Western media and Ukraine: global ideology versus local realities

Posted by Ricardo Lenoir-Grand Pons / 23rd July 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Europe, Media, Putin, Ukraine / -

With past week’s tragedy still dominating headlines across the world, the differences between local and Western press in how the conflict in Ukraine is viewed are starker than ever. This is a recurring phenomenon in our globalised world, with local and global media offering completely different interpretations of the same events as long as victims can be abstracted at a global level. Now that victims of the Ukrainian conflict include Western toursists, global and local perspectives will begin to converge. In the case of Ukraine, the difference between local and global perspectives goes back to the very beginning of the open conflict. The initial phase was seen as one of a clash between the West and Russia, in which the former considered it a struggle between the defenders of freedom against those who want to resuscitate authoritarian practices of the past; a conflict between those who are fighting for democracy against those who violate international law. Local media, on the other hand, focused more on cultural and geopolitical concerns, with Ukraine divided along ethnic lines and torn between spheres of influence.

Western mass media celebrated the fall of Yanukovich’s regime as a step towards the consolidation of democracy in the country, pushing it away from Russia and towards Western society. The actual local actors behind the two camps were overlooked in the process, at least by global media. Local media did pay attention to the fact that political parties had nationalist profiles with hints of clear xenophobia, but not so much in the West press: there, the victory of democracy facing the authoritarian oppression represented by the threat of Russia was the dominant narrative. Parties such as UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self- Defense), Svodoba (Freedom), Batkisvshchyna (Freedom) have been supported by the international community as well as by media without much regard for their actual local agendas or suspect ideologies.

The context in which these events took place matters. When the suspension of Russian as a co-official language was approved in Congress, the delay caused a direct confrontation with Russia. The fact that Russian is the most spoken language in the eastern part of Ukraine- used by half of the population, and even more so in Crimea- showed how much this was a local issue, rather than an ideological clash for freedom. Yet this was mostly ignored by Western media despite being such an important factor in triggering the crisis.

Reviewing past newspaper editorials, there is no surprise to find out that the perceived enemy of European and Western democracy was lurking large in the interpretation of the local conflict: Vladimir Putin has been raised to the status of the greatest threat to Western stability, and therefore also seen as the main agitator opposing Ukrainian freedom. This perspective has been present throughout the crisis, and since the MH17 crash is a dominant factor in any Western analysis once again. The Russian president’s actions are thoroughly analyzed whilst those of other involved parties are not. The European energy situation and its clear dependence on Russia- causing a blatant clash between words and actions on behalf of European governments- are barely discussed. Authoritarian attitudes are criticized while simultaneously a remarkable dependence on that very same antagonist is created. The analysis of the Ukraine and last week’s disaster is framed within a moralistic discourse, while behind the scenes the same practical ambiguity continues. European realpolitik supported by helpful media choosing to ignore any moral complexity about responsibility of their own leaders and societies.

At a local level, things are different. Ukrainian media extensively covered the crash, of course, but did so from a perspective of a long conflict that has caused victims throughout: Ukraine’s dilemma is one of sustained violence, not one isolated incident. And yet, the local consequences of the MH17 crash may be greater than any of the violence that has occurred before or after, as it brings Western victims into the fray. The dichotomy of Western media discourse on the one hand, and ambiguous policies on the other, is no longer sustainable now. Local and global may join the same reality now, with both types of media covering the practical situation rather indulging in ideological judgments.

It is understandable that the idea of the conflict changes depending on the source of the given information. It is also comprehensible that the information provided is influenced by national matters, depending on how the particular country could be affected. But, as the current situation shows, the intention of giving global coverage cannot be done without starting from a local perspective. In this particular case, the actions taken by Europe to expand its borders to the East, or the ones taken by the NATO in the same direction, together with some deficiencies of these institutions, must be included in the analysis. The responsibility for local suffering cannot be projected solely onto the dictatorial face of Vladimir Putin. It is shared by many, including the free European press.

The Future of Offical Development Assistance

Posted by Joanna Klever / 3rd July 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Aid Effectiveness, Guatemala, IFI, Nicaragua, ODA / -

Official Development Assistance has failed. Donor and recipient activities in the past decades have shown little success, and ongoing practices and ideas are subject of continuous criticism. What are the lessons learned and is the criticism valid? This article elaborates on those questions by shedding light on two cases from the 1990s in which the World Bank implemented reform programs in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Their successes were negligible.

