An expert opinion on development: Dr. Stephan Klingebiel

Posted by The Polis Team / 17th November 2014 / Categories: Opinion, Polis / -

Dr. Stephan Klingebiel is head of the department for Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation at the German Development Institute (DIE). His work areas include aid effectiveness and the political economy of aid, international cooperation and global public goods as well as the nexus of security and development. He is also a regular visiting professor at Stanford University.

Joanna Klever – Head of Communications at The Polis Project: Could you please tell us your experiences with, and current connection to, the development sector?

Stephan Klingebiel: I have been working on development issues since my years as a student at university. That was still the time of the classical North-South divide – just think about the Brandt Report in 1980 which was written by an independent international commission.

In my professional carrier I research development topics, teach courses on the subject and am also involved in policy advice, for example, at the level of the European Commission, the European Parliament, the OECD and the German and other governments. In addition, I gained much experience as a development practitioner when I was head of the German Development Bank (KFW) office in Rwanda for four years.

In terms of main areas of research, I especially deal with topics from three perspectives – quite often with overlaps: First, I like to study the basics of foreign aid and the political economy aspects of aid. For example: What is the rationale of donors in giving foreign aid? What are the unintended consequences of aid? Increasingly, I find myself dealing with the broader question of how international cooperation can address global challenges more adequately. Secondly, I have a strong focus on governance and conflict issues: How do development actors interact with non-state armed groups, for instance – even if they claim that they are not in contact with any of them? Thirdly, my main area of expertise is related to the sub-Saharan African region. I am not only very familiar with several countries of the region but also with regional and continental institutions. Having said that, I also work on countries outside the African region.

JK: How do you define successful international development?

SK: International cooperation can serve quite different objectives. However, we are increasingly seeing a need to contribute to the provision of global public goods or to avoid ‘global public bads’. Thus, cooperation is a way of organising collective action at an international level. From what we know, it is not at all easy to provide incentives in favour of global collective action and to avoid difficulties like ‘free riding’.

JK: What – in your opinion – are the biggest failures and successes of development cooperation thus far?

SK: In a general sense it is interesting to see that development actors have built up quite substantial knowledge about ‘best practises’ and ‘good aid’. This has led not least to the aid effectiveness agenda – including the Paris Declaration. At the same time, however, we know that donors have only been willing to implement their own agenda to a limited extent. For example, the fragmented landscape of donor approaches has to do with interests such as visibility. If you go to a country like Myanmar where donors have only started to work fairly recently, you will find strong motivations for each donor to rush in, rather than following best practices.

JK: In the “Beyond Aid” series of papers, the need to reform aid and transform development cooperation is recurrent. Could you briefly explain why this change is essential in the current context?

SK: In the face of a changing global context, development cooperation needs to redefine its role. The phrase “Beyond Aid” sums up the pressure to innovate as well as to develop ideas for reform. Conventional development issues still need to be addressed, as goals such as the eradication of poverty have not been achieved. At the same time, the development landscape is changing radically. Over the past few decades, the number of aid-receiving countries has decreased sharply. By 2030 it is estimated that another 28 countries with an aggregate population of 2 billion will no longer be eligible for development cooperation. Other fundamental features are also changing. Aid no longer serves only to reduce poverty; it is also being used to tackle challenges such as climate change, inequality and insecurity.

The “Beyond Aid” debate is quite diverse. It is about any actual or apparent reform in this policy area. Nonetheless, some dimensions have become obvious. The transformation is specifically evident in connection with actors, finance, regulation and knowledge. In our papers we discuss those four dimensions in detail.

In our view, the debate may lead to two different options or models. In a first model, development cooperation would focus on the steadily shrinking group of poor countries. Poverty reduction would remain the primary goal. […]

In a second model, development cooperation would become part of international cooperation in general. It would help to address challenges that many countries have in common. Such challenges include rapid urbanisation, demographic change, and the provision of global public goods such as the protection of the climate, biodiversity, food security and the prevention of pandemics. While poverty reduction would remain a major goal in this scenario, it would no longer be the main focus. Moreover, distinguishing ‘developed’ from ‘developing’ countries would no longer be crucial. On the contrary, policies would concern not only fragile and conflict-torn states but middle- and high-income countries as well. Development cooperation would thus contribute to collective action at the global level.

