Solutions: The Case of C.A.R. and the International Community

Posted by The Polis Team / 29th May 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: CAR, conflict, international community, peacekeeping / -

We live in turbulent times, where new crises hit anytime and anywhere,” said Christos Stylianides, the European commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis management. “But our attention must not shift from ongoing humanitarian crises such as this one. The people of the Central African Republic (CAR) continue to need our help to survive and rebuild their lives.” According to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, 2.7 million people are in need of aid in CAR, 436,000 are internally displaced, while more than 460,000 people are living as refugees in neighbouring countries. The humanitarian community has received only about a fifth of the total funds required for the UN strategic response plan. On Tuesday 26 May, the European Union announced a new assistance package for CAR worth €72m following the call by interim President Catherine Samba-Panza urging European countries to help CAR to return to democracy by the end of the year. “CAR lacks a lot of money” she said, which is needed to re-establish security and long lasting peace and to organise elections. She added that CAR “cannot go to the polls without having security in the country”. All of this typifies a reaction from the international community that is too little, too late and possibly even counterproductive.

As is all too common in the case of sub-Saharan conflicts, the upheaval in CAR has been accompanied by headlines describing it as a “forgotten humanitarian crisis” and “ignored emergencies“. These types of phrases are not all that hyperbolic, with the wider world only showing moderate interest at best. What is even more “forgotten” and “ignored”, however, are underlying local dynamics before and after such crises hit their peak. The current meek reaction of the international community- with peacekeeping intervention and diplomatic pressure- is still an improvement on the status quo. Engaging local communities during those times that no imminent crisis looms, engaging local communities would go a long way in avoiding humanitarian crises in the first place, but those are hardly ever priorities. Unfortunately, without humanitarian victims, interests in long-term dynamics tend to be deep down on the agenda. As a result, international information and knowledge on grassroots realities on a country such as CAR are minimal. When a crisis then forces a reaction, national governments and other parties that can hardly be considered neutral and constructive counterparts are the only partners the international community focuses on. The result is insufficient and ineffective action. CAR is a clear example of this lack of local connections.

The international community has always had this tendency to react to conflicts, rather than help preventing them in the first place. This has direct consequences during the crisis itself. Without a network and local engagement mechanisms in place, the reaction of outsiders is almost completely dependent on their direct and centralised counterparts: government officials, rebel groups and large scale actors. They are the primary source of information, and the go-to actors for understanding the underlying problems. The true social and economic factors- only clearly understood at a local level- are unknown to, or simply ignored by, a reactive international community. As a result, any solutions brought forward from the outside tends to be a patch to stem the bleeding, rather than a constructive contribution to long-term stability and wellbeing. And thus the cycle continues in perpetuity: ignored local and national problems fester; crisis hits, political and humanitarian reaction from the international community; underlying local realities and causes are ignored; most visible problems are hastily dealt with; international community withdraws; local and national problems continue.

In these situations, the fact that central counterparts are the only negotiating partners as well as sources of information is a major obstacle for an international community not knowledgeable on the very issues they pretend to solve. With very few attempts at talking to people at a grassroots level, any action taken is biased towards those responsible for the crisis in the first place. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2013, the privileged interlocutors of the international community have been the transitional government and the main opposing armed groups (the Séléka and anti-balaka). Due to their role in the conflict these actors were given a monopolistic space within the negotiating sphere. Given that these parties are both responsible for any violence as well as using it to their advantage- as is the case in any of these conflicts- not involving and representing grassroots actors means dealing with the rotten surface, rather than finding true answers. Without representation from the wider population it is hard to believe there is a real support for reconciliation and national cohesion. Finally, this month, the CAR took an important step toward fostering national cohesion through its Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation. The Bangui Forum brought together nearly 700 leaders from diverse groups within the CAR’s society—including the transitional government, national political parties, the main opposing armed groups, the private sector, civil society, traditional chiefs, and religious groups—to define their collective vision for the country’s future. Although peace and national reconciliation have not been achieved yet, the conclusions of the forum seem to mark the beginning of a new chapter for CAR.

A good example of how, from the beginning of the conflict, the international community’s interests were to stabilise the conflict and avoid bloodshed while undervaluing the importance of local realities and its complexity, is the deployment of the peacekeeping operation MINUSCA (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established it by its resolution 2149 of 10 April 2014 with the mandate to protect Central African Republic civilians. If the reasons that pushed the UNSC to create the MINUSCA are understandable with regards to the violence of the conflict, it is by no means a long-term solution. Then again, the language used suggested that MINUSCA was a profound solution to the problems faced by the country. The text includes indeed the full “peacekeeping package” with sentences such as “to assist the Transitional Authorities in mediation and reconciliation processes at both the national and local levels (…)” and “to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to address root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in the CAR”. Without any deeper understanding of what those root causes were, these phrases were fanciful at best, and disingenuous at worst. Sub-Sahara African history is littered with all too many similar cases of pretension trumping reality.