Why ODA is controversial

“Aid” in itself has been divided in many subcategories and types, representing a multitude of different targets and aims. Humanitarian and relief aid serve immediate needs while structural adjustment programs and the millennium development goals are set out for the longer term. They aim to sustainably improve people’s livelihoods. So far there is little evidence to suggest that the billions of dollars circulating have actually had a positive effect. On the contrary, it is increasingly argued that development aid fails to achieve its proposed effects, and in some cases it even worsens the situation. Often this happens through increased government accountability to donors instead of the electorate, resulting in the deterioration of stability and decreased focus on local needs and progress.

Quantitative analysis found that countries receiving ODA over the course of decades are more likely to show decreasing quality of governance and democracy. Furthermore, it seems that ODA is primarily given to countries that are able to present some minimum level of good governance already. Consequently, those countries that are most in need of support systems are less likely to receive aid. Certainly, it is understandable that donor organizations and governments refrain from giving aid to countries that are incapable of processing aid money. However, these countries should be given more attention and care.

The role of influential International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund is controversial. Their neoliberal political agenda is imposed on recipient nations through money lending programs, which condemn recipient governments to follow the specific requirements, posed by the IFIs disregarding any national attempts to develop towards a different political and economic model. The most prominent example is conditionality based lending, where recipient states are forced to implement certain conditions in order to receive financial support. Most often these conditions are related to changes in governance and increased democratization.

Originally conditions were designed to ensure that recipient states would be equipped and prepared to receive and process the incoming financial support. However, contrary to initial expectations, many recipient countries felt that the conditions were defined by the IFIs following their neoliberal development perspectives rather than national and local interests. As a result most conditionality-based programs are described as failures today.

Conditionality-based lending was most prominent in the 1980s and 1990s, a period in which many countries emerged from civil wars or dictatorships and were seeking to establish democratic nation states. It would be beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the ‘West’s’ interests in this process. However, it needs to be clear that industrialized nations, especially the United States had and continues to have strong interests in many countries, especially in Latin America and the Middle East. This resulted in strong tendencies towards neoliberal development.

The Case of Guatemala and Nicaragua

Nicaragua and Guatemala are two examples of countries that have been subject to lending programs in the 80s and 90s after having emerged from civil conflict just recently before.

Nicaragua looks back at a violent past of a decade long kleptocracy by the Somoza family in the 1970s, followed by the guerilla dictatorship of the Sandinistas between 1979 and 1990. In first free public elections political and social change was introduced under the leadership of elected President Chamorro. The country entered a phase of reconciliation, reintegration and de-politicization of armed security forces. As part of the reform process decentralization and increased local accountability away from Nicaragua’s capital Managua were initiated. While the process was hampered by a lack of coordination among state actors and failure to bridge gaps between local and national interests, the international donor community entered the debate. Its considerable financial support effectively dominated the political dialogue and steered decisions towards its own interest.

In this situation the World Bank introduced an institutional reform program in 1995. It was designed to reform twenty ministries, reduce personnel costs and bureaucracy while increasing wages and technological advancement. In total US$ 33 million was invested. The reform was designed to run over five years, envisioning that each year five ministries would successfully reform their organizational structure, redesign its human resource sector and be fully equipped with new technology.

In the World Bank’s 2002 evaluation report, the results are rather moderate. Instead of twenty, only seven ministries underwent any parts of the reform. The other ministries decided to continue evolving on their own pace and agenda. Furthermore, the leadership and execution of the reform, which was supposed to be managed by a Nicaraguan government agency, was hampered by high fluctuation of personnel and unsatisfactory commitment. As a result, the evaluation report assesses the result of the reform as ‘likely’ sustainable. Given the minimal outcome and lack of compliance by Nicaragua’s government, this assessment is highly optimistic and far from reality.

The project had a relevant objective. However, in its entirety it appears to be detached from the political reality of Nicaragua at entry time as well as during its execution. It failed to acknowledge that Nicaragua was a country in transition with a lack of many democratic features; effectively leading to deterioration of people’s trust in democracy. The World Bank’s project contributed to the decrease in trust and lack of government effectiveness, through mistaking its own priorities with the country’s needs. Therefore, its millions spent failed to reach any of the project’s long-term goals.

A similar situation occurred in Guatemala, which was subject of a World Bank reform program some years before Nicaragua. Similar to Nicaragua, Guatemala suffered under a civil war up to the 1980s. In 1985 a new constitution was approved in order to secure peace and democracy. It took ten more years to put an end to the civil war, with yearlong peace talks between governing parties, UN representatives and foreign mediators. The peace treaty involved the establishment of a human rights accord, a demilitarization treaty and an accord on the rights of indigenous people as well as one on socio-economic advancement, centered on poverty alleviation.