JK: With the post 2015 approaching, developing countries are asking to have their voices heard more in the process. How do you envision their participation with developed countries? What do developing nations need most to achieve true partnership, rather than the perceived imposition?

SK: I think we really need to see a universal development agenda. The current MDG agenda is unbalanced because it is mainly focused on development challenges in poor countries. However, an agenda with a universal character would address development need in all regions and countries. Just think about CO₂ emissions in industrialised countries or inequality issues not only in developing regions but also in the USA, Germany or Spain. If the main momentum of the future agenda is to be its universal character, developing countries will play a much stronger role, for example, in the implementation of the agenda.

JK: Envisioning true cooperation, how can local populations be more included in the reformed development cooperation system? How can local development be supported?

SK: In my view the principle of ‘using country systems’ is an important starting point for this issue. The best way for a local population to contribute through local NGOs and CSOs is not the isolated approach to aid. Instead, we need to focus on issues like: What is the role of local NGOs in the budget planning and execution process of district X or Y? This is the key question. In the best case, donors would use precisely those national mechanisms. If this is not possible, for instance because of poor governance or a conflict situation in a country, at least transparency is a crucial factor for the local population. How much money is being provided by a donor? How much money is really reaching the district? How much money is paid for overheads and consultants? Those are important aspects of information which are required if the local population is to be involved.

JK: You state in your “Beyond Aid” papers series: “Knowledge to drive the new development agenda and to meet partner countries’ differentiated needs is becoming more and more specialised and is generated by many institutions that are outside the realm of development cooperation. The challenge is to identify and share that knowledge and apply it to specific contexts.” How can this challenge be met with new technologies?

SK: New technologies are indeed key for all aspects of knowledge. Whether the focus is on updating farming methods, improving public finance or taking action to mitigate climate change, knowledge is the key to development. The transfer of knowledge is likely to become increasingly dissociated from financial transfers and technical advice.

JK: New alternatives and approaches are developed in the sector, which aim at turning aid into effective cooperation. How can they be heard and effectively contribute to today’s development discourse?

SK: Results-based approaches are not a ‘silver bullet’ to development cooperation but rather a fairly innovative way of how to provide aid. Those approaches aim to identify outputs or outcomes that can be measured and quantified, that is, results that can be directly linked to development activities. The key feature is the link between the aid intervention and strong incentives to encourage results. Not least NGOs are increasingly exploring those instruments, for example in the educational sector in Tanzania.

JK: How do you envision development cooperation in twenty years? Will it still exist, and what will its activities look like?

SK: I think it is quite likely that we will see two parallel mid-term trends: First, development cooperation will still exist for a shrinking number of poor countries. Aid will remain important in those cases, in support not only of the social sectors but also of other prime infrastructures. Emerging countries will also contribute concessional resources in support of development objectives. Secondly, we will see an increasing demand for new types of international cooperation which is different from development cooperation – just think about the quite different rationale in the case of Ebola. Those areas of international cooperation will need to address global challenges, for instance in terms of security, climate change and health.

This is the first edition of our new series of interviews with experts from the field of dcvelopment cooperation. Within this series The Polis team will explore different themes and perspectives on international development cooperation. These interviews will appear in our bimonthly newsletter as well as on this website.

Development and the Knowledge Problem: Towards an open source development sector?

Posted by Thomas Kruiper / 13th October 2014 / Categories: Opinion, Polis / Tags: Development Cooperation, International Actors, Knowledge / -

Knowledge about development is temporary, diffuse, and not locally owned. Apart from a few large International organisations, the almost infinite amount of data gathered by (International) non-governmental organisations (NGO) is completely inaccessible. This configuration, in which the interests of individuals and organisations are not aligned with the sector´s general purpose, is detrimental for effective development. In a world where knowledge means employment, such a configuration is hard to break through. But if the sector started sharing development knowledge openly, would it make itself redundant?

Over the past decades, mountains of valuable information have been gathered about pretty much every development issue imaginable. From crop yields per acre to training manuals for civil society groups, and from exploratory research on seasonal migration to impact studies of literacy campaigns; there exists a whole universe of baseline studies, impact studies, manuals, databases, and evaluations.