More than a year after the establishment of the MINUSCA, the expected impact of the peacekeeping operation is still uncertain. The mandate of the operation is too ambitious and does not correspond to the complexity of the field. In most places in the Central African Republic, reconciliation has started between the different communities but it stays fragile. The country is still working to end the cycles of violence and reunite its people. 436,000 people are internally displaced and most cannot go back to their hometown because they fear the re-eruption of violence. On top of that, the peacekeepers’ first mission is to protect civilians, but the latest scandal about the UN covering up the sexual assault of children by French troops raises the question of trust. The success of peacekeeping operations depends on creating a bond of trust with local populations. What kind of message does an institution that covers up sexual assault on minors send to vulnerable populations? They may stop other types of violence in the short run, but the long-term outcomes may be to exacerbate the very human insecurity that leads to conflict. The unholy mix of an unrealistic mandate, absence of long-term solutions and a lack of trust by local populations is the ideal cocktail for ineffective and counterproductive outcomes.

Sadly, CAR is an all too typical example of an international community uninterested in- and therefore out of touch with- local realities in sub-Saharan Africa. Lingering conflicts that require long-term international approaches based on local networks are instead ignored until a humanitarian crisis can no longer be avoided. Reacting to the symptoms rather than the causes means a perpetual cycle of violence in which the international community is at risk of being a perpetuating influence by strengthening centralised and warmongering actors, rather than representing those suffering the consequences. Greater investment in grassroots networks and development of local human security before conflicts escalate is essential for sustainable social development. That is where the international community’s priorities need to be, rather than using the military to bring only temporary short-lived peace.

This article was written by Isadora Loreto and Balder Hageraats.

Global Problems, Local Solutions: The Case of the US and Yemen

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 21st April 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Al-Qaeda, Local vs Global, Middle East, US, Yemen / -

Emboldened by Yemen’s continued internal fragility, Saudi Arabia is attempting to strengthen its control of the Arabian Peninsula through aggressive military action. It does so with direct support from the United States, which earlier removed its own remaining troops from the republic. Both Washington and Riyadh view the violence in Yemen as part of a wider conflict against hostile regional groups as well as Iran. For Saudi Arabia this is consistent with its regional aspirations and concerns about its rivalry with Tehran. For the US, however, the situation in the most southern tip of the peninsula is an unfortunate mess. The Americans continue to view the world as one of global struggles with transnational solutions. Still enslaved by its Cold War superpower mentality of old, Washington seems incapable of engaging the world at a local, practical level. In this thinking, local dynamics are mere building blocks of global systems, and as such are shifted around through grand strategies and complex analysis. If there is no obvious connection to such global struggles, the realities on the ground lose relevance, and America moves on. Eventually, it will not just be the Yemeni population that suffers; the US insistence on seeing the world as pawns of a global game is accelerating its own fall from grace. Only through practical, local solutions can this world tilt back into Washington’s favour. Yemen is a case in point.

Historical Yo-Yoing in Yemen

When, in October 2000, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack on the USS Cole- harboured at the time in Aden- the US began strengthening ties with Sana’a. Yemen was the very definition of a fragile state threatened by internal rivalries as well as outside interference. During the previous period- which started with Yemen’s unification in 1990, which is still the main origin of conflict in the present-day country -the US had mostly managed its relationships with the country through Saudi Arabian proxy. This had been mostly the result of US withdrawal of financial, military and diplomatic support for Yemen because of its opposition to American intervention in Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait in 1990. It was only after the USS Cole bombing that Washington’s concerns about international terrorism in the region led to a return to a more proactive approach. This then spiralled out of control after 9/11.

Local realities at the time were of deep local division and destructive regional meddling. Despite such fragility, the Bush Administration declared Yemen to be an ally in the War on Terror in November 2001, when then-President Saleh visited the White House for what would be the first of an unprecedented total of four times between then and 2007. Being recruited into the War on Terror did ostentatiously lead to economic and diplomatic benefits: humanitarian and development aid shot up through USAID support, and intelligence and military cooperation was re-established. Predictably, however, this quickly proved to be a poisoned chalice.

The US carrot and stick approach was the last thing Sana’a and Washington needed. The former was still struggling to create a stable, nationally recognised sovereign state after a violent and divisive past. The latter needed the same thing: a state capable of taking responsibility for its own territory, and able to resist outside interference or the establishment of international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. What it got instead was a magnet for anti-US sentiments, a magnet further reinforced by the destructive nature the War on Terror both regionally as well as ideologically. Any direct benefits to the local economy were more than compensated by perverse outcomes: the undermining of governmental legitimacy, internal division and lack of sovereign control, and the consequent inability of the Yemeni state to reassert itself at either a regional or national level.

When in 2011 this culminated in increasingly violent protests and weakened stability, the Obama administration attempted to support peaceful transition towards a more natural, local balance of power, but it was too little too late. By not dealing with local realities and instead viewing Yemen purely through the spectre of a global struggle against al-Qaeda and other such groups, the US had accomplished exactly the opposite of what it had wanted. Now, in 2015, it has closed its embassy in Yemen, withdrawn its last al-Qaeda fighting troops, and has no clear policy with respect to Yemen except for support for Saudi Arabian interests.

