Global Governance: Why Size Matters

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 20th December 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: Globalisation, Governance / -

Now that the end of the Mayan calendar turned out to be just that -the end of a calendar rather than the world- we should perhaps turn our attention to issues that actually do threaten our global community’s existence. Spoiler alert: they do not include nuclear war, Malthusian concerns or melting icecaps. Our human mind is very good at recognizing such imminent dangers, and we are innovative and rational enough to deal with them, even if not always timely or efficiently.

The issues that truly endanger humanity are those that form part of ourselves, individually, and as such are hard to spot and even more difficult to deal with effectively. Within that category, there are few forces so strong as our attraction to size and numbers; 2012 was one of those years in which large groups and bloated international organizations showed their true nature, and it has not been a pretty sight.

Unfortunately, increased scale does not mean better governance. It reduces individual responsibility and accountability, and the initial purpose of organizations loses out to internal interests and dynamics. Different answers to our problems will be needed if we want to reach the end of the century in reasonable shape.

The mix of globalization with growing populations and growing economies is putting new demands on the way we govern our world. The answers that global society is coming up with so far are focused on the expansion of existing structures: ever-growing governments, expanded transnational organizations, dubious attempts at universal law enforcement, mass popular movements, ever-merging private companies. Globalization has become a further excuse for our psyches to find shelter in size, to hide in numbers.

Systems such as large human organizations have an inherent tendency to expand. This process is closely linked with the desire for survival of any system, and size typically means strength. Moreover, individuals within large organizations have their own particular agendas that are defended through mini-expansions within the system as well: the creation of a new management layers to accommodate promotions, management’s pet-projects leading to new departments and increased budgets to justify increased salaries are only a few of the internal expansionist forces at work. The result is perpetual growth.

And with growth come strong internal survival mechanisms. When in November Nate Silver used relatively simple statistical models to predict- astoundingly accurately as it turned out- the outcome of the US presidential elections, the mainstream media jumped on him in ways usually only reserved for North Korean dictators or cheating congressmen. The criticisms didn’t question his method or philosophy, because there was not much to criticise. But the world of punditry realised that if a nerdy looking statistician could use reason rather than instinct to analyse politics, they could all be out of a job soon. And thus the reaction was fierce, like a threatened organism defending itself from an existential threat.

Are such ever-increasing expansion and self-defence mechanisms necessarily a bad thing? Let’s look at a few examples, starting with the go-to place for any analyst of declining civilizations: ancient Rome. During its final stages of decline, the Roman Empire continued to expand its bureaucracy. This created civilization-wide inertia and blocked attempts at reversing the civilization’s fortunes. Whereas during, say, the 4th century AD, Romans still had the know-how, prestige and resources to avoid eventual collapse, they no longer had the effective means to put those competitive advantages to use. No one was able to take responsibility for the bloated bureaucratic monsters and its internal organizations kept on growing ad infinitum. This is exactly what our global civilization is facing in the early 21st Century.

The BBC crisis surrounding Jimmy Savile, for example, showed how large organizations can become inert, lack lines of responsibility and are incapable of dealing with anything beyond standard procedure. As one former BBC head said, “an organisation that allowed that sort of structure to grow up so that people can’t make decisions, has got something to do – it has got to be cleared out”.

National governments have clutched at any straw they could find to stay relevant, including using the fear-factor of terrorism, health-scares- anyone remember BSE and avian flu?- and now economic meltdown. At a time that national politics and governments are losing their validity and importance to their citizen’s lives, it is their organizations’ internal intuition, their systemic desire for survival, that drives them forward. Now that growth through welfare-state dynamics are on the decline, they look towards security and transnational concerns. The main driving force behind state intrusion into private lives and infringement of individual rights are bureaucracies. Every surveillance program justifies internal budgets and employment, and every weapons-system development benefits a whole chain of people, including lawyers and politicians. This world is not driven by dark conspiracies; it is driven by increasingly faceless actors within large organizations defending their own small islands of interests. The result is wasted resources, inefficiency and, most importantly, lack of responsiveness to true threats to our societies.