Some of this information is freely accessible at the online platforms of large international organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation, and Transparency International. Access to such data is great for comparative research. However, the bulk of the existing data about development is gathered by INGOs and small-scale NGOs that work from international to local scales and that keep their research to themselves. The number of INGOs can still be counted (around 40.000 worldwide), while the number of NGOs can only be guessed. India was estimated to be home to 2 million NGOs in 2009, one for every 600 citizens. Considering that each of these organisations collects a variety of data each and every year, the combined knowledge is almost infinite.

So data published by big international organisations is just the tip of the iceberg. The specific and local knowledge is completely intransparent and inaccessible. Many people in the sector seem to acknowledge this problem, but only few point out or do something about it.

Knowledge about development is temporary, diffuse, and not locally owned

Knowledge is temporary because the people that own it come and go. Very few foreigners are committed to one issue in one region for a lifetime. Most world-changers come for a few years, make a contribution, up their street credit, and move on. After all, that is what is best for one´s career and that´s what counts. The interests of the sector as a whole and those who depend on it thus fail to align. In the meantime, the beneficiaries who should benefit from the knowledge accumulated in the sector stay empty handed.

The temporary nature of knowledge has been exemplified during the past months by the ebola crisis in West Africa. Besides the obvious and horrendous public health disaster, the food shortages, the security threats, and the virtual economic standstill, Guineans, Sierra Leoneans, and Liberians have also been forced to say goodbye to most of their NGO workers. Contrary to a few brave health workers and volunteers that poured into the region, most traditional NGO workers have gone the other direction, waiting for the storm to blow over. As months go by, it becomes clear that many of those who intended to leave temporarily feel compelled (or are forced) to look for other career options, taking with them lots of built up experience and expertise. From the individual´s perspective this makes complete sense, but it is disastrous for those who stay behind.

Knowledge is diffuse because it is either stored with temporary experts or with the internal documents of NGOs and International organisations. The true origin of the knowledge problem lies here. The competitive nature of the sector, in which access to donor money seems to be a zero-sum game, causes organisations to keep knowledge internally rather than sharing it freely. On top of that, organisations are also afraid to publish on failed projects. After all, those NGOs that fail to deliver might miss out at the next round of proposals.

Data from ´competitors´ cannot be accessed, meaning that newbies have to invent the wheel over and over again. Consultants that monitor and evaluate projects suffer from – and contribute to – the same problem. The lack of centralised information leads them to – unknowingly – replicate studies that were already done by ´competitors´. On top of that, the quality of their work cannot be controlled because there is no possibility of peer review. So it´s not only about good knowledge being inaccessible, but also about bad knowledge being undetected! Nobody seems to really care though, because on an individual level everyone on the donors’ side seems to benefit. Newbies get more time to settle in, consultants keep on creating work for themselves, and everybody lives to work another day.

Finally, knowledge is not locally owned. One would perhaps expect local populations to know all about their development; they should by now be experts about methodologies, interventions, and the impacts of the NGO projects in their region. After all, for many aid recipients, development is their daily bread. They are the only ones who will be around in the long term and they have an obvious interest in what´s going on.

In reality, local populations are largely outside of the information flow. They don´t have a subscription to the newsletter. NGO´s and International organisations study them, and consultants ask them thousands of questions about the impacts or projects, but the results are mostly taken home and the only ones that really learn anything are those who do the studies.

The uncomfortable truth is that a world in which locals lead their own development knowledge is a world in which many expats, experts, and consultant become redundant. In the information age, information is power. For many people in the development sector, this means that information is employment. Giving that away for free is shooting oneself in the foot.

The development sector is thus not much different from normal business sectors, where information is sensitive and where owning information gives one a competitive advantage. And yet, the sector claims to be different, to work for the greater good. Its members tend to work for not-for-profit or public actors, and as such cannot solely focus on profit margins or competitive advantage. For them to be effective and outcome focused, considering sharing their knowledge with other sector members should be on the table: sharing knowledge among peers in order to mutually strengthen the sectors outcomes would distinguish it from other sectors, and be consistent with claims about their charitable nature.

Towards open source development

Data about development is plentiful in virtually every imaginable region and sector. If it were available as open source data, the accumulated knowledge would probably be bigger than that stored at academic storages. One can only begin to imagine the research possibilities, ranging from big data to local anthropological studies.

If knowledge were permanent, centralised, and locally owned, the development sector would benefit greatly. Donors and NGO´s would not have to waste thousands of dollars on duplications of studies. Independent consultants would truly be independent. Failing NGOs would be easier to identify, and knowledge would be owned by those who it´s all for: local populations.