A focus on local realities without pushing for global involvement would have allowed different outcomes, more in tune with reality. The hunt for global ghosts in local closets, not so much. Instead, the yo-yo effect of support, pulling out, support again, and pulling out does nothing but harm the nature of social and political stability. It is what makes rebel groups and international terrorism thrive, and what makes US power only a shadow of its former Cold War self. In this sense, Yemen has followed the same template as in many other regions of the world.

The American Quagmire

By supporting the House of Saud in its quest to control Iran, further dominate the Arabian peninsula and secure its oil interests, US policy displays disturbing signs of multiple personality disorder. Not only is it also supporting Iran’s proxy groups that are fighting IS- essentially strengthen both sides of the regional rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh- it is also further destabilising its already complex relationship with Iraq, and even endangering stability in Saudi Arabia itself. For years the walls surrounding the Royal Family have been crumbling, even if not yet collapsing, and yet Washington seems to cling on to its traditional ally at all cost. This goes even as far as to endanger its much more pressing needs in Baghdad and elsewhere. With Afghanistan essentially seen to be a lost cause from an American geopolitical perspective, there is no other nation on the planet that has received so much attention from Washington in exchange for so few positive outcomes as Iraq. And America’s local coalition in Iraq is under severe pressure by recent events. With the fight continuing in Mesopotamia, Yemen’s destabilising effect on other regional relationships is not something the US is capable of dealing with right now.

If it had focussed on strengthening the state, rather than defending allied governments, things would have been very different in Yemen. If in 2000 it had recognised the importance of state building rather than coalition building; of supporting local stability and growth rather than a relationship conditioned on participating in an abstract war; if it had dealt with Yemen as a sovereign yet young and fragile nation that needs to strengthen its own institutions before it can shoulder militaristic alliances; if the US had looked at local solutions to its global problems, rather than global solutions to its local problems; if all these things, White House policy makers would have been in a very different position. Such alternative hypothetical scenarios are a fun playground for creative historians, but also a useful tool for analysts to explain the current situation, and how to proceed from here.

Right now, Washington’s foreign policy is divided up into separate, unconnected and mostly uncoordinated pieces, only hanging together by some vague yet grandiose master plan of making all the bits fit so as to create the perfect goldilocks situation. Unfortunately, the world does not work like that, nor does US influence. There is no grand theoretical scheme available that makes the global environment behave according to US interests anymore; and even if there was, the US State Department has no capacity to perform accordingly. They react to what rises up from the uncontrollable global weed, rather than cultivating green local pastures.

International Cooperation: reality or farce?

Posted by Joanna Klever / 7th April 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Aid workers, Development Cooperation, Donors / -

International development cooperation has been heavily criticised over the past decades. Both methods and objectives have been questioned, and involved actors are regularly accused of ineffective behaviour. What is less often analysed, however, is the human psychology on which international cooperation is based. Political motivations are often highlighted, and so are financial incentives, but the underlying patterns regulating those involved in the sector are all too often ignored. This is not a minor oversight. International cooperation actors are trapped in pre-existing psychological structures. These indirectly, and often unwittingly, create tendencies that corrupt the essential process and its true objectives. The main issue here is that cooperation in its true form is virtually impossible in the current sectoral psychology.

On the psychology of cooperation

The meaning of cooperation in international development cooperation can be described as ambiguous at best. It replaced more aid-based terms from the early days on, but the actual nature of the sector never quite made the same leap. Regardless, humans display a unique form of altruistic cooperation that is unprecedented in any other species on earth. Explanations vary from genetic predisposition to social awareness. In its most basic form, cooperation is defined as “the action or process of working together to the same end”. This means that both or all actors involved have a direct stake in the process. These actors can be individuals or groups, and cooperative individuals must have, amongst other factors, an underlying motivation to incur personal losses in return for improved common well being. The key here is “common wellbeing”.

Beyond that basic definition, it is clear that if humans can expect some kind of service or emotion in return for their action, they are much more likely to cooperate. Researchers find that human cooperation, on the scale as we can observe is attributable to prosocial cognition in the human psyche, clear groupings as well as cultural norms and institutions. These prosocial emotions make us sensitive to empathy; shame and guilt as well as social sanctions that could result from e.g. free riding. As such, humans are capable to differentiate between individuals or groups that are willing to cooperate – and tend to be drawn towards those individuals – and those who have solely egocentric intentions. Especially small-scale close-knit groups tend to be very sensitive to individual’s emotional capability to engage with others and cooperate.

Buchan et al (2011) show in their research that willingness to cooperate and to risk losses varies dramatically over different social self-ascriptions. During their experiments, differentiating between local, regional and global individuals’ inclination to engage in cooperation depended on their sense of belonging to those groups. Few participants identified themselves with the global society, but those who did, displayed striking tendencies. Strong identification with the global society emerged as the sole indicator for willingness to contribute to global welfare: those who displayed this readiness were not influenced by whether their investment would pay off or not. The researchers conclude that conditional on self-identification, global altruism exists just as it does at lower scale levels.