This year, and in a stunning display of institutional chutzpah, the European Union demanded- and is likely to get- a budget increase amidst the worse economic downturn in generations. If this had been done on Keynesian grounds- i.e. the need to invest our way out of the crisis- then it would have not been so brazen. Unfortunately, there was no such philosophy behind the demand. The EU has grown so large, and with so many national politicians and bureaucrats linked to specific islands of interest, that institutional growth benefits too many to halt it. The grey masses of anonymity that move national politics forward pale in comparison with the unaccountability of Brussels’ bureaucracy. And so, without anyone specifically being responsible, the EU continues to bloat. Not only does this lead to more inefficient bureaucracy, ineffective expenditure and frustrated citizens, it also undermines the EU’s abilities to to add value to our societies. Its primary purpose is now its own survival.

The UN is another prime example of a bloated system without any lines of responsibility (unless someone truly believes that Ban Ki-moon heads the world order?). It suffers under the weight of its own complexity. It was difficult enough to deal with roughly 200 nation-states, but now the UN is also increasingly dependent on other actors and on the good-will of its internal departments. They all have with their own agendas, budgets and specific interests. Unless such organizations are reformed into leaner and independent agencies without being able to hide behind institutional complexities or national agendas, they will fail their primary purpose.

One can observe this desire for size and numbers in all layers of society, not just in the public or international domain. Multinationals and other large companies do not escape internal expansionist dangers either. Mergers, development of new markets and other growth strategies often do not add any share or stake-holder value, except for those internally benefitting through increased bonuses or wages. In a globalised world- and just like national leaders- CEO’s may have formal responsibility over the actions of their organization, but true responsibility and choices come from deep down below.

To add insult to injury, not only are such companies too large for internal lines of responsibility, many of them have achieved “too big to fail” status. Because of society’s dependency on their operations, they will always be saved from doom. Needless to say that this negates the very essence of capitalism, and takes away significant flexibility and adaptability of how our global structures operate.

Even on the popular movement front things are not much better. 2012 is the year that effectively ended two popular movements that suffered because of their size and lack of clear lines of responsibility: the Tea Party and the Occupy-consortium. Both grew out of anger with the status quo, and very quickly became mass forces to be reckoned with. Both movements were based on size, with their power coming from numbers of followers. Both failed because of exactly that.

Believing that in today’s complex world you can have an effective agenda without clear leadership and hierarchy is preposterous. Without specific ambitions, and ways of holding people to account for their actions, any organization loses validity. Neither the Tea Party or Occupy attempted to create clear structure, and as a result their overly ambitious efforts turned into an aimless cacophony which then quickly faded away as both followers and observers moved on.

Humans are amazingly gifted creatures when it comes to applying their ingenuity, innovation and creativity to problem-solving. Huge challenges such as environmental degradation and poverty can be dealt with through innate abilities. Unfortunately, we are going down a dangerous path in which we are blocking our own problem-solving mechanisms. We are becoming incapable of creating the organization necessary for concerted global action. Instead, we have islands of specific interests and interest-groups ever-expanding, and increasingly blotting out the light. It is a fight of individual short-term interests versus societal long-term goals.

To avoid that challenges such those mentioned in the first paragraph of this article turn into unmanageable and survival-threatening problems, we need to rethink our love-affair with size. Organizations need to be lean and mean. Networks can connect organizations in order to coordinate efforts and cooperate, but let’s keep those as light, unfinanced and informal as possible. Civilization’s death does not come suddenly or through specific calamity, it comes through structural inertia. Strengthening individual responsibility, accountability and responsiveness are much worthier causes than doomsday-thinking. It is not the Mayan’s we need to fear; just ask the Romans.

Avaaz in Syria: Humanitarianism under Fire

Posted by Jorge Jimeno Almeida / 15th March 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: Humanitarian Action, ICRC, Syria / -

Neutrality is one of the humanitarian principles most likely to trigger interesting debates among humanitarian agencies, yet most of them prefer not to make much noise about the topic.

Neutrality means not to take side and position in any regard in any kind of conflict. It is very closely related to independence, i.e. not to act in support of political goals or actions of any party in the conflict. With impartiality, this means not to discriminate any person for belonging to any kind of group at the time of evaluating the human needs that have to be attended to first.

Almost all of the big humanitarian NGOs do not define themselves as neutral in their codes of conduct; they keep a rights based approach on the side of the oppressed. This position of defending those whose rights have been violated, and the carrying out of advocacy activities to stop such violations, is not compatible with a neutral attitude towards a conflict.