For the moment, development as an open source is only day dreaming. Data is not widely available and is stored with self-interested individual experts and competitive organisations. As long as knowledge about development is not locally owned and publicly shared and stored, it cannot be used optimally to deal with urgent issues in the sector. Donors will lack comprehensive insight, projects and evaluators will be unaccountable, and locals will stay in the dark. For knowledge to be permanent and widely accessible, those who own it will need to share it.

South Sudan: Global Succes Despite Local Failure

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 27th June 2014 / Categories: Opinion, Polis / Tags: Civil War, Development Cooperation, NGO, South Sudan / -

International cooperation is a permanent clash between broad, unspecified political goals and a system of narrow, actor-specific agendas using those broad goals to advance individual interests. This is true of transnational diplomacy, war, development cooperation, and any other such area. They all have in common that seemingly straightforward decision making hides the amalgamation of organisations, experts, schools of thought and political pressures that led to that decision in the first place, and that is responsible for subsequent execution. Such dichotomy often explains the failure of these broad goals, which tend to become hostage to specific interests. Not only does the mix of underlying agendas bias or even corrupt the formulation of general objectives, it also hampers implementation in subtle yet decisive ways. The broad agendas that do end up successful- such as the eradication of small pox in the 1970s, or the creation of the European Communities, guaranteeing long-term peace and stability on the continent- do so because they are consistent with the specific agendas, creating a natural path towards success of both. Such cases are rare. All too often, specific interests trump any general objective. One of the many recent examples has been the tragic case of independence and subsequent state building of South Sudan.

The independence of South Sudan was an event driven by international pressures. After the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, Western nations piled on to defend the right to self-determination of the predominantly Christian population. Not only was South Sudan on the African continent’s fault line between the Muslim, Arab controlled north and the Christian, pro-Western south, its creation was also a direct challenge to the virtually blacklisted al-Bashir government in Khartoum. Once the political door was opened to potential independence, UN agencies, NGOs, government representatives and the private sector joined the fray with an enthusiasm perhaps only surpassed by state building in Afghanistan. The broad goal was independence and freedom for the South Sudanese. The narrow goals in the background were those of the international state building and development sectors celebrating a new project to stay relevant and access public funds. The excitement among those licking their lips at the prospect of being involved at building a country from scratch was palpable. When the 2011 independence referendum came knocking, the outcome was a done deal. Years of Western money and political pressure had guaranteed success. The results, with 98.83% voting “yes”, may have been a percentage typically only seen in North Korea, but it did not matter to Western press or politicians: the people had spoken, freedom had prevailed.

Up to this point, broad objectives and narrow interests had coincided: many actors, both local as well as global, benefitted from independence. Local politicians saw the opportunity to seize power, whereas global politicians could claim once again to be arch angels of democracy and human rights. Local enterprise counted on an influx of foreign capital, global companies were hoping for large infrastructural and resource extraction contracts. Local civil society expected greater freedom to pursue their agendas, global NGOs were looking forward to an inpour of government funding and donor drives. And indeed, funds did come, accompanied by a bombardment of governmental development agencies and NGOs from all over the world. As a result, the process was generally considered a success by 2011, and with high expectations of a bright future. Political and funding goals had been met. Employment and budgets in both Juba’s governmental departments as well as those of the international NGO sector had increased dramatically, and UN and EU consultants were flying up and down at the cost of their usual, exorbitant daily fees.

Once independence had sunk in, however, broad and specific agendas started diverging. The general agenda of building a functional state had always been an incredibly long shot. Besides significant oil reserves, the South Sudanese economy mostly relies on unproductive agricultural activities. Basic infrastructure is among the worst in the world. The country’s weak political and social institutions are mostly driven by foreign support, rather than domestic expertise. The country is landlocked, heavily relying on its northern rival for its access to the rest of the world. Internal conflict, including long-simmering ethnic and economic tensions, were left unaddressed for much of the post-Naivasha period. In other words, for the Republic of South Sudan to ever become a success for its own population, a tremendous local and global effort would have been needed. Once the excitement surrounding the referendum had disappeared, global politics responsible for the broad objectives moved on to new focal points, leaving South Sudan in the hands of dispersed, decentralised and uncoordinated narrow interests. Funding levels and political support continued to be enough to maintain the Sudanese development industry that had been built up so eagerly, but were completely insufficient to reach a long-term, sustainable level of statehood and stability.