At group level, cooperation looks slightly different, but remains based on similar principles. Groups are formed on the basis of mutual attributes that give individuals a sense of belonging to a specific group, such as cultural, language, political, religious or ethnic groups. Once established as a group, its maintenance is crucial, especially in competition with other groups. When inter-group competition is high, intra-group cooperation tends to function well. Generally, most cultures share prosocial values such as empathy or care for others’ suffering. In comparison, when no external pressures exist, intra-group cooperation tends to suffer, as individuals have fewer incentives to stick together. Even worse, when very high pressures are exerted on groups, their cooperative mechanisms tend to break down and be replaced by individual quests for survival. This last scenario can be observed in these situations of high social distress such as during wars, famines or economic crises.

On the psychology of the international cooperation sector

We therefore have a basic understanding of what cooperation is supposed to look like, and what some of its characteristics are. If we apply that idea to the international development sector, the first problem we face is how to identify cooperative individuals and groups, and with whom do they cooperate? At first sight the idea is perhaps that NGOs cooperate with local “beneficiaries” – please note how this word does not correspond to the definition of cooperation given above – and donors to accomplish outcomes in their field of expertise, such as economic development or human rights. In reality, however, local groups are typically consulted, but not cooperative partners. True cooperation exists between the NGO and the donor, or, in broader terms, the executive organisations and their funding partners. Their mutual goals are quite clearly defined: survival of the respective organisations through implementing common agendas. In this process, the role of local beneficiaries is passive. They do not represent true value in the cooperation equation, besides perhaps having a vaguely defined common goal of making lives better. The hard incentives to cooperate – funding, jobs, organisational survival, evaluations – are all between executive partners and funding partners. Idealism and gratitude are not satisfying conditions to reach true cooperation; they do not represent enough of an incentive, despite the sector’s appearances.

Understanding the imbalanced relationship between groups in international development cooperation opens a new perspective on its past failures and current realities. Many initiatives were created with altruistic intentions, often with the vision of bringing along sustainable change. However, the misunderstanding of cooperation and misuse of the word have lead to the establishment of ineffective mechanisms and programmes. Recipients were never truly part of the process while donors continued to operate on a system that was geared towards themselves rather than the outer world.

The recent economic crisis hit the developments sector particularly hard. Not only did the sector suffer under extreme budget cuts by donor governments and international organisations leading to financial gaps and instability, but it also faced an increasingly distressed developing world suffering under the pressures of the global economic turmoil. Many developing countries faced increased trade prices, and constantly shifting commodity prices bringing along extreme instability and little ability to plan ahead. The reaction by NGOs and other executive actors clearly showed where their true cooperative nature lies. Long-term programmes such as the Millenium Development Goal implementation plan were minimised. Many target countries and governments had to reassess their prospects and curb their progress. The shift towards self-preservation rather than international cooperation were dramatic and self-explanatory: in times of distress groups protect themselves first, rather than pretend cooperation with outsiders (local beneficiaries). While these observations are barely surprising in the light of human cooperation and the need for self-preservation, they do hurt the vision the development sector portrays. Rather than truly caring for advancing developing countries, the sector’s work is hampered by reality and limits that donors are not willing to cross for the sake of international wellbeing.

Humans have an essential sense for self-preservation. Humans also have a unique trait for social interaction and altruistic behaviour. Hence supporting each other is just as much part of being human as it is to fight for survival. At the local level, cooperation is based on the mutual understanding that cooperation will advance the wellbeing of the group as one entity. At the international level, the overall benefits of cooperation are less clear, often phrased as increasing well being for recipients. Not only is it difficult to call international development cooperation, as groups within the sector never truly embraced it, but also visible positive effects of international development cooperation remain difficult to identify.

With growing understanding that the lack of incentives to cooperate with recipients left several development challenges unsolved, an opportunity for change is created. If the sector with all its member groups – donors, executives and recipient – understood the need for change, true cooperation could be achieved. It can be based on mutually engaging and trustful relationships where all partnering groups join mutually beneficial efforts to advance development. Just as we do one on one, international development cooperation taking into account global dependencies, could move towards being true cooperation if donors let go off their self-centred bias and recipients were to participate fully. Various initiatives have already recognised the need for change and work towards enacting true and unbiased cooperation. With introspection and an outward-looking mind-set, the development sector can shift towards a more equal future.

The Dark Side of International Volunteering: shedding light on its negative impact

Posted by Stephanie Halksworth / 7th April 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Education, International Cooperation, International Volunteering, Madagascar / -

Well-intentioned international volunteers often have a counterproductive impact where they go. The experience of volunteering in the community of Tsiroanomandidy, Madagascar, is a useful reference to explore the wider issues surrounding the economic, educational and psychological ramifications of volunteering in the education sector.