However, most of humanitarian agencies employ a public discourse calling for the respect of humanitarian principles. When these are enumerated, neutrality is included, along with independence, impartiality and humanity, even if they do not really adhere to the former. Some of the organizations are clear in articles,and explicitly state that they are not neutral.Others claim to be neutral while later making a mess of concepts like impartiality and finally ending with a poetic defence of the rights of the oppressed.

But in spite of what is written, all humanitarian agencies advocate operative neutrality in the field, claiming access solely to deliver aid to those in need. Of course, this claim in only truly valid for a few organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (ICRC). In reality, most of the humanitarian agencies do not only provide assistance but also carry advocacy activities, such as social mobilization, denouncing issues in the media and lobbying to a lesser or larger extent.

The debate about neutrality is not new. Indeed, it triggered the founding of Doctors Without Borders (better known with the French acronym MSF) when a group of ICRC workers disagreed with the silence kept by this organization during the Biafra war (1967-1970). Yet Avaaz, with its current humanitarian assistance in Syria, has gone a little further in the debate humanitarianism vs neutrality. Perhaps it is defining the new pattern for the humanitarian aid and even for the international cooperation in general.

While carrying out advocacy work, humanitarian organizations are very careful in their public discourse in order to not hamper actual assistance. They balance what assistance and advocacy mean to the target population, and they decide where to put more weight depending on the circumstances.

On the other hand, Avaaz- an organization flagging the social mobilization through the cybernetic networks, and therefore using one of the most powerful advocacy tools available nowadays- not only denounces the abandon of the Syrian population, not only request to those actors with decision power to act, but also claims to be providing humanitarian aid through their networks in the area. If some years ago the term humanitarian action was born to include both the humanitarian aid and advocacy, perhaps Avaaz may own the “humanitarian activism” label.

It is not the first time Avaaz includes humanitarian assistance in their advocacy activities; they also did it in the case of getting and channelling funds to Buddhist monks in Myanmar when the authorities of that country forbade entry to humanitarian agencies after the Nargis hurricane in 2008. By then, however, Avaaz was not as popular as it is now, and Myanmar was not witnessing the kind conflict taking place currently in Syria.

Obviously it is not the first time activism networks, local or international, assist civilian populations that support one actor or who are trapped on one side of the conflict. But Avaaz is an international organization without any preliminary interest in the conflict; and it makes public all of its aid delivery in its global network. This network has millions of followers, and it labels this kind of help as humanitarian while requesting donations from the public to continue “smuggling” the aid into the conflict situation, with strong statements such as this one:

“Let’s be clear — as embassies close, medical agencies withdraw and journalists pull out, Avaaz has the only network that is both smuggling medical equipment and journalists in and images and information out. The UN has failed, but we can help peaceful democracy heroes like Danny loosen the dictator’s grip on their country. Watch Danny’s urgent appeal and chip in now so we can continue our Arab spring campaigning and support for citizen journalists — if enough of us donate now, we can get aid to the most besieged cities and towns before the next attack.”
(www.avaaz.org)

Neutrality should be a principle ensuring the entry of humanitarian agencies in any conflict, but we can see that in practice this is not the case. This is the case even to the ICRC who signs up to that principle unambiguously. Perhaps this is the result of the vague neutrality played by many agencies. Or perhaps it is only that no one wants to welcome witnesses to the crimes.

Be that it may, neutrality, like the Responsibility to Protect as well, are not proving to be very useful. Maybe the only way right now to many organizations is clear non-neutrality and to adapt its operational methodology accordingly, supporting to the civil society groups considered right –by them- in each case. Perhaps, on the other hand, those being truly neutral, with all the consequences of the term, may take for granted universal access. Even if there are conflicts where it seems that not even the purest neutrality will take anything for granted.

What is Civil Society?

Posted by Jorge Jimeno Almeida / 5th February 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: Civil Society, NGO / -

There seems to exists a general agreement that international development programmes must be based on the support of local organizations and frameworks in the countries and areas where the projects are implemented, rather than the direct work of the international agencies and NGOs. Most of international cooperation projects are carried out following this approach, giving an increasingly leading role to local actors. The main goal is to strengthen the local counterparts and their ownership of development actvities in order to ensure long-term sustainability.