When in December 2013 civil war erupted, it should have come as a surprise to no one. The writing had been on the wall for a long time. Moreover, the responsibility of this failure lay firmly in the hands of the international community so eagerly pushing through an unsustainable agenda in the first place. In order to satisfy narrow agendas, they supported an unachievable broad goal. They- both the international private sector as well as the public sectors and the development industry- benefitted politically and financially, while doing so under the guise of human rights and welfare concerns. Now, they express disappointment at the failures and hardship suffered by the local population, but where are the mea culpas? Where are the statements from donors, NGOs and transnational institutions admitting that they got it wrong?

Last week, De Volkskrant published an article on how Dutch development aid to Sudan over the past ten years had been wasted. The Netherlands, one of South Sudan’s most important donors and advocates of independence, spent over half a billion Euros on local development and financial support. This was mostly steered towards social needs and humanitarian assistance, and very little was dedicated to more fundamental issues necessary to achieve the broad objectives of sustainability. The Dutch government turned its attention elsewhere after formulating the general aims, leaving policy making and funding decisions in the hands of narrow interests, i.e. those of specialised NGOs and experts. The broader vision was lost, and interested parties had free reign over directing the flow of the significant financial resources that had been made available. Any organisation defends the importance of their own field of expertise, regardless of the wider picture. When central coordination weakens, those with the best lobbies prevail.

One of the main lessons from the case of South Sudan is the importance of making sure that broad goals are consistent with specific interests. Moreover, global actors need to respond to local realities, and not attempt to set the agenda. If those criteria cannot be guaranteed, then the mission is doomed to fail. Complex human- self-interested- systems then take over, and start nibbling away at the foundations necessary to achieve the stated objectives. When De Volkskrant wrote that Dutch development aid has “gone up in smoke”, they only got it half right. It has gone up in smoke from a local perspective. In that sense the case of South Sudan has been a massive failure, with the Sudanese suffering the consequences. But large amounts of that €500 million ended up in the pockets of Dutch development experts and organisational overhead, to whom the operation was successful: it has provided employment and political relevance to such organisations worldwide. This divergence between broad and narrow interests has led to a conflict ridden country, in which the local population is paying the price for poor international decision making. Not to worry though, as Western nations will undoubtedly be sending their humanitarian experts and NGOs back to help the suffering locals once again in these times of need. After all, that is what friends are for.

Emerging Economies: Finding a Balance Locally as well as Globally

Posted by Ricardo Lenoir-Grand Pons / 18th November 2013 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: BRIC, Emerging Economies, IMF, World Bank / -

Economic growth of so-called emerging countries has not always brought about the desirable and necessary development and strengthening of social and civil rights, nor the consolidation of their democratic systems. Alongside this, the reluctance of some Western countries in view of the increasing number of competing economic high-performers in the international arena has hindered their efforts in the path of human development. High economic growth of emerging countries has been achieved by a combination of cheap labor with easy access to credit, resulting in lower production costs, a dramatic increase in foreign demand for their industrial products and commodities and the expansion of their domestic markets. The other side of the coin is the challenges that are still pending: a proper separation of powers, the protection of minorities, a greater respect for social rights and a better distribution of wealth. The wealth of a country goes far beyond economic growth.

Emerging countries have been labeled in a number of ways, ranging from BRIC and CIVETS to EAGLES. Within the first group there is China, the indisputable leader of all charts, a giant whose power has become a model for many, not only economically but also politically. It also contains Brazil, an dynamic and quickly growing economy still marred by significant social and economic inequalities. The second group, lagging far behind the first, is a heterogeneous and troubled group that includes Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa. Within this framework we find some strengths and weaknesses related to economic and social development: since the new round of peace talks in Colombia, the “narco” wars seen to have subsided; Indonesia and Vietnam keep growing in the shadow of China, well integrated into global production chains; and yet the military coup in Egypt or the tense climate of social conflict in southeastern Turkey remind us that economic indexes seldom reflect the wealth and well-being of a country.

The social inequality that can be found in these countries has an interesting parallel with the inequality among nations at an international level. Unequal power sharing between rich and poor is also on full display when it comes to global arrangements. Regardless of the relative power of each of those countries, all of the emerging economies have high hopes of increasing their presence in international decision-making bodies such as the G-20. And this is precisely where a controversy has arisen after the US refused to accept the new rules to ensure a balance between Western and emerging countries, which has forced the International Monetary Fund President Christine Lagarde to urge “countries to fulfill their commitment to expeditiously implement this reform.”