International volunteers are considered part of ‘the wider international development agenda’, and it bridges a fundamental gap between ‘hard’ development outcomes and ‘soft’ development outcomes. It is a human-centred, bottom up approach to development aimed at benefitting communities in a vast range of sectors, including sustainable development and education. International volunteering is particularly active in the education sector, with an influx of volunteers providing services in schools, youth centres and educational programmes. As education is a fundamental dimension in the Sustainable Development Goals, the role played by international volunteers is pivotal: key skills, languages and teaching methods are transferred and applied to local communities. And yet this unilateral service does not go uncriticised. There are contentious debates with regard to the long-term effects on local communities. These include increased unemployment, disruption in the academic sphere, and psychological ramifications from disillusion and lack of faith in local initiatives.

Ambiguous Economic Outcomes

Many volunteer organisations insist on the direct economic benefits of foreign volunteers for local communities. The increase in revenue from these volunteers facilitates local employment, and there is no doubt that in many cases, these outsiders contribute to improving local facilities, such as youth centres, schools and libraries. An important argument used to justify international volunteering is that it benefits the local community economically, thus increasing the standard of living of local residents. However, the economic implications of international volunteering are more complex than what the immediate effects might convey. In order to send and receive international volunteers, time, money and resources are spent to ensure the smooth running of the volunteering process, resources that may well be spent on local initiatives, development and residents.

Although there may be a slight increase in local employment due to the injection of revenue, the long-term effects reveal a darker side: a constant stream of international volunteers in a community means that these outsiders continually usurp the roles and posts that would otherwise be allocated to locals. Volunteer placements take precedence over local workers, which means that much-needed jobs become less available. If volunteers are unskilled and untrained, as is often the case, it is even likely to cause more hindrance than assistance to the host community. There is a risk of international volunteers becoming the teachers, doctors, construction workers, project developers rather than assistants in each field. In those cases, they assume the characteristics of experts and leaders, rather than learners and students, giving a helping hand while absorbing their new environment and learning the ways of the local community. The skills provided may appear beneficial in the short term, but how are the locals to practice their skills and build up their experience if they are never given the chance?

Educational Setbacks

While the economic outcomes of volunteering are ambiguous at best, the educational impact is even more worrisome. Education systems, programmes and syllabuses vary from country to country. This makes an understanding of the relevant system one of the most crucial criteria for working in the education sector. A particularly common and unfortunate trend in international volunteering is the act of sending volunteers who have not been fully trained nor coached in the specific needs of the educational system of the host community. This can have multifarious consequences for local communities, especially if the volunteer assumes a more hands-on role.

One of the most evident drawbacks in the system is the problematic timing of many volunteers: schools have a set academic schedule with a fixed syllabus. Nevertheless, many volunteers are often not only unable to stay for the duration of the academic term or year, but also tend to arrive after the academic year has started, or in the middle of a semester. The importance of routine, continuity and consistency is paramount for effective student learning and progress; so how can this service – which entails a regular turnover of volunteers with disparate arrival dates and varying timeframes – be an efficient strategy in the education sector? If anything, the pattern of volunteering can be detrimental to the pupils’ learning.

This danger was evident with respect to the educational volunteering service in the rural community of Tsiroanomandidy: a new person entering the classroom triggers a change in dynamic; valuable time is used to ‘break the ice’ and connect with the class and understand the needs of the students. The teachers often spend time explaining the syllabus, what has been taught and what the students have yet to learn, and this time-consuming process leads to an interruption in the calendar, a disruption in the teaching, and subsequently an interference in the learning. Furthermore, when volunteers in Tsiroanomandidy stay to teach for varying timeframes, these disruptions can occur biweekly to every six months; as the schools and teachers are often uninformed with regard to volunteer timeframes and arrival dates, this contributes to an environment of uncertainty and unpredictability.

Another glaring issue with the inconsistent nature of the volunteering service in Tsiroanomandidy is the disruption of the syllabus content and teaching methods. For example, volunteers from some organisations have a one-day training course before visiting the schools and meeting the teachers. This course consists of practical activities and songs with only one focus: primary students. Considering volunteers teach in primary as well as secondary schools, youth centres and clubs for working adults, this training day hardly scrapes the surface. With little information on the syllabus, volunteers are expected to jump in, take the lead and teach courses they are not familiar with. This inevitably leads to volunteers creating their own lesson plans, often misjudging the students’ level, and generating content which is incongruous with the school curriculum. Furthermore, each teacher has a specific teaching style, and this crucial skill needs to be acquired as a trained and qualified teacher in order to maintain consistency and coherence.

The dangerous combination of inexperienced volunteers, underdeveloped teaching styles and incompatible teaching methods create a fragmented learning experience for the students. The hindrance this can cause to the students’ learning and understanding of the respective subject must not be underestimated. The process of learning is parallel to building blocks: strategic steps must be taken to ensure students build up their knowledge at each level. Disruptions in the syllabus, the timeframe, the teaching styles and the content will only serve to confuse and impede their development.