Given the political developments, the World Bank’s involvement clearly shows the absurdity surrounding some ODA programs: In 1988 already it introduced a municipal development project that was designed to reform the municipality’s organizational structure, reorganize urban planning and thereby reduce urban poverty. Over the set out timeframe of ten years, the project constituted ten percent of all ODA received by the Guatemalan government.

From the outset, the reform was doomed to fail, as the initial loan disbursement was withheld: Guatemala’s creditworthiness could not be guaranteed. Later, in 1993 the loan disbursements were stopped entirely due to the lack of Guatemalan counterpart commitment. Furthermore, the government issued new laws that rendered the further implementation of the reform infeasible. As a result the main goals of the project were never achieved. Nonetheless, the results report describes the entire project as “satisfactory with likely sustainability”.

After 1995 the Guatemalan government implemented various reforms with similar aims as the ones stated in the World Bank reform program. However, they did so following their own agenda.

In the two cases presented the World Bank failed to acknowledge that the governments were not prepared to take the burden of intrusive structural reform and were incapable to implement it. As a result millions are lost with little measureable future effect. The political environment in both countries continues to be instable.

Where to steer in the future

Two contradictory directions for future involvement have been suggested: Firstly, donors argue that not enough money has been spent yet and once aid flows cross a certain threshold, their desired effects will be observed. In other words, more money is needed. Secondly, the development sector is becoming increasingly aware that its foreign involvement may have been more harmful than supportive, at least on a large scale.

The evidence so far clearly favors the second perspective. ODA has been more harmful than fruitful. ODA’s intrusive conditions force recipient governments to accurately follow IFI agendas, disregarding national political characteristics that might ask for different approaches to development. However, ODA must not be condemned it its entirety. If IFIs decide loosen their conditions and allow for more national ownership, the future of ODA could be bright. As the two case studies show, strictly prescribed ODA does not help. On the contrary, it may be misallocated and push for a development that is not supported within the recipient government. Seeing that the government of Guatemala did implement municipal reforms some years after the World Bank project, it is clear that the need for change is recognized locally, but it needs to follow its natural pace. ODA needs to become more flexible, allowing for recipient countries to choose who to collaborate with and which reforms to implement. Once the IFIs let go of their agendas, ODAs worst critics might be silenced and the road towards success could be revealed.

South Sudan: Global Succes Despite Local Failure

Posted by Balder Hageraats / 27th June 2014 / Categories: Opinion, Polis / Tags: Civil War, Development Cooperation, NGO, South Sudan / -

International cooperation is a permanent clash between broad, unspecified political goals and a system of narrow, actor-specific agendas using those broad goals to advance individual interests. This is true of transnational diplomacy, war, development cooperation, and any other such area. They all have in common that seemingly straightforward decision making hides the amalgamation of organisations, experts, schools of thought and political pressures that led to that decision in the first place, and that is responsible for subsequent execution. Such dichotomy often explains the failure of these broad goals, which tend to become hostage to specific interests. Not only does the mix of underlying agendas bias or even corrupt the formulation of general objectives, it also hampers implementation in subtle yet decisive ways. The broad agendas that do end up successful- such as the eradication of small pox in the 1970s, or the creation of the European Communities, guaranteeing long-term peace and stability on the continent- do so because they are consistent with the specific agendas, creating a natural path towards success of both. Such cases are rare. All too often, specific interests trump any general objective. One of the many recent examples has been the tragic case of independence and subsequent state building of South Sudan.

The independence of South Sudan was an event driven by international pressures. After the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, Western nations piled on to defend the right to self-determination of the predominantly Christian population. Not only was South Sudan on the African continent’s fault line between the Muslim, Arab controlled north and the Christian, pro-Western south, its creation was also a direct challenge to the virtually blacklisted al-Bashir government in Khartoum. Once the political door was opened to potential independence, UN agencies, NGOs, government representatives and the private sector joined the fray with an enthusiasm perhaps only surpassed by state building in Afghanistan. The broad goal was independence and freedom for the South Sudanese. The narrow goals in the background were those of the international state building and development sectors celebrating a new project to stay relevant and access public funds. The excitement among those licking their lips at the prospect of being involved at building a country from scratch was palpable. When the 2011 independence referendum came knocking, the outcome was a done deal. Years of Western money and political pressure had guaranteed success. The results, with 98.83% voting “yes”, may have been a percentage typically only seen in North Korea, but it did not matter to Western press or politicians: the people had spoken, freedom had prevailed.