Within this context, the term “civil society” is used continuously in forums and seminars. Bold statements abound about the work of this or that organization mainly supporting civil society in this or that country. But civil society is not homogenous, and therefore to announce overall support to civil society is too simplistic and hides an important question facing international organizations: Who is actually being supported?

In the case of structural support to governmental bodies, either local and regional or national, the answer is simple: governments are legitimate and recognized actors- regardless of whether they have been democratically elected or not. However, most NGOs – and also governmental agencies in some cases- prefer to work with civil society’s organizations for moral reasons. In fact, NGOs are civil society’s actors and therefore it is reasonable they look for cooperation with similar types of actors.

Yet civil society is heterogeneous and their organizations have several interests, frequently with multiple agendas and lack of coherence. The legitimacy of the local counterparts can not be extrapolated further than the one held by the members of those organizations. This in spite of those statements assuming that working with one organization of a country’s civil society means working with its overall civil society.

In addition, the problem at the time of choosing the “twin” organizations is increased according to the level of advocacy associated to the programme: in a project of, for example, improvement of irrigation techniques in an agricultural area, it is not that important whether this is done through the organization A or B. At least as long as both are impartial, fair and good managers in general. However, in a project also looking for improving the agriculture policies in an area, the question about who is supported gains greater significance.

In the case of advocacy projects the goal is not only the strengthening of local organizations, but also, and above all, to legitimise the political requests. Most foreign NGOs do not see themselves having enough legitimacy to influence the political agendas of another country or region. This is blatant hypocrisy, as by supporting one group or another- or defending one political position or another- they are already playing a role. International NGOs often argue they only give funds and technical support to civil society to fight for their goals. However, as stated above, civil society is not homogeneous, so this discourse is flawed in most of the cases.

Indeed, international NGOs cooperate frequently with the development of political agendas of those “theoretical local civil society representatives”. Besides it only being part of the story, to affirm simple support of civil society is mistaken. In most of the cases, at least, there is a collaborative aspect in the work. Obviously it is not about international political intrigue by the NGOs: political agendas of NGOs are basically about the rights to access to minimum social services for those in need. So, why are they so worried about demonstrating that they are not an actor in the political arena of other countries?

The answer can be focused on two aspects of the matter: on the one hand, the frequent neo-colonialism accusations about NGOs force them to simply support a homogeneous civil society; on the other hand, NGOs are afraid a more honest position may close doors to hampering its influence as well as putting at risk their own survival. And there are of course more reasons in each particular case that make international development organizations move on the edge of incoherent discourse in so many situations.

However, the biggest problem is not the danger of pretending; the main concern should be the fact of neglecting the question itself.

NGOs and the Security Challenge

Posted by Diego Guerrero Oris / 30th January 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: NGO, Security / -

In the past years there has been amongst NGOs, and in particular amongst humanitarian agencies, a rising concern for the security and safety. They are increasingly confronted with more and more dangerous and hostile environments. This is especially true since 2001 and the beginning of the global “War on Terror” initiated by the Bush administration and his acolytes which marked a new dimension in the evolution of an already existing trend.

For decades humanitarian agencies would mostly operate in contexts of asymmetric warfare between territorial states, in which the objectives of the contenders were relatively defined and unambiguous. Moreover, each conflicting party had a hierarchical structure that – in theory – followed or claimed to follow and respect the rules of war and the related international conventions. Nowadays, the number of different actors, their objectives and their low or limited military training and hierarchical structure, combined with the changes in the nature of the conflicts, represent a significant transformation in the working environment in which humanitarian agencies operate. In the majority of cases the new conflicts or war settings do not correspond to the traditional pattern nor they obey to an element of territoriality. This results in muddied objectives. The different actors and forces are decentralized and typically do not recognize (nor know, in many cases) International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Convention. As a consequence, this results in an increase of attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers.

Many of these attacks are parts of political strategies that have a clear message and intention. It is therefore essential to develop an understanding of the nature of the conflicts, to be aware of these changing realities and of the different interacting actors, as well as of their interests and strategies. Simultaneously, humanitarian agencies need to transmit a coherent image, and develop clear strategies to communicate their specific principles, role and responsibilities and the humanitarian objectives of their action.