Disregarded Psychological Consequences

In addition to the contentious effects on the educational dimension of communities, there is also a psychological factor that needs to be considered. This aspect is a fundamental, yet often unstated dimension of international volunteering. As volunteers become a regular presence in the classroom, students begin to connect and accustom to their voluntary teacher. A relationship is formed between volunteer and student that can even transgress the traditional teacher-student relationship. In Tsiroanomandidy, volunteers are not only welcomed, but become a novelty in the community. Children know and call out volunteers’ names in the streets; students, enthusiastic about their new teacher and intrigued by the volunteer’s alien status, attempt to form bonds instantaneously. The volunteer, eager to gain a better cultural understanding of the community, connects with students and adults outside as well as inside the classroom, by taking part in community events, extra-curricular activities and learning the local language. The emotional ties that are typically formed between the volunteers and local residents can be beneficial on multiple levels, especially for the volunteer. However, the departure of volunteers can cause deeper ramifications for the local community, especially for the students. The natural progression in education is that students learn, advance and achieve. Each year they leave their teacher behind and move on to the next stage in their education. In this case, however, volunteers leave their students behind. This can create a sense of abandonment, invalidation and stagnation.

For many local communities, international volunteering is a normalised process, and they even act as role models to the local community. However, international volunteers are also perceived as outsiders, and the notion of outsiders acting as role models is problematic. It makes students in schools and youth centres accustom to this dynamic and perceive the outsiders as superior and better role models than the local teachers. This attitude towards volunteers and the mistrust in local alternatives is damaging for both students and teachers, and especially detrimental to their self-esteem. A key drive in development is upholding confidence and value in the community, and in order to reverse this damaging dynamic, it is important that volunteers are not just outsiders, or perceived outsiders, but that volunteers are also local. Initiatives to encourage local residents to volunteer can increase self esteem, dismantle the unilateral pattern of volunteering and restore faith in the local community.

The assessment of international volunteering impacts on local communities is not one-dimensional: the many factors that come into play, including the community, its specific needs, the timeframe and skill set of volunteers, result in complex economic, emotional and psychological impacts. Its detrimental implications are often underestimated, even if it is rooted in good intentions. This is especially visible in the education sector. There exist situations in which volunteerism is positive and even a necessary tool in the hands of local communities. One example of this is is the socio-cultural centre Bel Air in Tsiroanomandidy, operated by the Bongolava Antsitrapo Association who succeed in sustaining a local led nature of these activities. In their case, they continue to employ a bottom up approach, always focussed on listening and implementing local ideas. But this is the exception rather than the rule, and great care has to be taken to ensure that volunteers are properly trained, and are aware of their roles and potentially negative impact on communities. The role of a volunteer is not to be a pillar of the education system, but to assist, support and encourage local capacities. Furthermore, volunteerism from local communities themselves needs to be expanded. Local initiatives and local expertise are typically free from the pitfalls of international volunteering, and directly strengthen the long-term capacity of recipient communities.

Global Problems, Local Solutions: The Case of fighting the Islamic State

Posted by Isadora Loreto / 3rd April 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Iraq, Islamic State, Local People, Syria / -

The current military campaign led by the United States (U.S.) against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is not having the expected outcomes: the organisation is neither beaten nor destroyed nor eliminated. Measures taken by the governments involved are practical short-term answers to the pressing threat posed by IS. They are not part of a planned long-term strategy, although they will have consequences in the region for years to come. Only if the western coalition shifts its focus on local realities and develops a comprehensive strategy can it attain its objectives in the region.

History is repeating itself. Lessons from past interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan are not learned. Western governments keep on addressing terrorist groups without a comprehensive approach which includes a real understanding of the complexity of the situation on the ground. Rather than approach the issue strategically, the West has once again gone for the “war against terror” narrative. Both in Iraq and in Syria, it has introduced a subjective hierarchy of the different actors at stake and provided political backing and military support to whoever happened to be in the right place at the right time. It is conducting unsuccessful “high value targeting” in both countries, further militarising a fragmented landscape of Kurdish factions and at the same endorsing the rise of pro-Iranian-backed Shia militias working closely with the Iraqi Security Forces. The western coalition’s measures are also intensifying the Syrian conflict by striking terrorist targets and rehabilitating the Assad regime without a long-term vision.

Typically, agendas are set at the highest level and interventions are planned without taking into account local realities. Too little effort has been made to comprehend why IS has grown so rapidly, how come it took major Iraqi cities while facing so little resistance and why it is proving to be so difficult to dislodge. Understanding the complex roots of the terrorist group and engaging with local actors to support them in creating the conditions that will diminish IS does not seem to be a top priority for policy-makers. Various reports and strategies- most recently the Confronting the Islamic State from The National Security Network- have been developed on how to improve the approach of the U.S. towards the Islamic State. But the Obama Administration seems to want to continue with its “Counter terrorism Plus” approach based on plans to degrade and defeat IS. This end is sought by employing U.S.-trained and supported local forces in Iraq and Syria, augmented by U.S. airstrikes and Special Operations Forces. Once again, it is evidence that relations, image management and short-term answers increasingly dominate the decision-making process. Shocking events prompt an urgent need to make public statements, which later inspire and restrict concrete measures that need to fit into the “war against terror” narrative rather than into a clear strategy. Just like air strikes, decisions seem to come from above and lack connections to local realities and challenges.