Up to this point, broad objectives and narrow interests had coincided: many actors, both local as well as global, benefitted from independence. Local politicians saw the opportunity to seize power, whereas global politicians could claim once again to be arch angels of democracy and human rights. Local enterprise counted on an influx of foreign capital, global companies were hoping for large infrastructural and resource extraction contracts. Local civil society expected greater freedom to pursue their agendas, global NGOs were looking forward to an inpour of government funding and donor drives. And indeed, funds did come, accompanied by a bombardment of governmental development agencies and NGOs from all over the world. As a result, the process was generally considered a success by 2011, and with high expectations of a bright future. Political and funding goals had been met. Employment and budgets in both Juba’s governmental departments as well as those of the international NGO sector had increased dramatically, and UN and EU consultants were flying up and down at the cost of their usual, exorbitant daily fees.

Once independence had sunk in, however, broad and specific agendas started diverging. The general agenda of building a functional state had always been an incredibly long shot. Besides significant oil reserves, the South Sudanese economy mostly relies on unproductive agricultural activities. Basic infrastructure is among the worst in the world. The country’s weak political and social institutions are mostly driven by foreign support, rather than domestic expertise. The country is landlocked, heavily relying on its northern rival for its access to the rest of the world. Internal conflict, including long-simmering ethnic and economic tensions, were left unaddressed for much of the post-Naivasha period. In other words, for the Republic of South Sudan to ever become a success for its own population, a tremendous local and global effort would have been needed. Once the excitement surrounding the referendum had disappeared, global politics responsible for the broad objectives moved on to new focal points, leaving South Sudan in the hands of dispersed, decentralised and uncoordinated narrow interests. Funding levels and political support continued to be enough to maintain the Sudanese development industry that had been built up so eagerly, but were completely insufficient to reach a long-term, sustainable level of statehood and stability.

When in December 2013 civil war erupted, it should have come as a surprise to no one. The writing had been on the wall for a long time. Moreover, the responsibility of this failure lay firmly in the hands of the international community so eagerly pushing through an unsustainable agenda in the first place. In order to satisfy narrow agendas, they supported an unachievable broad goal. They- both the international private sector as well as the public sectors and the development industry- benefitted politically and financially, while doing so under the guise of human rights and welfare concerns. Now, they express disappointment at the failures and hardship suffered by the local population, but where are the mea culpas? Where are the statements from donors, NGOs and transnational institutions admitting that they got it wrong?

Last week, De Volkskrant published an article on how Dutch development aid to Sudan over the past ten years had been wasted. The Netherlands, one of South Sudan’s most important donors and advocates of independence, spent over half a billion Euros on local development and financial support. This was mostly steered towards social needs and humanitarian assistance, and very little was dedicated to more fundamental issues necessary to achieve the broad objectives of sustainability. The Dutch government turned its attention elsewhere after formulating the general aims, leaving policy making and funding decisions in the hands of narrow interests, i.e. those of specialised NGOs and experts. The broader vision was lost, and interested parties had free reign over directing the flow of the significant financial resources that had been made available. Any organisation defends the importance of their own field of expertise, regardless of the wider picture. When central coordination weakens, those with the best lobbies prevail.

One of the main lessons from the case of South Sudan is the importance of making sure that broad goals are consistent with specific interests. Moreover, global actors need to respond to local realities, and not attempt to set the agenda. If those criteria cannot be guaranteed, then the mission is doomed to fail. Complex human- self-interested- systems then take over, and start nibbling away at the foundations necessary to achieve the stated objectives. When De Volkskrant wrote that Dutch development aid has “gone up in smoke”, they only got it half right. It has gone up in smoke from a local perspective. In that sense the case of South Sudan has been a massive failure, with the Sudanese suffering the consequences. But large amounts of that €500 million ended up in the pockets of Dutch development experts and organisational overhead, to whom the operation was successful: it has provided employment and political relevance to such organisations worldwide. This divergence between broad and narrow interests has led to a conflict ridden country, in which the local population is paying the price for poor international decision making. Not to worry though, as Western nations will undoubtedly be sending their humanitarian experts and NGOs back to help the suffering locals once again in these times of need. After all, that is what friends are for.

Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Syria: Assessing the Role of INGOs

Posted by Isadora Loreto / 28th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: NGO, Peacebuilding, Polis, Syria / -

The Syrian situation

The major human rights violations in Syria have created a wave of concern within the community of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and particularly among those INGOs that work on issues relating to human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation. This article aims at underlining the importance for INGOs to take into account the “lessons learned” from past (post) conflict situations. Indeed, over the last two years, many INGOs have developed programmes on peace building and transitional justice in Syria, but today many questions arise regarding the effectiveness and efficiency thereof. Do the INGOs take into account the particular needs of the Syrian civil society? Is there any coordination between the stakeholders present on the field? Are they willing to support initiatives that already exist on the ground? And, last but not least, do they develop mechanisms to empower the civil society in Syria?

While some INGOS establish programmes within a well-developed strategy, others just follow the “trend” to develop programmes on peace building and transitional justice without a clear objective and/or strategy. Three years after the beginning of the conflict, it is time to look at the way INGO’s are involved in the Syrian situation regarding peace building and transitional justice.

Peacebuilding, transitional justice and INGO’s

Past and recent experiences have demonstrated the challenges of post-conflict transitions. Peace building and transitional justice were firmly developed in the 1990’s, following conflicts such as the ones in ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda or South Africa. Today, both peacebuilding and transitional justice are considered essential tools in post-conflicts situations.

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that encompasses programmes designed to consolidate sustainable peace, prevent disputes from escalating, and avoid a relapse into violent conflict. Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that are implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses.

INGOs are often, if not always, involved in these processes of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It is important to underline the core principles regarding peacebuilding and transitional justice that INGOs must take into account when operating in situations such as the one in Syria. INGO’s have often been criticised for the way they handle crisis situations, and those working in Syria and beyond should learn from criticisms the sector faced in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan.

Empowerment, coordination and long term strategy

INGOs have a role to play in conflicts situations: their expertise in reconciliation, peace building and transitional justice can be meaningful to civil society. However, they cannot work in isolation. Instead, they need to work together and be interdependent with local actors. If INGOs can, and must, take initiatives the development of joint programmes based on grass root initiatives needs to be the preferred approach since it has already shown successes in various countries such as Libya and Tunisia.

If possible, peacebuilding and transitional justice priorities must be determined locally. On the one hand, local actors usually have a better knowledge of the situation and, on the other, it is more likely that peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives will succeed if citizens and groups are involved in defining the problems and articulating the solutions. This local based approach leads to empowering the civil society. If local initiatives are the basis of programmes developed by INGO’s, it become more natural for internal actors to be the drivers, or owners, of their own national peacebuilding frameworks and transitional justice mechanisms. Developing the capacity of, and giving ownership to, the local government and civil society should thus be the main methodology of all INGO programmes.

Furthermore, the need for enhanced coordination between external actors (such as donor governments, United Nations Country Teams, INGOs) on the one hand- and internal actors (such as governments, local administrations and civil society) on the other, is essential. Without enhanced and deepened levels of coordination, peacebuilding and transitional activities will overlap, duplicate, and potentially have limited impact on the conflict systems they try to stop.

Over the last few years, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of peace building, the international community has understood that there was a need for guidelines and particularly regarding coordination of all stakeholders. In 2005, the Peacebuilding commission was established by resolution 60/180 of the United Nations Security Council, and resolution 1645 of the United Nations General Assembly. The Peacebuilding Commission is an inter-governmental advisory body that helps countries in peace building, recovery, reconstruction and development. It has defined a “peacebuilding architecture”, composed of roadmaps on action that should be taken in order to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding. The Commission insisted on the necessity of a local based approach.

Finally, in order to have a real impact on the situation, it is necessary not only to involve local actors and to have a good coordination between all actors but also to develop long term programmes of actions with them. Indeed, it is essential to share knowledge and expertise between local and international actors but this must be done within a framework which allows long-term benefits for local civil society.

In Syria, it seems that while some INGOs understand the necessity of working with local actors, others have forgotten the overall goal of developing programmes on peace building and transitional justice. INGOs working there should keep in mind that their aim is to strengthen Syrian civil society capacities and outcomes, and not their own.

This article is part of the Polis Project, a ReSeT programme focused on connecting local needs to global resources.

Money for Nothing: What the Development Sector Could Learn from Cash-Transfer Programmes

Posted by Thomas Kruiper / 20th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Charity, Development Cooperation, Polis / -

Earlier this year Balder Hageraats published an article titled “International Development: Please drop the Charity Act”, criticizing the schizophrenic relationship between donors, NGO´s, and local beneficiaries of development help, and arguing for a more efficient development sector in which needs on the ground take centre-stage. If the sector were to follow such an approach, it could learn a lot from the global South, where various government programmes transfer money directly to the poor, no strings attached. They have led the way in showing that poor individuals already KNOW how to escape poverty: they simply lack the cash.