This reform adopted and approved by the G -20 directly affects the composition and functioning of the Bretton Woods institutions. In the case of the IMF, new financial lines have been created and its resources have increased, but with greater supervisory powers. But most importantly, the reform introduces changes in the IMF’s governance, aiming to increase the legitimacy of the institution by adapting the voting system, taking into account the actual economic weight of each country, which benefits the emerging economies that have grown considerably in recent years. As for the World Bank, the changes were inspired by the “Zedillo Report” and are generally in line with the IMF’s: more resources and new financing and an important economic governance reform with greater representation for the Emerging Countries and Least Developed Countries. Overall, developing countries have increased by 50% their basic votes in this institution. Another sign of change is that the Executive Board has reserved a seat for the first time in history for a sub-Saharan African country. However, other urgent measures have not even been pinpointed yet, such as improving and strengthening the monitoring mechanisms to forecast financial crisis, or appointing citizens of countries other than European ones (IMF) or the US (World Bank; Jim Yong Kim is Korean-born American after all) for the top positions of these institutions. Consequently, while on paper the recent support measures have been applauded by the emerging powers, in practice there is still a long way to go in recognizing their political legitimacy.

Two news items found on 22nd October in the media serve to illustrate the situation. The first, published by financial newspaper Expansion CNN, reads that “despite the rapid growth of developing economies in the last decade, advanced economies still dominate the lists of the largest corporations in the world, representing 75% of companies of the Fortune Global 500 this year, and totaling 91% if we exclude state-owned enterprises”. Meanwhile, on that same day Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev declared in Beijing –as to add extra symbolism to his words- that: “If China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Russia cannot contribute to the stable development of the world economy, nothing will “.

Emerging countries are close to completing the conversion of their economic systems, but have yet to take a final step to solve domestic problems of capital importance such as the full recognition of basic rights and a fairer distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, the West provides them with the tools to participate in international trade, complying with the norms of liberal trade theory, but hypocritically keeps impeding- if not denying their right- to access decision-making positions that match their economic size. This is why further reforms undertaken in the G -20 should take the first step to fulfill two objectives: promoting structural reforms within emerging economies and finding a better balance between their economic weight and their political representation at an international level. Only this will ensure sustainable growth among both local populations and the global community.

Nobody Wants to Play with Barack Anymore

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 2nd July 2013 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: NSA, Obama, United States / -

When US Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Jerusalem last week to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, what will have gone through his mind when Netanyahu made him wait for an hour? Perhaps he felt that the prime minister did him a favour. By signalling the complete lack of trust between the two administrations, and by symbolizing the impotence of the highest representative of President Barack Obama, pressure was taken off Kerry’s shoulders to return home with, as he calls them, actual “positive outcomes”. Performing the obligatory ritual of negotiating peace in the Middle East has been a Sisyphean task during the best of times, but these days it is a particularly thankless job for the US State Department. This is not because peace is out of reach- ’twas always thus, and always thus will be- but because United States leadership has become a nuisance on the international stage. It is flapping its geopolitical arms around like a child who is no longer the centre of attention at the playground, and who is desperately trying to get his audience back with new, exciting ideas. And the other kids no longer care. Representing that child must be emotionally draining, even for someone as unflappable as John Kerry.

The White House under Barack Obama has continued its decline which began during the Bush presidency. It went from being an undisputed world leader to that of a powerful but slightly antiquated, uncomfortable and strangely irrelevant presence on the world stage. The United States remains a source of great influence and prestige. It is still unmatched scientifically and economically, and it is still the most important source of global culture and innovation. But its formal representative and voice to the outside world- the president and his administration- have become the child that no one wants to play with. The German kid has the moral high ground, the Russian kid the chutzpah and the Chinese kid the cool toys.

Obama knows it. First, he tried to scare the world into following him. There was the almost obligatory episode about Iran, in which Obama, just like every of his predecessors since 1979, tried to argue that Teheran’s nuclear programme is an existential threat to the world. And then there was the awkward and perplexing stand-off with North Korea. As the former cool kid you know when you are in trouble when you get into a shouting match with a toddler half your age. More recently, there has been the confused- and quickly rebuffed- hard-line towards Syria.