The issue is highly complex with different actors having interests at stake and there are no easy solutions. As a result to the geopolitical and security challenge the Islamic State poses, regional powers have readjusted their policies and relations with each other. Damascus and Baghdad are not the only ones that need to deal with IS; other regional key players – Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia chief among them – have recalculated their positions as well. There is no quick fix to the problem of IS in Iraq nor in Syria, particularly given the real changes on the ground over the past few years and the involvement of the different regional powers. Western governments can at least clarify their intentions and see through what they can accomplish. But more importantly, they can provide support to local actors who are willing to make the political, structural and social changes necessary to turn on the organisation. Local players often have the power to find their own solutions to conflict and to build their own future, hence supporting them does not imply the meddling of Western states into internal affairs. It is easy to forget that only decade ago meddling caused the chaos the country faces today.

In Iraq, local actors are working to build the political and social conditions which will enable them to durably fight IS. There is a need to identify trustworthy Sunni leaders who are capable of uniting their people against IS. Local people might be indeed more inclined to join IS if they see inactivity from local leaders. This policy implies that Baghdad will need to accept some local leaders who served in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein. Other potential Sunni allies will include clerics and political activists who are conservative but do not support IS’ ideology. In order to succeed, the proposal to enrol Sunnis must incorporate assurances from Baghdad that the human rights abuses of the Maliki era will not rehash under the current Abadi government. Furthermore, the government needs to reassert state authority, for example with respect to re-establishing local police in areas it regains from the Islamic State. This mitigates the risk that the territories fall this time within the Shia militias control. Ultimately, the success of rebuilding trust among communities and restoring the state’s stability will lay on whether the Iraqi Sunni leaders in Anbar and nearby provinces perceive Baghdad as ready to act independently from Tehran. Iraqi Sunni leaders may tolerate IS if it is considered as the lesser evil compared to a government that is seen as a manikin of Tehran and if the Iraqi Security Forces is viewed as directly connected to Iranian-backed Shia militias. The only thing the coalition can do is supporting the different local actors which participate in putting into practice those essential measures.

In Syria, with the lack of a united Syrian opposition to fight IS on the one hand, and a real strategy by the U.S. led coalition to eliminate the organisation on the other, people living under IS control cannot rebel against the organisation because they do not have the means to do so neither a real alternative to go for. This is to the advantage of IS which has created a fake sense of justice and stability. The more time passes, the more the organisation is filling the vacuum left in the areas it controls, and the more difficult it becomes to dislodge it. Only small groups of local people actually support IS. Most of them, however, are opposed to the coalition air raids. People do not have a choice at the moment, they are stuck between the regime, IS, and airstrikes by the coalition: a clear plan to provide people with a socio-political alternative is necessary.

Only if a comprehensive strategy includes a socio-political approach inclusive of local realities and attentive to the human dimension of the conflict, can the U.S. led coalition claim to participate in fighting IS in Iraq and Syria. The insanity of repeating failed history cannot be permitted to continue any longer. This implies abandoning the current airstrikes over IS territories and focus on providing support to local actors who are working towards a way to win over the population with a future they can believe in; a future that inspires them to resist IS.

Doing Development Differently: An Interview with Matt Andrews and Leni Wild

Posted by The Polis Team / 2nd February 2015 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Doing Development Differently, Governance, International Development Cooperation / -

This month we focus on Doing Development Differently (DDD), a community of development researchers and practitioners brought together in an effort to understand better flexible and locally led approaches to governance issues in developing countries. This article is based on separate conversations led by Thomas Kruiper, Head of Communications at the ReSeT´s Polis Project, with Matt Andrews at Harvard´s Center for International Development (CID) and Leni Wild at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, who were instrumental in leading a 2014 DDD workshop and creating a DDD manifesto. Andrews´ research focuses on Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) in governance and policy reform. Wild is an expert on political economy and service delivery, accountability and aid, and currently leads an ODI program on the politics of service delivery.

Having worked on governance and service delivery in a wide variety of countries for many years, Andrews and Wild know the traits of traditional development thinking. Andrews´ interest in PDIA was born from his observations from working in governance, both as a researcher and as an outsider from the World Bank, in which many reform initiatives fail to deliver sustained improvements because organisations and governments focus on what policies look like rather than what they actually do. Andrews: “You see laws being passed and money being moved for a health project, but you don´t see actual nurses being hired or drugs being moved into place.”

In traditional development, solutions tend to be placed before the problems. Wild: “A lot of aid programs still tend to come in with a set of solutions and look for local groups to implement them, rather than coming in to identify who are the local reformers, who is making change happen, and how can they be supported”. Fortunately there is a growing community of people who try new things and share their experiences.