In Kenya, Having worked as a day labourer for years on end, mr. Omondi one day woke up to receive an sms-text saying he had been given $500 US, no strings attached! He had been one of the recipients selected in a programme where poor families in poor rural villages were given free cash-transfers to help them out of poverty. No conditions, no pay-backs, just free money. Local villagers suspected that the government was somehow behind it, trying to buy votes. People in the development industry were mostly afraid that recipients wouldn’t be able to handle the money wisely, spending it on alcohol and cigarettes. However, none of this happened. Many people in the programme used the money to replace their thatched roofs with metal roofs, which costs a few hundred dollars, but saves money in the long term. The results? People also invested in livestock and small businesses, showing a 48% increase in revenues from animal husbandry, for example. Mr. Omondi bought a motor-cycle to drive people from town to town, making $6 to $9 a day, more than doubling his daily salary, and enabling him to buy a second bike to expand his business.

Most cash-transfers programmes are not one-time lottery tickets however. More and more developing countries, most notably Brazil, Mexico, South-Africa, but also Indonesia, Namibia, Bolivia, Armenia and many others, are setting up long-term programmes that target a substantial but selected portion of the population and gives them a monthly cash transfer between 3$ and 100$ a month. Cash-transfer programmes differ greatly from each other, but are similar in the sense that (1) they benefit a selected group of poor families, (2) that the transfers are monthly and on a long-term basis, and (3) that there are no or few conditions as to how the money is spent. The basic results: It pushes the poorest families out of absolute poverty; it leads to more capital investments, local economic growth, better health, more children going to school, and lower birth rates; all without outside interference. For example, children that benefit from the Oportunidades programme in Mexico (which gives an average of 38$ a month to poor households) are 23% more likely to finish grade 9 than those outside of the programme. The same programme also meant that people eat 8% more calories and a more balanced diet of fruit, vegetables, and meat, leading to fewer illnesses among children and fewer sick-days for adults. In Brazil, the Bolsa Familia (family grant) and Bolsa Escola (school grant) programmes helped in bringing down poverty from 28% in 2001 to 17% in 2008.

Why cash-transfer programmes make sense and are affordable

Just as in developed western societies, various countries in the global South have recognized that everyone in society deserves a minimum amount of economic security. The cash-transfers are a right, not charity. Obviously, the transfers are only for selected groups of people in need, and they don´t serve as a substitute for salary through labour. Depending on the country and the programme, the transfers vary between USD $3 and USD $100 per month per individual or per family.

There are two important counter arguments to the idea behind cash-transfers in developing countries. One, can states afford such kinds of projects? And two, doesn´t handing out free money kill initiative and entrepreneurship, making people lazy and dependent? The answer is that pessimistic expectations with regard to the latter lead people to over-estimate the importance of the former. In other words; cash-transfers lead to local economic growth in the longer term, helping people out of the poverty trap and making the cash-transfer programmes not just relatively cheap, but actually profitable.

Let´s start with the argument that “charity” takes away initiative and entrepreneurship, a theory that micro-credit guru Muhammad Yunus has been fond of pointing out. Cash-transfer programmes in Mexico, South Africa, and Brazil have however shown that the money transferred to poor families is almost never spoilt. Admittedly, the money is not always invested, but rather spent on keeping children in school, or buying more nutritious food. This might not harvest direct financial profits, but certainly helps in long term development; Children in the Mexican Oportunidades programme, for example, are more likely to finish 9th grade, are healthier, and score higher grades. But cash-transfer programmes, just like micro-credits, can also have a multiplier effect for local businesses, because the extra cash allows people to invest in tools or skills and setting up a small enterprise. Poor people tend to invest and consume locally, creating a double benefit for the local economy. Also, cash-transfers don´t necessarily replace micro-credits. As a matter of fact, they can serve to make micro-credits safer and more attractive. Indeed, studies have shown that beneficiaries of cash-transfer programmes are more receptive to taking financial risks.

The fact that cash-transfer programmes are cost-effective in the long term takes away a big obstacle for governments as to who is going to pay. There are however other comprehensible concerns. Firstly, cash-transfer programmes are not a silver bullet to solving poverty; they can help people out of absolute poverty and intergenerational poverty, and they contribute to strengthening local economies and promoting social mobility, but only few make it to middle class. Also, the bigger the amount of cash per family, the less families you can select, and vice versa. In order to be able to afford a substantial programme, a government needs a solid tax-base or windfalls from resource-exports.