When the stick failed, the White House tried carrots. In the past weeks alone they have launched major international initiatives on non-proliferation, climate change, and Kerry’s doomed mission to kick-start a US led peace process in the Middle East. The first was shot down by Moscow in a matter of hours, the second lacks any credibility at home, and the third started off with their only true ally in the region arriving late and grumpy. It is quite a feat to be disliked by both the Israeli establishment as well as environmentalists in San Francisco.

Clearly, throwing initiatives at a wall and hoping that some of them stick is not working out for Obama. It can no longer distract the world’s attention from Washington’s political incompetence. Initiatives devoid of substance can no longer compete in an age in which Edward Snowden dominates the global psyche.

The world does not look to the United States for leadership anymore. Times have changed. The War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan, the financial crisis, drone assassinations, Guantanamo Bay, and now the NSA wiretapping revelations have reduced the White House to near irrelevance as a source of guidance. Its leadership depended on credibility, on being the light on the hill that Americans like to portray themselves as. Bizarrely, Russia and China are quickly becoming more credible actors on the international stage. Not because they are a beacon of morality- they clearly are not- but because they do not pretend to be. Their influence comes from hard power, and they know it. Everyone knows it. Foreigners do not have to listen to sanctimonious and hypocritical speeches when doing business with them, and it is no wonder that as a result they are a hit in many parts of the world.

Susan Rice, the incoming national security adviser, said in response to the Snowden leaks that she thinks that “the United States of America is and will remain the most influential, powerful and important country in the world, the largest economy, and the largest military, [with] a network of alliances, values that are universally respected”. Only the last bit about universal values is relevant, and on that she is wrong: the US has lost its way in that one, crucial regard. US long-term influence never came from its military capabilities or even economic prowess. It was always based on something more intangible, something to do with purpose, with hope that human societies can grow and eventually prosper. The world was willing to forgive the United States its mistakes, as long as it provided such hope. The American nation was even allowed to throw a few tantrums, even damage its surroundings, as long as it was willing to learn and grow. It projected a sense of naive optimism that the old guard in Europe had lost long ago. Vietnam, nuclear proliferation, and destructive power games were fiercely criticised, but did not undermine that sense of universal hope. Their most important foreign policy was their national identity.

When Obama won the 2008 elections on a platform of hope and change, he tapped into that global thirst for leadership. Not one based on hard power or even diplomatic strong-arming, but based on representing a society that was essentially optimistic and well-intentioned. By not delivering that promise to return to a world based not on fear but on optimism, he put the nail in the coffin of his country’s position as main voice for the global community. His mandate was to change the vicious dynamics that were slowly undermining the White House’s leadership in a quagmire of complex Washington dynamics. Instead of being that moral beacon- Nobel Peace Prize endorsed, no less- he made the world see US political leadership as an obnoxious little kid with too many economic and military toys at its disposal. Nobody wants to play anymore, no matter how many games little Barack can think of.

Conspiracy in the Sahel? Would that it were

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 28th February 2013 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: AFRICOM, Mali, Mauritania, Sahel / -

With Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger and various other countries in the Sahel suffering from instability and foreign intervention, conspiracy theories about Western control are running amok. They always do, especially in the complex context of international relations. Conspiracy theories give us comfort and shelter against the much harsher realities of our world. Unfortunately, they also block serious analysis and our quest for solutions. The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is no different: it is essential to analyse and tackle the very real challenges in the region- including Western involvement- without reaching for counter-productive conspiracy comfort food.

Countries of the Sahel combine an inherent fragility caused by poor economic conditions with post-colonial divisions that make national stability difficult: ethnic and religious lines run right across borders and divide nations into disperse communities. Proper infrastructure is scarce. Even with good governance policies, such a situation would always be difficult to manage.

Whereas until 2001 the region was largely ignored by Western policy, and mostly left to development cooperation and humanitarian actors, 9/11 changed everything. Since then, it has very much been on the radar screen of offices in Washington and the main European capitals.

Not only does the Sahel represent a religious fault-line between Islam in the north and Christianity in the south, but weak control of central governments plus a lack of Western presence created perfect local hiding spots for terrorist groups. Or, at least, that was the argument for getting involved. And thus, since the War on Terror began, financial, political and military resources have been pouring into countries like Mali. The discovery of natural resources in the region accelerated these dynamics even further.