DDD, successful development, and connectivity

The people and organisations within the DDD community turn upside-down two things: they put problems before solutions, and they put local actors before outsiders. In Wild´s view, fundamentally, successful development cooperation facilitates and supports the process of a project rather than managing or dominating it. Locally led means that those people who are already there lead the project; they are in the driving seat. They identify and address problems, and they have the strongest incentives to solve them. Outsiders can be invited to give their views and share information.

The term ´local´ should be widely interpreted. Wild: “It works at the grass-roots level, but also at central governments or in the private sector. We often tend to think of locals as community leaders but it´s much wider than that.”

This diversity was reflected in the workshop too. Andrews: “All these people have framed their agendas so as to empower people rather than telling people what to do. They´ve been doing that for a long period of time. The workshop wasn´t about getting them together and saying to them that they had to do DDD, because they were the ones that are doing it.”

The DDD community also serves as a teaching tool in showing practitioners what successful development cooperation looks like, but also how to actually do it. The fifty or so public servants that take Andrews´ course at Harvard are stimulated to engage with the organisations in the DDD community and to watch the videos they post online about their methodologies.

Problem driven, locally led, and flexible strategies are not new by any means. In policymaking and development studies, voices have long preached for community driven work and against top-down approaches and blueprints. Andrews: “My sense is that when those ideas (of Hirschmann and Brinkerhoff) were coming up they were completely overwhelmed by what I would call the more engineering mindset in development, where people thought that you build governments like you build a road. For a long period development was dominated by either engineers or by very mathematics based economists.”

Today the circumstances to get like-mind souls together are easier. Andrews: “One of the things that we are trying to take advantage of, and why we had the workshop last year, and why we developed a manifesto, is that there is more connectivity between people. And our hypothesis is actually that there´s more people doing development in this way than we commonly would think about.”

Connectivity also seems to be a key to success for local actors and their projects. As Wild explained on the connectedness of a local actor in a community scorecard program in Malawi: “He understood the dynamics happening at different levels and in different areas; he was able to appraised things at the local level and say: in this community, we don’t have the right people on the ground to do what we are going to do, so we need to stop working there or we have to find a different way of working”. Putting well connected actors in the driving seat is thus essential for success.

Donors and Measuring Success

For locally led and flexible approaches to gain ground, donors have to be brought aboard too. Some donors try to lock things in at the beginning and to remove flexibility later on. Andrews: “So during and after the workshop we spent a lot of time talking about: how do you buy that flexibility later on. How do you use things like logical frameworks in more flexible ways? I think that you can use exactly the same tools, just in more flexible ways.”

Andrews does not recognise the dichotomy between inflexible donors on one side and governments and NGOs on the other. Across the board, organisations struggle to create space for more flexibility, not only on the donor side.

One of these struggles has to deal with measuring success in ways that help us understand how people learn, rather than simply looking at meaningless milestones. Wild: “Often people are stuck with a particular set of project and reporting frameworks, so all of the things they are doing that are actually making a difference – the way they are adapting, learning, or navigating local relationships – don´t get reported on. We need some kind of benchmarks to know what a genuinely locally led process looks like.”

In Andrew´s view, many policy makers underestimate the difficulty of planning in developmental environments. In a controlled and developed environment, planning a project is relatively easy; you know your objectives and you know how to fulfill and measure them. DDD practitioners know that the reality looks different: “The problem is that if development looks like going from St. Louis to the west coast in 1803, it´s a different strategy. You don´t have any roads, you don´t know where the west coast is, and you don´t know where your milestones are going to be. And if you were to lay a 2013 map onto a team and say: “Go to Albuquerque”, they would say “where´s Albuquerque?” And then on the first day, they would find out that the road to Albuquerque doesn´t exist. So you want them to be learning step by step how to get to the west-coast. So you want to be saying: “OK, when you said you were going to get to Albuquerque, what were the assumptions that you made, and what did you learn about your assumptions? What step did you take? What capacities did you build as you were moving on?” Those things are as important (or maybe more important) than the question: Did you spend the money?”

DDD in 2015

2015 is an interesting year for the development sector, in which the world awaits a new set of global commitments. Although the CID and ODI by no means have a political agenda related to the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals, the DDD community does realise that ideas need to be cultivated, marketed, and taught. Each organisation has to look at itself and contribute to change in its own way. The website and the manifesto just help facilitate it. Wild: “We don´t want to be sitting here in 2030 or 2040 saying: Don’t we need to do things differently?”

The manifesto currently has a community of over 400 signatories from 60 countries, with more organisations (Including ReSeT and its Polis Project) joining every week. Besides people meeting in small groups, the CID and ODI frequently organise events and publish research on DDD approaches to development cooperation. The recently published DDD website also includes a blog, forum, and videos of organisations in the community. Additionally, ODI has just launched a report called Adapting Development, which picks up on many of the themes discussed in the interview.

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