In recent years, NGOs have developed security policies, manuals and procedures to facilitate and help a better management of their own security. The degree and level of these tools vary according to the organizations and their capabilities. However, one of the most frequent deficiencies is the lack of understanding and knowledge of the contexts in which they work. With the exception of a few, most of the organizations have not been able to develop a constant and methodical analysis of their area of operations, and of the risks it entails. On the contrary, in most cases they simply tend to apply a set of protocols and procedures that – without a good analysis of the particular context – cannot, alone, mitigate the potential threats and risks towhich theycan be exposed.

This obviously affects any strategies adopted to maintain operations in volatile and insecure settings.

On the other hand, humanitarian agencies have increasingly “militarized” their security. Such “militarization”, as a consequence, deepens even more the gap and their ability to respond with an appropriate strategic vision.

One of the most significant changes occurred in the dimension of the “Security Triangle” (Acceptance, Protection and Deterrence) which vary depending on the working environments, organizations and available resources. The acceptance strategy is the primary, and by default, security strategy used by NGOs. Despite that, their misconception of this concept on the one hand and, on the other, the new complex contexts of most of humanitarian interventions, are today for the vast majority of NGOs a major challenge, a pending cornerstone.

Additionally, in the current and increasingly changing environment there is some controversy regarding the current value and effectiveness of acceptance as security strategy.

However, should we really question acceptance as an effective security strategy, or does the problem reside elsewhere? Certainly the lack of knowledge and analysis of the given context makes the agencies more vulnerable than they, perhaps, should be. Itisthereforefundamental to understandthat:

a)Acceptance must be a proactive strategy, which requires specific resources and actions. In most organizations this does not occur. The vast majority of them erroneously assume the acceptance strategy passively.

b)Acceptance is the result of how an organization is perceived and it depends on several factors, including most importantly its official position and the behavior of its personnel.

c)Acceptance requires a high maintenance in terms of staff, time and resources that not all agencies have or can maintain.

d)Most of the agencies lack experienced staff and knowledge of the dynamics of the conflicts and actors.

Simultaneously, in the daily work of NGOs, security remains a marginal element. This in many cases is seen as an impediment or obstacle rather than an element that aids them in their work in conflict and insecure settings.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that there has been an improvement of the security situation of NGOs. Security criteria have been integrated into organizational criteria, resulting in the development of security policies, procedures and practices, and well as in the allocation of resources (financial, human, etc.). Despite these achievements, most of the agencies lack the necessary resources and strategies to operate in complex and insecure settings. The security management starts, and does not end, in the knowledge of the working environment, its dynamics and actors. The deficiency of knowledge and understanding of the context, the lack of rigor in the analysis of the threats and risks makes the implementation of security protocols and procedures weak and, in some cases, inadequate. In order to ensure that these measures are effective and thus guarantee a better security management, it is essential to mainstream the analysis of the conditions, threats and risks where NGOs operates. Moreover, agencies must ensure a constant, regular and methodical assessment of the given context as fundamental tool not only for their security but also for their interventions and re-adaptation of programs and activities.

Belligerence against Iran: Reckless and Counterproductive

Posted by Alberto Perez Vadillo / 19th January 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: Geopolitics, Iran / -

In the wake of last November’s IAEA report, it is time once again to examine the adopted policy on the issue: sanctions. This in the context of the latest moves by the United States and the European Union to cripple Iran’s oil industry, and subsequent threats by Tehran to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Specifically, it is necessary to think about the nature of those sanctions and whether they are in any way useful to prevent the ayatollahs from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Moreover, we could go further and ask ourselves if that goal is worthwhile at all, regardless of the cost.

The rationale behind sanctions is the following: If enough material pain is inflicted against the Iranian people, the alleged nuclear weapons program would become so politically and economically costly that the regime would have no other options than to drop it. This way of thinking would be flawless if we could objectively agree on what level of suffering is inacceptable for both the Iranians and their leadership. Obviously, the problem is that we cannot do that. In fact, more sanctions could be not only ineffective, but even counterproductive.