In parallel, and following the same religious-default-line argument, missionaries from both the Christian world as well as from countries such Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began flooding in. A moderate and inclusive version of Islam that communities in the Sahel typically follow is quickly being radicalized through this clash of religious civilizations. A clash that can be witnessed in most of sub-Saharan Africa through the proliferation of evangelical churches and mosques on every street corner, but which is particularly pernicious in those countries that until recently had a certain religious equilibrium of moderation and tolerance.

Even ignoring ethical concerns about foreign intervention in local societies, it is not difficult to see how destabilizing Western policies can be. The US AFRICOM, with a budget of roughly $300 million and almost four thousand personnel, is a game-changer in terms of local security. Similarly, when France intervenes through Operation Serval, the local balance of power shifts dramatically. This destabilization would occur even if such intervention is coherent and with clear purpose. As it stands, they are neither: Western governments, like any large organization, respond and act according to a multitude of internal and external pressures, resulting in inconsistent and deficient outcomes.

This is exactly where conspiracy theorists consistently get it wrong, and are detrimental to the search for better policies. Western actors in the Sahel undoubtedly prioritise their own agendas over the interest of local populations. They also will try to cover this up by formal discourse using all the tools in the box: human rights, democracy, development, anti-terrorism, and other such generic and vacuous terminology. And yet, there is no “Western agenda” as such. Instead, there is an amalgamation of a plurality of Western actors with specific objectives, some internal, and some with respect to local situation.

Before foreign policy is articulated and implemented, it will have been influenced by a multitude of actors focussed on disperse agendas. Some of those (such as defence contractors or oil multinationals) will want to use local instability for economic profit. Others will focus on expanding their range of activities to stay relevant in 21st Century complexities. This can be applied to the Pentagon as well as to religious or humanitarian organizations. The former will convince itself that its existence is vital for international security, and that, as such, their work represents a moral imperative by protecting the US population. Similarly, the latter believe they have a moral responsibility towards the souls or lives of local populations. At the same time, Malian diplomats will lobby the White House to support the political leader they represent, often with true conviction and purpose. And Human Rights groups will lobby the UN to condemn the very same political leader.

All, however, push for an expansion of their own importance, size and influence. What is more, this game of identifying groups influencing international policy can be played with respect to each individual lobby as well. The Pentagon does not represent a uniform set of interests. Nor do human rights groups. Any NGO will consist of some people who choose to work there because of non-financial agendas, such as religious or moral concerns. To others, it is just a job like any other. Both types, however, will have as a primary objective the survival and growth of their own organisation.

When analysing actors at the lowest possible level, i.e. the individual CEO, criminal mastermind, local diplomat, advocate, analyst, secretary, aid worker or lobbyist, people tend to be terrible at understanding the complexity of their own environment. As a result, and even if we have a clearly identified purpose, we tend to fail at understanding the role we need to play to properly influence such a complex system. Furthermore, the moment agendas are shared between individuals, information tends to be leaked. Groups are not particularly good at keeping secrets.

Within such complexity, any large scale policies or operations tend towards destruction rather than creation. Not because of some master plan that defends the interests of a selected few, but because of the people’s inability to create any type of master plan in the first place. The days of clearly developed Napoleonic campaigns are long gone, and even Bonaparte had to contend with numerous lobbyists and complex influences. Within this context, the best is to be as modest as possible with respect to local interventions- whether they be military, economic or humanitarian- and work on a daily basis to understand and improve the internal dynamics that lead to such decision making in the first place. In other words, know thyself.

Western policy in the Sahel is largely responsible for the destruction and violence taking place at the moment. The irony that locally based terrorism could become a reality through anti-terrorist programmes was not difficult to foresee. And yes, some actors may have actually pushed for this to happen. But the main reason is not a controlled conspiracies emanating from Washington or Parisian offices, but the lack of control and lack of purpose that complicated internal human systems always display.

This is a much scarier thought than any conspiracy theory could ever be: human beings- including its most powerful individuals- are not in control of their own destiny. All we can do is try to steer society in the right direction by analysing and improving our systems’ internal mechanisms. Putting one’s head in the sand by eating the comfort food provided by conspiracy theorists only undermines such a worthy cause. Reality is difficult enough, and there is no need to create imaginary foes.

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