Why the development sector should jump on the bandwagon

But the money could also come directly from the international development sector. If governments in the global South can demonstrate that there is no need for paternalistic nudges, conditionality, or moral guidance, why couldn´t the development sector follow suit? There are many reasons to suggest that it should.

Firstly, cash-transfer programmes simply have a pretty convincing track-record when it comes to helping people out of poverty. In other words, it simply works. Cash-transfers are right-based rather than charity based, they are pragmatic in the sense that by nature they empower beneficiaries, and they are cheaper because each invested dollar has the potential of turning into two dollars. Many countries that currently benefit from ´traditional´ forms of cooperation could hugely benefit from switching to a more direct approach.

The development sector could jump on the bandwagon in two ways. The simplest way is by pitching in directly where governments lack public money to pay for cash-transfer programmes. But the development sector has an at least equally important role to play when it comes to actively stimulating development through the provision training, research, expertise and other services. ONLY giving money helps people in climbing out of the poverty trap, but they do still need a hand to pull themselves up. The development sector has all the necessary qualities to be this hand stretching out. Sadly, the hand that the development sector is currently stretching out is that of NGOs stretching their hands upwards to donors.

If the development sector were to learn from the logic behind cash-transfer programmes, they would fund locally identified needs directly. Donors could allow funds to flow more easily and directly to local communities (through local connectors), empowering those on the ground and connecting local needs to global resources.

This article is part of the Polis Project, a ReSeT programme focused on connecting local needs to global resources.

Environmental Disconnect Between Global and Local Actors: The Case of REDD+ and Embobut Forest

Posted by Ivanka Puigdueta Bartolomé / 14th May 2014 / Categories: Analysis, Polis / Tags: Climate Change, Environment, Kenya, Polis, REDD / -

The global environmental initiative for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is unrealistic in its ambitions and image: various actors, including local populations, are divided on how this mechanism impacts their livelihoods and its utility towards global climate challenges. A case in point is the situation in Kenya. In that country, there are two clearly opposite perspectives with respect to the REDD+ project at Embobut Forest, and there is major disagreement with respect to dangers and opportunities. In order for REDD+ and similar initiatives to be truly effective, global institutions, governments and local populations must attain an agreement on the way in which they are implemented. Without active local support and stakeholdership, such mechanisms are doomed to fail.

REDD+ is a mitigation mechanism still being designed, and one that forms part of international climate change dialogue. Its principal aim is to reduce climate change by protecting global forests- the main planet’s CO2 stores and sinks- from deforestation and degradation. With 25% of total CO2 absorption occurring through forests, and around 15% of carbon dioxide emissions coming from changes in land use, there is widespread consensus that that global rainforests should be protected as a path towards climate change reduction. By maintaining absorption rates and reducing an important source of CO2, global emissions will increase more slowly, which will significantly contribute to anti-climate change efforts. As a form of encouragement, countries with rainforests that reduce their emission levels (coming from these forests) relative to a calculated reference, will receive financial compensation. As countries having rainforests within their borders tend to be impoverished countries, this mechanism is also seen as an opportunity towards poverty alleviation. With these goals in mind, the driving forces for REDD+ mechanisms are the introduction of governance reforms and institutional support, a monitoring system and the design of safeguard frameworks for possibly damaged injured sectors.

Lack of understanding

Many REDD+ initiatives all over the world face strong disagreements. One such case is Kenya’s Embobut Forest. The project was designed by the Kenyan government and World Bank, and has led to a series of displacements of Sengwer People, the indigenous people occupying the area and who have traditional land rights. These displacements are seen as illegitimate evictions by this indigenous group and their supporters, and as a necessary and well-justified step in the path for conservation and global climate initiatives by the Kenyan government. Another prominent line of confrontation is the usefulness of REDD+ as an actual way to protect forests and fight climate change. Kenya’s government has been accused of using indigenous forest lands for agricultural and profit-making purposes, which would of course be in contradiction with the REDD+ purpose and official public stance.

The principal reason behind deforestation in Kenya is forest conversion into agriculture. Forest degradation also occurs through unsustainable utilization, illegal logging, uncontrolled grazing and charcoal production. Thus, Kenya’s government identified the REDD+ project as a useful mechanism to protect Embobut Forest. This programme includes the identification of grazing systems and the implementation of a methodology for monitoring community engagement in forest management. Within this last strategy, a series of workshops were organized for local communities to educate them on carbon financing from a government perspective. In addition to improving forest protection, these actions are presented as a way to transmit management responsibilities to local communities, which would empower them and improve their livelihoods by “increasing the benefits of forests”. REDD+ mechanisms would therefore strengthen the fight against climate change through better governance of forestry lands.