Weapons, particularly of the big and terrifying kind, give a country prestige and security. Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its political elite have felt insecure and suspicious of the intentions of its neighbours and its main enemy, the U.S. That still holds true. With Russia, India, Israel and Pakistan all having nuclear arsenals, and with Turkey being part of NATO, atomic bombs would give Iran a ‘calming’ deterrence capability. Consequently, there is a reasonable argument to be made that the reasons behind the nuclear program are too strong for Tehran to abandon its plans, even though if this implies losing oil revenue that is vital to an already besieged economy.

If this is indeed the case, popular protests triggered by the latest sanction would not oblige the regime to change its nuclear policy; in fact, the situation could result in repression and push Iran to speed up its pace towards nuclearization. It seems clear that in the mind of the Iranian leaders the experience of Libya and the defeat of Gaddafi are starkly present. Certainly, for them the words of Aisha Gaddafi, the Colonel’s daughter, probably ring true: “To every country that has weapons of mass destruction: keep them or make more so they will not meet the same fate as Libya” (March, 2011).

But in our analysis we may well be more adventurous and question if it is possible that the bulk of Iranian society could itself be willing on enduring more economic sanctions to attain nuclear capabilities. This might be the case. We should not ignore that the clerics’ shows of strength are partly intended at gathering popular support. Playing the card of national unity against the enemy might work up to a certain degree. Of course, this does not cancel the possibility of street protests like those in 2009. This latter prospect is surely one of the regime’s main fears, but we should bear the ambiguity of Iranian society in mind nonetheless.

Iran has abandoned its previous stance towards the West and shifted to a more combative attitude. This was the idea behind Tehran’s war games in the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for exporting 40% of the world’s oil. According to prominent officials in the Iranian army, they are capable of blocking it as a response to sanctions considered by the regime to be an “act of war”. It is unlikely they would actually make good on such threats, for the Strait is as important to the overall world oil exports as to Iran’s own. Yet it is a scenario that should not be discarded out of hand. If indeed the oil embargo the West has agreed on is fully implemented, which already is a complex task, Tehran might well decide it is worth trying to close the Strait. It would certainly harm those Iranian oil exports still flowing despite the embargo, but it would also provoke spikes in oil prices, not a pleasant prospect for Western nations in the actual economic situation.

This is precisely what makes the implementation of sanctions difficult and what lies behind the reluctance of several actors (including here the Obama Administration itself). However, if the Strait is blocked, the U.S. Fifth Fleet would quickly retaliate. Assuming the Iranian navy gets defeated, that would expose the military vulnerability of the clerics, and reinforce the call of hardliners for greater weaponization. Yet another reason why sanctions may backfire.

So, if sanctions seem to be too risky, unpredictable or unsuited for this task, what is left then? Probably not diplomacy, at least in the foreseeable future, since both sides have burnt that bridge. There are already covert operations in place. These include facility sabotage, the assassination of scientists relevant to the program and cyberwarfare (2010 Stuxnet attack). However, this has only slowed down Iran’s nuclear plans, nothing more.

Thus, now is when we get to the critical point of possibly opting for a preventive attack, and here let us not delude ourselves: a strike against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure is highly dangerous to international security and stability. On the one hand, a preventive strike like this would only work if it is unexpected, so there would not be any Security Council debate before an attack. This would make it illegal under international law and upset not only the Iranians, but also the Russians and the Chinese. On the other hand, a quick strike, probably carried out by Israel, might not be that effective. It can be argued that to render the nuclear program useless a more sustained campaign is needed, and that would need the involvement of the U.S. and maybe others. Apart from all of this, Iran’s- as well as its and its allies’- possible retaliation should not be ignored. All of this makes it unclear whether playing this gambit is reasonable. A Middle East with a nuclearized Iran would might be a region with increased instability. That, however, is not enough of a reason to start a war over it.

Democracies and their Search for Enemies

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 17th January 2012 / Categories: Opinion / Tags: Democracy, Francis Fukuyama / -

In an interesting fusion of international relations and developmental psychology, the Enemy System Theory (EST) has been used since the Cold War to explain conflicts between human tribes. Its main premise is that the human mind requires the identification of both antagonistic as well as friendly groups that validate one’s own existence. In other words, we need enemies in order to feel good about ourselves. From an evolutionary human need’s perspective, it allows our psychology to show loyalty to our surroundings by sharing a common foe. If no such foe exists, we artificially create one. Needless to say, this urge seems to be alive and well in our modern day societies. In Europe and the United States, especially, there seems to be a continuous search for potential enemies to identify and hunt down. And if we cannot find them, we invent them.

An often heard misconception about our world is that democracies are more peaceful than dictatorships or other types of regimes. Even though there is some evidence to suggest that among themselves democracies tend to be peaceful, democracies have proven to be ferociously violent towards non-democratic regimes. This is true even if one leaves the United States out of the equation on the basis of being unrivalled- and therefore almost unavoidably irresponsible- in its military superiority. European democracies have been heavily involved in, and shared responsibility for, most of the violent and diplomatic conflicts this century so far.

To continue to insist that this is because democratic nations are more vested in spreading their self-perceived enlightenment around the globe- and thus accelerating Fukuyama’s now infamous End of History- seems unsustainable. Too many inconsistencies in Western behaviour undermine that thesis. Yet to argue that it is all down to realist, self-interested behaviour fuelled by oil and other geostrategic concerns, is also missing the mark. The large conflicts of our time (Iraq, Afghanistan, the War on Terror in general) have been too self-destructive, too badly calculated, to have been born solely out of such sinister motives.

Our perceived need for enemies as explained by the EST seems to be a more appropriate explanation. In a time that natural enemies are increasingly hard to find, we actively seek them out. In many cases, we even encourage them. Reading the newspapers, one would almost get the false impression that times are particularly dangerous for the West right now. Our tribal instincts do not seem to be comfortable in a globalized world in which we can no longer define good or evil according to Cold War parameters. Hence, over the past twenty years or so, democracies have been actively searching for new targets.

During the hopeful and idealistic 1990s, the targets were particularly hard to come by. Those that were found- in the Balkans, for example- tended to be portrayed as enemies of humanity and human rights, rather than as enemies of democratic populations specifically. The first decade of the new century, however, saw the rise of terrorism as an all encompassing foe ready to be applied to our darkest nightmares. It led to wars with hundreds of thousands of civilians killed by democratic forces.

Now, with the fear and anger towards faceless terrorist on the decline, democratic aggression has turned back to more value driven targets, such as Libya and Syria. Iran seems to be the only constant throughout the ages, with Teheran making an appetising and useful target for continual rhetoric and sanctions. The North Korean regime has proven too extreme and too cartoonish in Western eyes to be useful as true antagonists, despite the human suffering among the Korean population.

It is hard to overestimate the psychological power of enemies in our collective conscious. British and American comedy shows still seem incapable to even mention Germany without some distasteful reference to Hitler or its Nazi past. Immigrants are increasingly perceived as a fifth column for unspecified rivals. Irrational fear of Iran’s nuclear program is shared by both the political right as well as the left throughout the West. The mere mention of terrorist plots continue to open political paths unimaginable in any rational society.

The level of enthusiasm for our own societal arrangements is inversely related to the relationship with our surroundings. Even internally, within democratic societies, the artificiality of much of the political discourse against the other side is obvious, of course. Railing against the other political side makes us feel good about ourselves and those who agree with us. Being a victim, potential or actual, of forces that are perceived to be against us, is a powerful sedative. It liberates us from introspection and self-assessment.

The fact that politicians gladly use the EST to their advantage is nothing new, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so. Yet it would be a mistake to automatically interpret this as wilful abuse on their part. Besides the irony of such attitudes towards them, proving the EST itself (making political leaders our perceived enemies), it is likely that they themselves are victims of their own human frailty. Just like all of us.

By any reasonable standard (mortal victims, economic destruction, geopolitical manipulation), democracies have proven the most aggressive actors in violent conflicts worldwide over the past decades. And yet we continue to see ourselves as the good side, righteous and generally well-behaved, albeit perhaps error prone in the practical application of our ideals.

Next time that the political right and the left come together to overthrow a regime in Libya, or impose tougher sanctions on Iran, or suggest intervention in Syria, perhaps should have a look at how that has worked out for us in the past. Maybe some modesty in both our admiration for our own moral superiority as well as restraint in our anger towards unpleasant regimes would be appropriate. It certainly would have benefited the Iraqi and Afghani populations over the past decade or so. After all, who needs enemies with friends like us?

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