The Kenyan government and other promoters of REDD+ mechanisms signal poverty and population growth as two of the main threats to national forests. With population growth and lack of access to biomass energy substitutes, there exists major friction in rural zones. Poverty makes people more dependent on natural resources, as they turn to them in order to cover their basic needs and extract economic income. This leads to more pressure on Kenyan forests. In addition, Embobut’s forest population has increased as a result of landslides and people fleeing cities after Kenya’s 2007-2008 electoral disturbances. These Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), just like the Sengwer, are seen as squatters, and a series of evictions were carried out to safeguard urban water supplies and to protect the forest.

In opposition to REDD+ projects, indigenous people and various national and international NGOs claim that this project is serving to illegally eject traditional occupants from their lands in the name of a fake climate change fight and with the real aim of financial profit. A major complaint is the government’s support in the eviction of the Sengwer, signaling cases of individuals being targeted and persecuted, as well as the burning down of their houses. From March 2013 until January 2014, Eldoret High Court emitted various rulings forbidding and condemning these actions. On the other hand, REDD+ opponents claim that Embobut project will actually promote deforestation. They accuse the Kenya Forest Service of having transformed indigenous forest into profit-making plantations and agriculture lands in the past, something which they fear will be repeated in Sengwer lands under the guise of REDD+ projects. They argue that the way in which REDD+ is being implemented does not only fail to contribute to the fight against climate change, it also leads to social injustices.

Addressing confrontation

Why indigenous people and some NGOs and ecologist groups in Kenya position themselves against REDD+ mechanism might be a mystery to its supporters, as they are meant to be the first beneficiaries or partisan of climate change and poverty fighting efforts. Clearer and more focused dialogue is needed to clarify different concerns and perspectives and find common ground. Agreeing that mechanisms have to be implemented to fight both poverty and climate change, stakeholders must first determine if such dynamics are really properly designed towards achieving the desired results.

One confrontation line- and thus need for dialogue- is the management of forestry resources and the potential displacement of people. While indigenous groups allege being unlawfully evicted, and governments and intergovernmental institutions arguing that this is necessary to attain better governance, poverty threatens affected areas. Nonetheless, government institutions also claim that REDD+ mechanisms will lead to communal management and livelihood improvements. It is crucial to clarify how the eviction of indigenous populations will serve to empower local communities and strengthen their position in forests management. And although energy generation and consumption is rather inefficient among the poorer sectors of affected populations, the lack of industrial behaviour and the small scale of such activities are insignificant to other sources of CO2 emissions, certainly when compared in absolute terms. Moreover, in order for the solutions to environmental problems to be supported by crucially important local actors, they should avoid social upheaval and disproportionate sacrifice. Truly effective measures require traditional occupants to remain actively involved and not be forced to leave their lands.

The utility of Embobut REDD+ project to environmental objectives also require further analysis. The problems witnessed in Kenya have also been signaled in other parts of the globe in which REDD+ projects are being developed. Kenya’s government and international agencies empathetically deny this accusation of generalized problems, but at the very least a clearer framework must be designed and monitoring mechanisms must be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary destruction in Embobut Forest and elsewhere.

The search for understanding

What is clear is that there is no unanimous support for REDD+. While large institutions and a vast majority of governments present it as a promising way to fight climate change and poverty in Kenya, wide sectors of civil society stand up against it and claim that it will have disastrous consequences in people’s lives and their environment. Evictions of indigenous groups undermine the fight against climate change, and better solutions must be found to IDI’s situation. Clearer forest management plans are required to guarantee consistency both with REDD+ overall objectives as well as with those of local stakeholders.

Climate change and poverty alleviation are two of the most important challenges facing the global community, and it is a point of serious concern why positions between people directly affected by these challenges and the mechanisms designed to face them seem so far apart. For REDD+ to work, governments and international institutions have to translate global ambitions into effective local application, and this requires much greater dialogue with local populations. Without this, indigenous peoples and other local communities will stand at the edge of these dynamics, eventually suffering the negative consequences as well as undermining the objectives of the project. It is still to be seen whether REDD+ can eventually become a useful mechanism towards climate change mitigation and poverty alleviation, as Kenya’s government and international institutions claim. Only the future will tell. Then again, when dealing with climate change, the future is not an option.

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